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Abstract                                                                                                           
 
This dissertation investigates how alarm management practices can be implemented at 
a large industrial facility, and what effect this could have on alarm system 
performance.  Poor performing alarm systems create an environment where alarms of 
high importance can be missed or operators are desensitised to the alarm system.  
Alarm system performance has been a factor in several high consequence industrial 
accidents. 
The project was conducted at a large coal fired power plant which uses modern 
Process Control and Human Machine Interface systems.  The project site has never 
employed any alarm management practices in the past and is seeking to implement 
alarm management practices based on ISA-18.2-2009 Management of Alarm Systems 
for the Process Industries. 
The requirements of industry best practice alarm management were researched and 
identified.  Alarm management processes were created and adopted by the project 
site.  New software tools were developed to support the alarm management 
processes. 
The alarm system performance at the project site was measured using these software 
tools.   The worst performing alarms over a six month period were identified.  By 
investigating the causes of the worst performing alarms improvements were identified 
that could reduce the alarm rate by 40%. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction                                                                          
 
1.1. The Worst Case Scenario 
“He was blasted into the air, struck a solid object with his head and hit the ground with 
liquid, dirt and stones pelting him at high velocity.  He felt as if he were being shot at 
by a machine gun.  Wherever he crawled he continued to get pelted.  He smelt nothing 
because he was holding his breath.  Eventually he saw a glimmer of light and crawled 
in that direction.  He must have come out from behind something that was sheltering 
him, because he was rolled over and again exposed to the blast. He had his eyes 
closed.  He crawled into the clear and noticed two other blackened persons crawling 
towards the control room.  Blood was flowing from an injured eye.  He glanced over his 
shoulder and saw white vapour everywhere.  GP905 had been skewed at an angle and 
there was still a loud roar of vapour and liquid” (Longford Royal Commission, 1999). 
 
 
Figure 1 – Photo of explosion at the Longford facility (Longford Royal Commission, 1999) 
 
This is the moment a plant disturbance turned into an industrial accident at the 
Longford gas plant in Victoria, Australia in 1998.  This is the extreme case of what can 
go wrong.  Perrow describes normal accidents as “rare but inevitable in interactively 
complex, tightly coupled systems.  Some complex systems with catastrophic potential 
are just too dangerous to exist, not because we do not want to make them safe, but 
because, as so much experience has shown, we simply cannot” (Perrow, 2011).   
This appeared to be case for the nuclear power industry as a result of the Fukushima 
nuclear incident in 2011 on which Perrow bases his paper.  A year after the disaster all 
but two of Japan’s nuclear reactors had been shut down due to fears of nuclear power.  
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In 2015 there are now 24 reactors in the process of seeking approval to restart (World 
Nuclear Association, 2015).   
The nature of industrial processes means that there are hazards to be controlled.  The 
nuclear power industry has radiation and heat, which if not controlled can melt 
reactors and contaminate the environment with radioactive material.   The 
hydrocarbon industry processes highly flammable materials which can explode if not 
contained.  Pesticide manufacturing involves handing poisonous chemicals.  Accidents 
occur when control of hazards is lost.  The results can be catastrophic. 
1.2. Automation and Control in the Process Industry 
The process industry is concerned with the transformation of raw products into more 
complex products.  This is achieved by the transfer of mass or energy or the reaction of 
chemicals to combine or separate raw products.  Industrial processes usually consist of 
a complex arrangement of tanks, vessels, and other fixed equipment such as mixers, 
heat exchangers and furnaces.  Materials are moved throughout the process with 
machinery such as pumps, valves, compressors and material conveying systems.  
Examples of industrial processes are oil and petroleum refining, natural gas processing, 
fertiliser and pesticide manufacturing, chemical manufacturing and in the case of the 
project site, large scale power generation. 
Industrial processes are controlled using automation and control technologies.  
Sensors measure process conditions and send signals to a control system.  The control 
system determines what actions to take to regulate the process and sends signals to 
control elements.  Control systems have evolved from mechanical systems to 
microprocessor based computer systems such as a Distributed Control Systems (DCS) 
or Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC’s). 
 
 
Figure 2 – Early (left) and modern (right) central control room 
 
Personnel who supervise and control industrial processes are call operators.  Most 
often they work from centralised control rooms. Operators interact with the process 
using a Human Machine Interface (HMI).  Figure 2 shows and early control room to the 
left and modern control room to the right.  The early control room comprises of panels 
with gauges, dials, lights and buttons, each in a fixed position on the panel.  The 
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modern control room features multiple computers systems with a graphical user 
interface.  This control room also has a large display monitor giving and overview of 
the whole process.  
Automation and control is designed to keep a process conditions on target or within 
normal operating conditions.  Upsets or abnormal situations can arise where the 
process exceeds normal operating conditions.  This can result in a loss of product 
quality, an interruption to production, or worse, the loss of assets or human lives due 
to catastrophic failures.   
When the automation cannot keep the processes at the target or in normal operating 
conditions operators are alerted to the abnormal situation by alarms.  This alerts the 
operator of the abnormal situation such that they can take action to return the process 
to normal conditions.  If the exceedance continues automated supervisory actions may 
intervene and shut down the process.  Figure 3 shows the relationship between the 
control system, the operator and the process conditions. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Relationship between Control System, Operator and the Process (EEMUA, 2007)  
 
1.3. The Alarm Problem 
Early alarm systems comprised of panels that had individual indicators for each alarm.  
The number of alarms was limited to the physical space available to install the 
indicators and the cost to construct it.  There may have been only one to two hundred 
different alarms in a control room.  The advent of modern computer based HMI 
systems meant the cost and effort of adding new alarms reduced significantly.  All that 
was required was some simple software configuration and a new alarm could be 
implemented.  As the cost and effort was low there was a tendency to add alarms ‘just 
in case’ or for ‘information only’.  It was thought that adding an alarm made the plant 
safer.  Modern industrial facilities now may have many thousands of configured 
alarms.  Figure 4 shows the growth of configured alarms at industrial facilities. 
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Figure 4 – Growth of Alarms (Hollifield & Habibi, 2001) 
 
All of the configured alarms do not create a problem on their own.  The problem 
occurs when alarms activate.  Each alarm requires the operator to identify the cause, 
decide what action to take, then take the action and monitor the process response.  
This takes time, which means there is a finite number of alarms an operator can 
effectively manage over period of time.  This is where the problem begins – operators 
receiving more alarms that they can effectively manage. 
For large industrial facility there are usually many different contractors and vendors 
that supply and construct the subsystems that make up the total plant.  Each of the 
contractors and vendors are responsible for identifying the alarm requirements for 
their subsystem.  There is usually no common approach across all of the contractors 
and vendors and the plant owner or end user also has limited involvement.  Many 
alarms are added for information only while others are added as it thought to be safer 
and more conservative to add an alarm.  
Once the facility is begins commercial operation the alarm system is normally not 
maintained to any performance standard.  Alarms are usually added as a result of 
learnings of incidents that occur at the facility site over time.  Learning from past 
events is a sound practice but there is often no consistent methodology employed to 
implement new alarms. 
Operators begin to mask alarms mentally – they learn that specific alarms have in the 
past not lead to undesirable consequences so they may be ignored.  They also learn 
some of the key alarms to look out for – these are alarms that occur regularly and have 
led to undesirable consequences in past if ignored. 
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From time to time some alarms activate and de-activate at high rates, taking over the 
alarm system.  This can go on for hours and some time event days.  This is tolerated as 
by now the alarm system is not seen as an overly useful tool anyway.    
This is most common scenario for an alarm system that pre-dates industry best 
practice.  In Australia some industry sectors apply industry best practice alarm 
management, while some specific organisations have also embraced it.  For some 
facilities a lack of good alarm management practices still continues to a problem. 
The solution to the alarm problem is not singular.  What is required is an array of 
technical solutions and pragmatic work practices – something that is right at home to a 
professional engineer. 
1.4. Project Summary 
The aim of this project was to develop and implement systems and tools such that 
project site could sustain industry best practice alarm management practices.  The 
project was conducted at one of Western Australia’s largest coal fired power plants.  
For commercial reasons the project site has requested to remain unnamed.  Also note 
that the author is not currently employed by, or part of any commercial relationship 
with the project site.  
The project site uses modern automation technologies and HMI systems similar to 
those described in current industry best practice alarm management guidelines and 
standards.  The project site has never employed any alarm management practices.  It is 
known that the alarm performance at the site exceeds current industry best practice 
metrics, thought the full extend was unknown.    
Unbeknown to the author at the time of negotiating the nature and scope of the 
project the project site received a corporate engineering directive stating they are to 
implement an alarm management practices based on ISA-18.2-2009.  The project site 
is relying on this project to initiate its compliance with the engineering directive. 
Background information on modern control systems is firstly presented.  The research 
aspects of the project included past industrial accidents that have elements of alarm 
management in their causes, the development of alarm management guides and 
standards and current industry best practice for alarm management.   
Based on the research of current industry best practice for alarm management an 
alarm management procedure was created for the project site – the ‘Alarm 
Philosophy’.  Some of the requirements of the Alarm Philosophy could not be met by 
the functional capabilities of project site’s control system infrastructure – a ‘Master 
Alarm Database’ and ‘Alarm Reporting Tool’.  Software engineering techniques were 
used to develop these functional capabilities. 
The worst performing alarms for the first six months of the year were identified.  Case 
Studies were performed using a systems integration engineering approach.  The 
predicted improvement to the alarm performance based on the results of the case 
studies is presented. 
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1.5. Abbreviations 
 
ANSI  American National Standards Institute 
ASCII  American Standard Code for Information Interchange 
ASM   Abnormal Situation Management (as in ASM Consortium) 
DCS  Distributive Control System 
EEMUA the Engineering Equipment and Material User Association 
HMI  Human Machine Interface.  A computer system were  
HSE UK Health and Safety Executive of the United Kingdom 
IEC  International Electrotechnical Commission 
ISA  International Society of Automation 
SQL  Structured Query Language 
TCP/IP  Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol 
UTC  Coordinated Universal Time 
VBA  Visual Basic for Applications 
 
 
  
Implementing Industry Best Practice Alarm Management – Modern Process Control Equipment 
 
Author: Daniel Snelgar                                                                                                                  Page 7 
 
Chapter 2 – Modern Process Control Equipment                                                      
 
A control system is “a system that responds to input signals from the equipment under 
control and/or from and operator and generates output signals that cause the 
equipment under control to operate in the desired manner” (ISA, 2009).   
The modern control system is an industrial computer system.  It comprises of both 
hardware and software to perform automation and control.  The control system also 
provides an interface for operators to monitor and intervene when required.  An 
operator’s role can vary depending on the size of the plant and the complexity of the 
automation implemented in the control system.  The level of automation can be 
simple where operators have to determine when to control individual pieces of 
equipment, or it may be complex and all-encompassing where an operator’s main role 
is monitoring and supervision of the process. 
The project site uses a DCS as its control system.  The following provides a simplified 
description of how automation and control is implemented in a modern DCS system.  
In most cases the description is applicable to most DCS’s though some of the specific 
features and terminology of the project site’s DCS are used. 
2.1. Field Equipment 
Field equipment can be generally classed as measurements or drives.  Measurements 
and drives interface to the control system using an Input / Output (I/O) interface.  This 
is where there is a physical connection to the control system using wires.  This enables 
electrical and electronic signals to be exchanged between the control system and the 
field equipment.  The equipment must be chosen and configured correctly to ensure 
that the signals are compatible with the I/O interface.  Wireless technology is also 
beginning to find its way into industrial automation and control. 
2.1.1. Measurements 
Measurements devices read the value of process variables.  Process variables can 
include the temperature or flow rate of gasses, fluids or materials; the pressure, level 
or mass of a fluid or material in a tank or vessel; the chemical properties of a liquid 
such as pH or conductivity; the concentration of a particular component molecule in a 
gas.  Process variables can also include the physical position or status of equipment or 
machinery such as a valve open, a pump running or an actuator arm extended.  
Measurement devices are considered to be either ‘analog’ or ‘digital’.  These terms are 
legacy in nature and do reflect the way the signals are processed – being a computer 
system all signals are digitised.  The term ‘analog’ refers to values that are continuous.  
They may take on any value within the resolution of an analogue to digital conversion 
or the floating point representation of the process variable.  The term ‘digital’ refers to 
values that are discrete.  It has a set of particular values which normally reflect a state 
such as On or Off, Open or Closed.   
‘Analog’ measurement devices are often called transmitters.  A single transmitter is 
designed to read one specific type of process variable and transmit this value to the 
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control system in real time.  Most transmitters use a sensing element that changes its 
physical properties or reacts in a known way when exposed to the process.  The 
transmitter then uses electronics, which may also be microprocessor based, to 
measure the response.  An example is a pressure transmitter where the pressure in the 
process exerts force on a measuring cell.  The force on the measuring cell causes 
capacitance of the measuring cell to change.  The electronics in the transmitter 
measure the change in capacitance and convert this to a value that is in pressure units. 
The transmission of the process variable from the transmitter to the control system is 
normally via an analogue electrical current or voltage signal over wires.  The I/O 
interface performs an analogue to digital conversion of the electrical signal, upon 
which the process variable is available for use by control algorithms in the control 
system.  More modern transmitters may also use a serial communications interface to 
transmit process variables to the control system as a floating point numbers. 
‘Digital’ measurement devices are essentially switches.  They may be used to measure 
the physical position of piece of equipment, the status of a machine or other plant 
subsystem, or the position of an operator push button or selector switch.  They may 
also be used determine if a process variable in within a predetermined limit.  Such an 
example is a pressure switch.  Pressure in the process acts on a diaphragm within the 
switch.  When the pressure in the process reaches a pre-determined value deflection 
of the diaphragm operates a mechanical switch.  It is now not uncommon for modern 
process switches to use similar technology as a transmitter.  Instead of transmitting a 
continuous value the electronics operates a switch when the process value goes 
beyond a pre-determined limit. 
A ‘digital’ measurement device is wired in an electrical circuit with the I/O interface.  
By supplying voltage to the switch and measuring electrical current the I/O interface 
can determine if the switch is open or closed.  When the switch is open no current will 
flow through the circuit.  When the switch is closed current will flow through the 
circuit.  The I/O interface assigns a binary value of ‘0’ to an open switch and a binary 
value of ‘1’ to a closed switch.  Within the control system the user is able to assign 
meaningful text to state of the binary value.  In the case of the pressure measurement 
a binary value of ‘1’ can be assigned the state of pressure HIGH and binary value of ‘0’ 
can be assigned to the state of pressure NOT HIGH. 
Figure 5 shows some typical measurement devices.  In the fore ground the two blue 
devices are pressure transmitters.  The process connection is via a small pipe to the 
main process pipe.  The measuring cell is at the base of the transmitter.   To the right 
of the pressure transmitters the white devices are temperature transmitters.  A 
temperature probe extends into the main process pipe. 
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Figure 5 – Typical measurement devices 
 
2.1.2. Drives 
Drives are the final control elements in the process cause the equipment under control 
to operate in the desired manner.  Drives include motor driven equipment such as 
pumps and conveyors which move materials through the process; valves and dampers 
which control the flow of materials; electrical switches which control high voltage or 
high current devices; or audible and visual indicators.  Like measurement devices, 
drives can be considered to be either ‘analog’ or ‘digital’. 
‘Digital’ drives are drives that have discrete states.  For example, a motor may be 
running or stopped.  A valve may be open or closed.  A ‘digital’ drive can operated 
manually by an operator or automatically as part of a simple on-off feedback control 
algorithm or a complex sequence that controls many final elements.   
The control system’s I/O interface issues commands to the drive by operating ‘digital’ 
outputs.  The ‘digital’ output is normally an electromagnetic relay or a solid state 
electronic switch.  The closing of the switch sends electrical current to the drive.  The 
amount of current the I/O interface can deliver is relatively small.  It does not have 
enough power to directly control a ‘digital’ drive.  Pilot devices control other energy 
sources which operate the drive.  For a motor drive the pilot device is an 
electromagnetic relay which in turn activates a larger electromagnetic relay that 
controls the flow of electric power to the motor.  For a valve the pilot device is an 
electromagnetic operated solenoid valve.  When the solenoid valve is activated it 
routes compressed air to a pneumatic actuator, which in turn provides mechanical 
energy to drive a valve to the required position. 
It is normal practice to monitor the status of a drive as a measurement in the control 
system.  For a motor an auxiliary switch on the main electromagnetic relay is used to 
determine if it is running.  For a valve a position switches connected to the shaft of the 
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valve can be used to determine its position.  The control system can use the status 
measurements to detect discrepancies between the commanded stated and the actual 
state.  Discrepancies occur if a device fails to move when commanded, or if there is a 
malfunction in the drive that causes an unexpected change from the commanded 
state. 
 
 
Figure 6 – Typical 'digital’ drives 
 
Figure 6 shows some typical ‘digital’ drives.  On the left is a pneumatic operated on-off 
valve.  The red object is the pneumatic actuator which provides motive force to turn 
the valve shaft through 90 degrees, which in turn opens and closes the valve.  Note 
that this valve in encased in thermal insulation directly below the actuator and cannot 
be seen.  The solenoid valve which controls the supply of pneumatic air is mounted in 
front of the actuator.  Mounted on top of the actuator is a box that contains switches 
to detect when the valve is in the closed or open position.  On the right is a motor 
driven pump.  The supply of electrical power to the motor is from a centralised 
switchboard where the electromagnetic relays can switch electrical power to the 
motor. 
 ‘Analog’ drives are special drives that can operate over a continuous range of 
positions.  They are normally used in regulatory control.  ‘Analog’ drives require 
specific hardware to operate and cannot easily be adapted from ‘digital’ drives.  To 
control the speed of a motor specially designed power electronics are required to 
adjust the frequency of the motor supply voltage.  For a valve special positioning 
hardware is required.  It uses the valve shaft travel position to adjust the amount of 
compressed air pressure in the valve’s pneumatic actuator, and hence its position. 
Figure 7 shows typical ‘analog’ drives.  On left is a control valve.  The mechanical 
components that regulate the flow of material are inside the valve body which is 
directly in line with the pipework.  Above the valve body is the positioning hardware 
and the pneumatic actuator is at the top.  On the right is an air duct with a louver 
damper inside.  This uses a pneumatic ram and levers to provide the turning force to 
position the louvers.  The black box with three gauges the positioning hardware.  
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Figure 7 – Typical 'analog' drives 
 
2.2. DCS Infrastructure 
The DCS is an industrial computer system.  The user develops application software to 
perform the automation and control to suit the process.  The software is loaded into 
DCS controllers where it controls the process in real time. 
2.2.1. DCS Controller Hardware 
Control systems must provide high availability and reliability.  Hardware failures or 
system crashes may result in lost production and can be very costly for plant owners.  
The firmware within the controllers is designed to operate in very controlled manner 
where resourcing of CPU and memory is tightly controlled.  This ensures continuous 
operation over many years without system crashes.  The construction of the DCS 
hardware is usually more robust than that of consumer electronics.  The DCS hardware 
is designed to last for well over a decade.  
Failures do occur so here are several methods employed to ensure availability.  One 
method is the use of a dual redundant controller.  This is where a secondary controller 
is loaded with the same application software as the primary controller.  If the primary 
controller fails the secondary controller immediately takes over control.  The failed 
controller can then be replaced while the secondary controller is active.  The method 
employed at the project site is to distribute the control software in many (100’s) small 
controllers.  The failure of a single controller only represents a very small portion of 
the plant and it is likely that the failure will not result in a loss of production. 
Control systems are designed to be scalable.  This makes them suitable for use in small 
process plants and very large plants.  The number of I/O signals can range from 
hundreds to tens of thousands.  Apart from processing power and memory one if the 
limiting factors of a controller is the number of I/O signals that it can handle.  In a 
medium sized plant is likely that more than one controller will be required for all of the 
automation and control tasks.  This requires an effective inter-controller 
communications system.  The inter-controller communications must also provide high 
availability and reliability to avoid costly down time in the case of a hardware failure. 
Implementing Industry Best Practice Alarm Management – Modern Process Control Equipment 
 
Author: Daniel Snelgar                                                                                                                  Page 12 
 
Control system vendors originally developed their own serial communications network 
hardware and protocols.  The networks are normally arranged in redundant pairs.  This 
ensures that the network is always available in the case of a network failure. 
Modern control systems are now employing Ethernet TCP/IP communications 
networks for inter-controller communications.  The traffic on these networks is still 
tightly controlled and not mixed with general day to day business networks.  Although 
Ethernet TCP/IP is not deterministic, by managing traffic and bandwidth it has proven 
to be suitable for process control and automation.  The Ethernet TCP/IP networks are 
still arranged in redundant pairs to ensure that the network is always available in the 
case of a hardware failure. 
Many control system vendors are now also using common communications protocols 
on Ethernet TCP/IP communications networks.  Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) 
was developed by Microsoft to allow software developers to link data between 
software applications.  This has been used in the industrial automation industry.  OLE 
for Process Control (OPC) is an extension of OLE technology.  Devices such as 
controllers may run as an OPC server and allow an OPC client to access data within 
controller. 
 
 
Figure 8 – Rack mounted DCS controllers  
 
Figure 8 shows a rack mount DCS controller system.  The rack contains three pairs of 
redundant controllers.  The controllers are the cards with seven segment LED display.  
‘P1’ are the active controllers, ‘b1’ are the backup or standby controllers. To the 
extreme right are two inter-controller network interface cards.  In the top section of 
the rack are four redundant power supply cards.  
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Figure 9 – Backplane mounted DCS controllers 
 
Figure 9 shows a backplane mounted DCS Controller system.  The two cards to the very 
left are a power supply card and DCS controller pair.  The next two cards are a backup 
power supply and DCS controller.  Each controller has two Ethernet TCP/IP RJ45 
network connections on the bottom to connect to the inter-controller network.   
2.2.2. DCS I/O Interface 
The functionality of the I/O interface was described in Section 2.1.  This section will 
expand on the hardware and how it relates to the DCS controllers.  The hardware for 
the I/O interface can be arranged in several ways.  The traditional method is used a 
single circuit board or card assembly for each type of I/O – ‘analog’ input card; ‘analog’ 
output card; ‘digital’ input card; and ‘digital’ output card.  The number of I/O points on 
each card is normally eight, sixteen or 32.  The cards have terminals where the physical 
wiring to the field equipment can be connected.  In Figure 9, to the right of the power 
supplies and DCS controllers are local mounted I/O cards. 
The I/O interface may also be located remote to the controllers.  This type of 
configuration requires special I/O controllers at the DCS controller and the remote I/O 
interface.  The two I/O controllers are then connected with a dedicated serial 
communications network.  Refer back to Figure 8, to the right of each controller are 
I/O controllers.  Figure 10 shows a group of remote I/O cards with an I/O controller at 
the top.    
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Figure 10 – DCS I/O Cards 
 
2.2.3. Controller Software 
The application software is what the user develops to effect the required automation 
and control tasks.  It is a mixture of closed loop feedback control algorithms using both 
measurements and drives and the direct feedforward control of drives.  Higher levels 
of automation can also be implemented using sequences where groups of drives are 
controlled at specific times or when measurements are at specific values.  It is also 
possible to implement higher levels of control on closed loop feedback systems where 
target values are set by other closed loop feedback control algorithms. 
Many variables can be created and manipulated by the application software.  The 
concept of ‘analog’ and ‘digital’ signals still exists in the application software.  ‘Analog’ 
values are used as real numbers and can be used in mathematical operations.  ‘Digital’ 
values are used in Boolean operations.  ‘Digital’ signals can be created from ‘analog’ 
signals by performing a comparison, i.e. is ‘analog’ value ‘A’ greater than ‘analog’ value 
‘B’ – the result being either true of false.  At the project site these are referred to as 
limit values.  They are often used as alarms 
The development of the application software is performed using engineering tools that 
are specially designed for the control system.  The engineering tools are normally 
installed on a dedicated computer terminal.  The terminal is permanently connected to 
the control system via the controller inter-communications network.  This allows the 
application software to be loaded on to controllers when required.  The terminal 
normally called an engineering station.  Engineering stations developed from specially 
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designed computer systems for this purpose only to personal computers with specific 
software to build and load the application software to the controllers. 
Programming languages for industrial control systems have been specifically designed 
for automation and control tasks.  The functionality mainly focuses on regulatory 
control, drive control, Boolean algebra, sequences to operate groups of equipment 
and mathematical operations.  Most control system vendors have developed their own 
versions of programming languages.  In 1993 an international standard was developed 
for programming languages – IEC 61131-3 Programmable controllers - Part 3: 
Programming languages (IEC, 2013).  This standard identities Ladder Logic, Function 
Block, Structured Text, Instruction List as well Sequential Function Chart for sequences.  
Many control system vendors had input to this standard and the languages in standard 
captured much of what was already used.  The project site uses Function Block and 
Sequential Function Chart languages which are closely aligned to this standard. 
The application software is normally grouped based on specific automation and 
control tasks.  The groupings are often called loops, functions or modules.  The 
groupings represent the smallest block of code that can be individually programmed.  
Each block of code is given a unique name, or Tag.   
Tags are normally alpha numeric strings that provide some clue to the purpose of the 
software grouping.  ANSI/ISA-5.1-2009 Instrumentation Symbols and Identification 
(ISA, 2009) is widely used in industrial industries to designate Tag names for field 
equipment and software groupings in control systems.  Within the power generation 
industry the KKS tagging system is widely adopted in power plants across the world.  
The KKS tagging system is administered by the VGA Group (VGA Group, 2015).  The 
project site utilises the KKS tagging system for both physical equipment designation 
and the groupings of software code, which are referred to as Functions. 
Normally the loops, functions or modules are further grouped into several hierarchal 
levels based on which plant subsystem, plant area and/or processing unit the software 
is associated with.  The project site DCS further groups Functions into Function Groups 
and then plant areas. 
2.3. Human Machine Interface 
The HMI provides the means for operators to interact with the application software.  
The interface is a computer terminal with a graphical user interface.  The terminal is 
normally called a HMI station.  Similar to an engineering station, HMI stations 
developed from specially designed computer systems to personal computers with 
specific software for control and monitoring.  Depending on the size of the plant it is 
possible that there may be many operators required to operate the plant.  Each 
operator required a HMI station.  These can be located in one central control room or 
in several control rooms spread throughout the plant.  It is common for the HMI 
station to used multi monitor displays. 
HMI stations are permanently connected to the control system via the controller 
inter-communications network.  This enables real time data exchange between the 
HMI and the DCS controllers.  The HMI system may also have a network connection to 
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the engineering station.  The engineering station is used to configure all of or parts of 
the HMI interface as it is closely aligned to the application software. 
2.3.1. Graphical Displays 
The most common method to present the interface to an operator is via graphical 
displays.  There may be dozens to 100’s of different graphical displays for a plant 
depending on its size.  Each display is made up of shapes that depict specific areas of 
the plant.  The shapes represent plant elements such as tanks, pipes and vessels.  The 
layout of each graphic is such that it associates the graphic to either the physical layout 
of the plant, the flow of the process materials through the plant or the tasks an 
operator may be required to perform.   
Interactive elements are added to the displays that represent measurements and 
drives.  These elements provide real time indication of the value and status of the 
measurements and drives.  By selecting these elements pop-up windows open 
displaying further information.  These windows, often referred to as a Faceplate, 
provide the means to operate drives.  Drives may be stopped or started, set points and 
control modes may be changed, sequences and higher level control algorithms may 
also be controlled. 
 
 
Figure 11 – Graphical display for plant area 
 
The displays are normally grouped in a similar fashion to software groupings – using 
several hierarchal levels based on which plant subsystem, plant area and/or processing 
unit the display is associated with. 
Figure 11 shows one of the graphical displays from the project site.  Many interactive 
elements can be seen, such as the value of process variables and symbols representing 
drives.  As an example a pump is depicted as a circle with an arrow inside.  When 
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highlighted white pump is off; when highlighted green the pump is running; and, when 
highlighted yellow the control system has detected a diagnostic fault with the pump.  
Figure 12 shows the same graphic but with a Faceplate selected for a valve.  The set 
point and control mode of the closed loop controller associated with this valve may be 
altered via the Faceplate 
 
 
Figure 12 – Graphical display for plant area with pop-up Faceplate 
 
2.3.2. Alarms and Events 
In general an Alarm or Event is any ‘digital’ signal from the application software that is 
specifically selected for use in the HMI.  Alarms and events are configured as part of 
the application software.  Alarms are specific ‘digital’ signals that represent a condition 
that requires the operator’s attention.  Events are specific ‘digital’ signals that may be 
used to drive dynamic elements on graphical displays or their activation is to be 
recorded for review at a later stage.  Events also include changes in the status of drives 
and any commands made by operators. 
Alarms are assigned a priority.  This provides guidance to operators when determining 
which alarm to respond when several are active.  It is most comment to have either 
three priorities – Low, Medium or High, or four priorities – Low, Medium, High and 
Critical.  A colour is also associated with each priority.  The project site uses red for 
High priority alarms, orange for Medium priority alarms and yellow for Low priority 
alarms yellow.  Priority colour schemes are typically user selectable on newer control 
systems. 
There may also be specific priorities relating to diagnostic alarms.  Diagnostics alarms 
include measurement signals that are outside of their configured range or drive 
discrepancy alarms.  The diagnostic alarms do not require any configuration by the 
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user.  They are built into the control system when using measurements and drives in 
the application software. 
When an alarm activates it is presented to an operator in several ways.  Firstly 
elements on the HMI graphic display associated with the alarm may change to the 
priority colour. Secondly, alarms may produce an audible warning the operator.  The 
tone or sound of the audible waring can be different for different priorities.  Finally, an 
alarm list is provided.  This is a list of every alarm activation.  The list may be ordered 
based on chronological order of activation, the priority of the alarm, or a combination 
of other these and other attributes.  The alarm list may be filtered to only present 
alarms from certain areas of the plant, or certain priories, or other attributes of the 
alarm. 
 
 
Figure 13 – Alarm on graphical display 
 
Figure 13 shows how alarms are represented on graphical displays on the project site.  
Highlighted in orange is a priority 2 alarm associated with the level in the hopper.  The 
alarm state or text associated with this ’digital’ signal in the alarm state is ‘>HIGH’.  To 
left there is another hopper where the high level alarm is not active.  The text for the 
normal state is ‘<HIGH’.    
Figure 14 shows the alarm list display at the project site.  This list has been sorted by 
priority.  In the top left hand corner the total number of active alarms for each priority 
is shown.  
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Figure 14 – Alarm List display 
 
2.3.3. Alarm Handling 
Within the application software an Alarm is either active or not active.  On the HMI the 
alarm can have further attributes which affect how it is presented to an operator.  
Alarm handling describes how these attributes are handled.  One of these attributes is 
the Acknowledgment.  This is best described by explaining the alarm handling at the 
project site.  When an alarm becomes active is considered to be active and not 
acknowledged.  In this state the element on the HMI graphic flashes in the priority 
colour and the auditable alert is triggered.  The alarm also appears on the HMI alarm 
list display with its alarm text flashing in the priority colour.  When the operator 
acknowledges the alarm it is then considered to be active and acknowledged.  The 
audible alert will silence and the element on the HMI graphic will hold steady in the 
priority colour.  In the alarm list text will also hold steady in the priority colour. 
Once the conditions that triggered the alarm have cleared the alarm will be considered 
non active.  The element on the graphic will revert to its normal colour and the alarm 
will disappear from the alarm list.  The project site also the possibility of masking the 
alarm.  An alarm masking is a signal in the configured in the application software.  If 
this signal is in an active state when the alarm actives the HMI will transition it directly 
to Active and Acknowledged. 
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Figure 15 – Alarm Handling transition diagram for project site 
 
 
Figure 16 – Alarm Handling transition diagram from ISA-18.2-2009 (ISA, 2009) 
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Alarm handling techniques can differ slightly among Control System vendors.  
Recommended practice for alarm handling is now defined in several industry guides 
and standards.   
Figure 15 shows the alarm handling transition diagram from the project site.  Figure 16 
shows the recommended alarm handling transition diagram from ISA-18.2-2009 
Management of Alarm Systems for the Process Industries.  Note that the project site 
HMI cannot functionally meet the requirements of ISA-18.2-2009.  
 
2.4.  Historical Data 
Historical data is collected for reporting and investigation purposes.  HMI systems have 
a limited capacity to store both ‘analog’ and alarm and event historical data.  
Depending on the control system it is normally in the range of days to weeks.  The long 
term storage of data from the control system is normally achieved using a Historian. 
A Historian is a computer system that has specific software to read and store ‘analog’ 
and alarm and event data from the DCS.  They can have a direct connection to the 
inter-controller network or a TCP/IP network connection directly to a HMI station.  
Most modern Historian systems now utilise OPC data communications to read data 
from the DCS.  There may be many years of ‘analog’ and alarm and event data for 
1000’s of different tags.  The data can be stored using proprietary database software, 
or commercially available database platforms such as Oracle and Microsoft SQL Server. 
‘Analog’ data is normally collected using exception based rules.  An example of an 
exception base rule is as follows:  
Read the value of an ‘analog’ signal every 10 seconds.  If the difference 
between the current value and the last value stored is more than 0.1% of its 
range then store the current value in the database along with the current time, 
otherwise do not store a value. 
The exception based method is an efficient means to store data.  Data is only stored 
when needed, as opposed to potentially recording the same or similar value at regular 
intervals.  This reduces the size of the database.  All alarm and event activations and 
deactivations are captured and stored in database tables. 
Historical data is used for reporting and review.  ‘Analog’ data may be trended using 
special client software packages.  Figure 17 shows a screen shot from a Historian 
trending software package.  It is displaying over two months of data in a single 
window.  Most Historian systems also have an interface that allows the data to be 
exported to spreadsheets.  Reports templates can be created with in spreadsheets and 
run manually or on a schedule.  An Example of a scheduled report at the project site is 
a weekly report that shows coal tonnages used each day. 
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Figure 17 – Historian Trend Tool 
 
 
Figure 18 – Historian Alarm and Event Tool 
 
Alarm and event data may also be used for reporting and review using client software 
packages and spreadsheet tools.  Figure 18 shows a screen shot from a Historian Alarm 
and event package.  It is listing alarm and events in chronological order for a selected 
time period.  This list may be filtered by any of the attributes and any time period. 
Historian systems are normally connected to the business Ethernet network.  The 
client software packages are normally installed on computes on the business Ethernet 
network.  This enables staff other than operators to view and analyse data as required.  
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The Ethernet connection is normally controlled with a firewall which restricts TCP/IP 
traffic.  This is for both security and performance purposes.  Unwanted traffic in the 
control system can impact performance, while malicious attacks can be perpetrated on 
unsecured connections. 
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Chapter 3 – The Usual Suspects – Industrial Incidents                                                             
 
The nature of industrial processes means that there are hazards to be controlled.  
Sometimes control of these hazards is lost and the results can be catastrophic.  The 
following three accidents can only be described this way. 
3.1. Milford Haven 
The explosion at the Texaco Refinery, Milford Haven United Kingdom in 1994 is the 
industrial accident that is referenced most often when discussing alarm management.  
It directly referred in the first page of EEMUA 191 (EEMUA, 2007) and in countless 
whitepapers on alarm management.  The accident was investigated by HSE UK, the 
United Kingdom’s regulator for workplace health and safety.  The following is a 
simplified account based on the HSE UK (HSE UK, 1997) official investigation of the 
accident. 
The beginnings of the accident can be traced to plant disturbances caused by an 
electrical storm before 9:00am on the 24th of July.  A lightning strike caused a power 
dip, resulting in much of the plant shutting down and a small fire to break out.  
Operators spend the next few hours trying to restart the plant.  One of the tasks 
required was to refill a process vessel with hydrocarbon liquids.  The automated outlet 
value on vessel was supposed to be open but it did not operate correctly.  It was 
indicating to the operators that it was open when it was not.  This created confusion 
with the operators as they could not understand why the vessel would not fill. 
Throughout the morning there were several attempts to fill the vessel.  The closed 
outlet valve caused it to overpressure each time.  To relieve the overpressure the 
vessel was vented to a flare system where the hydrocarbons are vented and burned in 
the atmosphere.  Prior to the flare the hydrocarbons pass through a vessel known as a 
knock out drum.  Liquids in the vented hydrocarbons are captured so only gas is passed 
to the flare. 
Liquids passing into the flare system can cause an overpressure which the pipework is 
not designed to take.  A pump-out system was fitted to remove the liquids from the 
knock out drum.  A prior modification to the pump-out system for other purposes had 
a side effect of reducing its capacity to remove liquids from the knock out drum.  The 
knock out drum was fitted with a high level alarm to warn operators when there was 
too much liquid in the knock out drum. 
During the morning the vessel pressure relief operated three times, with the last time 
at 12:36 for 36 minutes.  At 12:56 a high level alarm for the knock out drum activated, 
though there was no evidence that it was seen.  As the liquid hydrocarbons continued 
to flow the knock out drum was filled beyond its design capacity.  This caused liquid 
hydrocarbons to exit the knock out drum in the pipework to the flare.  At 13:12 the 
pipework could no longer hold pack the pressure of the liquid hydrocarbon and the 
pipework ruptured.  Twenty tonnes of hydrocarbon was released and the resulting 
vapour cloud found an ignition source and exploded. 
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The explosion injured 26 people, none seriously, though the report states that one of 
the mitigating factors was the fact that the accident occurred on a Sunday there were 
relatively few employees on the site.  The report itself does not put a cost on the 
damage but the HSE UK information sheet titles Better Alarm Handling (HSE UK, n.d.) 
suggests that the accident “caused damage of around £48 million and significant 
production losses”. 
The report identified the following causes: 
 The valve being shut when it indicated it was open 
 Modification to the flare without the consequences being fully accessed 
 The HMI did provide the necessary overviews to adequately diagnose the 
problem 
 Attempting to continue operation when the plant should have been shut down 
 The failing of the company to take overall perspective, focussing on local and 
immediate issues instead of trying to determine the root cause 
 Failures of the company’s systems for: 
o Assessing risks from plant and procedure modification 
o The use of programmable electronic systems 
o The Management of inspection and maintenance 
3.2. Longford Gas Plant 
The explosion at Esso’s Longford Gas Plant, Victoria Australia resulted in the deaths of 
two people.  The state of Victoria lost its natural gas supply for two weeks causing 
major economic losses as the state’s industry ground to a halt.  Many people who 
relied on natural gas for their homes also suffered hardship.  A government of Victoria 
formed a Royal Commission to investigate the accident.  The following is a simplified 
account based on Royal Commission (Longford Royal Commission, 1999) investigation 
of the accident. 
The accident had its beginnings on the night shift prior.  The plant was being prepared 
to operate at higher production rates.  The plant was dealing with higher than normal 
volumes of liquid hydrocarbons.  The was due a hydrocarbon supply which was rich 
with liquids and a process vessel that had been out of service and accumulating liquids 
was being returned to service. 
By the time the day shift took control of the plant one cold hydrocarbon liquid began 
to flow into an oil stream bound for a one of the plant heat exchangers.  This on its 
own did not present a problem as long as the heat source for the heat exchanger – 
warm lean oil flow was maintained.  Process disturbances eventually caused a 
shutdown of the lean oil pumps at 08:19, at which point an alarm was activated to 
warn the operator.  At 08:30 the operator attempted a restart of the lean oil pumps 
but was unsuccessful. 
The heat exchanger then cooled to point where flange joints on the pipework attached 
to the heat exchanger deformed and began to leak liquid hydrocarbon.   Without the 
warm lean oil flow the temperature in the heat exchanger dropped to -48oC by 09:30, 
causing embrittlement of the heat exchanger metal.  The plant operators spent the 
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morning trying to return the plant to normal operation.  They did not associate any 
hazards with the loss of the lean oil flow other than off spec production and leaks at 
the heat exchanger flanges.   
At around 12:17 the lean oil flow was reintroduced and started to heat you the heat 
exchanger.  At 12:25 the rapid heating caused it to fail catastrophically.  Ten tonnes of 
hydrocarbon escaped and found an ignition source and exploded.  There were several 
more explosions and many spot files.  Two workers were killed and eight were injured 
in the explosions and fires. 
The report identifies the real causes of the accident as: 
 Incorrect actions following the shutdown of the lean oil pumps 
 Insufficient knowledge of the dangers of associated with the loss of the lean oil 
flow 
 Deficiencies in operator training 
 Lack of operating procedures to deal with the process conditions encountered 
on the day 
3.3. Three Mile Island 
The accident a Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania 
United States of America in 1979 caused a partial meltdown of a reactor.  No people 
were injured and there was negligible release of radioactive materials but the clean-up 
lasted for almost 15 years and cost an estimated cost of $1 billion dollars.  It is also 
attributed to stalling the expansion of the nuclear power industry in the United States.  
Although the accident does not involve use of modern process control systems it does 
highlight some of issues surrounding abnormal situations and alarm management.   
The reactors at Three Mile Island have two water circuits.  The primary water circulates 
through the reactor core, to the steam generator and the returns to the reactor core.  
Secondary water circulates through the steam generator, where it is turned to steam, 
through the steam turbine generator.  It is then condensed and returned to the steam 
generator.  Energy as heat is transferred from the reactor core to the primary water, 
from the primary water to the secondary water.  The heat energy is converted to 
mechanical energy in the turbine generator.  The primary water is radioactive as it is 
exposed to the reactor core.  The following is a simplified account based on the official 
(The Presidents Commission on The Accident at TMI, 1979) report off the accident. 
The accident began late on the 28th of March 1979 at 04:00 when pumps feeding 
secondary water to the steam generator shut down.  Without secondary water the 
reactor automatically went into a shutdown – control rods are dropped into the 
reactor core to stop the nuclear reaction.  Although there is no longer a nuclear 
reaction the radioactive materials in the reactor continue to produce enough heat such 
that primary water is still required to prevent damage to the reactor.   
During this type of shutdown it is normal for a pilot operated relief valve open to 
release the pressure in the primary water system.  Thirteen seconds after it opened 
the pressure in the primary water system returned to normal and the pilot operated 
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relief valve was supposed to close but it did not.  It did indicate to operators that it was 
closed. 
There are three emergency cooling pumps for the secondary water which did start as 
required, though the valves on each of the two emergency cooling water lines were 
closed and no emergency water was reaching the steam generator.  Two minutes into 
the accident the high pressure injection pumps started and began to deliver water 
directly to the reactor.  The operators were not aware that the pilot operated relief 
valve had not closed.  Due to the open pilot operated relief valve radioactive water 
was escaping the reactor.  Another knock on effect was that the water level 
instrumentation in the reactor core did not respond accurately 
As the accident developed the operators restricted the flow of the high pressure water 
injection pumps as they were concerned that they could overfill the reactor core, a 
situation known as ‘going solid’.  They did not correctly diagnose the situation as being 
caused by the pilot operated relief valve.  The accident was now escalating as reactor 
core was no longer covered with water and began to overheat.   
The temperature of pipe downstream of the pilot operated relief valve also indicated it 
was over 200oF.  One of the plant procedures stated that temperatures over 200oF 
indicated the pilot operated relief valve is open.  The operators testified to that it was 
normal for the temperature to be high due to a leaking pilot operated relief valve or 
other valves leaking.  The operators did not consider the temperature of the pipe as 
significant. 
Two hours and 22 minutes after the accident began it was determine that the pilot 
operated relief valve was stuck open.  A manual valve near downstream from the pilot 
operated relief valve was closed and the primary water system was contained.  By this 
point 32000 gallons of radioactive water had escaped through the open valve.  It was 
not until 10:30 that the high pressure injection pumps were finally able restore the 
reactor water level above the core.  The temperature of the reactor was brought under 
control over the next day.  By this time the reactor was damaged beyond repair.  
The report made the following assessment of the significant events: 
 The event was initiated by equipment failures 
 Operators were not able to recognise the actual conditions in the plant 
 Operator training did not prepare them the situation 
 Operators took incorrect actions, and failed to take correct actions which 
escalated what would have been a minor incident to the actual accident 
3.4. The Alarm System’s Role in these Accidents 
What is not captured in the descriptions of these accidents is the tension and 
frustration operators were experiencing.  In all three accidents the operators were 
dealing with abnormal situations.  In each case there were many attempts to bring the 
plant back to normal operation.  The operators were struggling to understand what 
was really happening.  At Three Mile Island one of the operators testified that he 
“would have liked to have thrown away the alarm panel. It wasn't giving us any useful 
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information” (The Presidents Commission on The Accident at TMI, 1979).  The alarm 
systems that were supposed to support them were adding the frustration. 
Common to all the accidents are the flood of alarms.  At Three Mile Island “During the 
first few minutes of the accident, more than 100 alarms went off, and there was no 
system for suppressing the unimportant signals so that operators could concentrate on 
the significant alarms” (The Presidents Commission on The Accident at TMI, 1979).    
At Milford Haven the report stated that “the chances of the operators restoring control 
by manual intervention decreased the longer the upset condition persisted.  This was 
because they became progressively overloaded with an increasing barrage of alarms” 
and “alarms were being presented to operators at the rate of one every two to three 
seconds.  Alarms going off this frequently resulting in operators cancelling them 
because of their nuisance value without necessarily recognising what they meant” 
(HSE UK, 1997).   
Recognising that there is an alarm condition is only the first part in managing an 
abnormal situation.  It is important that the consequences are well understood.  At 
Longford within ten minutes of the lean oil pumps stopping operators has attempted 
to restart them but could not.  Operators knew they had to restart the lean oil system, 
but they only associated the situation with off spec production, not the potential to 
cause the catastrophic failure of the heat exchanger. 
One of the expert witnesses at the Longford Royal Commission stated that in the 
industry “hazards associated with the loss of the lean oil flow were well known” 
(Longford Royal Commission, 1999).  Hopkins suggests (Hopkins, n.d.) that it was the 
failure of the operators to respond to the alarms that led to the failure of the lean oil 
system which subsequently caused the cold temperature embrittlement failure of the 
heat exchanger.  If the operators had understood the consequences of they may have 
the loss of the lean oil system they might   
The normalisation of abnormal situations is another problem highlighted in these 
accidents.  At Longford “there was evidence that in the GP1 control room it was 
common for a large number of alarms to be active at any one time.”  At Three Mile 
Island operators stated in the normal operation it was not uncommon to have more 
than 52 alarms active (The Presidents Commission on The Accident at TMI, 1979).  In 
the Three Mile Island accident operators had been normalised to the situation of high 
temperature on the pilot operated relief valve pipework which should have indicated 
that the valve was open.  Although no alarm is attributed to this situation is 
demonstrates how situations that are documented as abnormal become normalised.  
In all three accidents the alarms system did not support operators, they impeded the 
operators.  This was not due the situations.  There were systematic failures in the 
design and management of the alarm systems.   At Longford “One of the operators 
gave evidence nuisance alarms had the capacity to distract operators and frequently 
did.  They could become very repetitive and could result in more important alarms not 
being picked up or noticed because their warning signals were lost amongst the 
numerous other alarms” (Longford Royal Commission, 1999).  At Three Mile Island 
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“The danger of having too many alarms was recognized by Burns and Row during the 
design stage, but the problem was never resolved” (The Presidents Commission on The 
Accident at TMI, 1979) 
The alarm systems did not cause these accidents.  There were many systematic causes.  
The accidents transitioned from disruptive incidents to major accident thought the loss 
of situational awareness.  An analysis of 32 major process industry accidents by the 
ASM Consortium (ASM Consortium, 2013) showed that 50% of failures by operators 
were due to a loss of situational awareness.  Alarm systems must add to situational 
awareness, not detract from it.  
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Chapter 4 – The Development of Alarm Management                            
 
The alarm problem pre-dates the modern control system.  Problems were identified 
prior to the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 though there were no coordinated 
efforts to solve them.  The modern control system saw a rapid increase in the number 
of configured alarms.  This amplified the alarm problem. 
4.1. Early Work and Research (Pre 2000) 
The first coordinated effort to tackle the alarm management was in the USA in 1989.  
Honeywell, a control system vendor, identified the growing problem of alarms on 
modern computer based HMI systems.  They convened a task force with 25 of their 
clients to investigate the problem.  This effort became more focussed in 1992 when 
Honeywell and four companies (Amoco, Chevron, Exxon and Shell) formed the 
Abnormal Situation Management (ASM) Consortium.  ASM believed “that the alarm 
system was but a part of the larger issue of the management of unexpected process 
upsets” (ASM Consortium, n.d.).  
By 1994 four more companies (BP, Mobil, NOVA Chemicals, and Texaco) had joined 
ASM.  The consortium applied for, and received funding from USA’s National Institute 
of Standards and Technology's (NIST) Advanced Technology Program for research 
funding.  This was a significant in the fact that the consortium of private companies 
provided $8.5 million of their own funds.  This funding was matched closely by NIST.   
The research project had a duration of four years and focussed on developing software 
based decision support tools and consistent information management for process 
plant operators.  NIST (NIST, 2009) suggests that as a result of the research project that 
ASM generated on average savings of $800 000 a year for a process plant and 
increases production from 95% of capacity 99%, and there are over 120 operating 
plant with ASM’s Alarm Configuration Tool. 
The next major event in alarm management was as a result of the 1994 explosion at 
the Texaco Refinery, Milford Haven United Kingdom.  The HSE UK began looking 
closely at how poorly managed alarm systems affect safety.  In 1996 HSE UK funded a 
research project “to survey alarms systems in the power and chemical industries and 
hence identify and report current industry best practice” (Bransby & Jenkinson, 1997).  
The research project covered: 
 visits to 15 plants, discussions where held with a range of staff, operations, 
engineering and managerial 
 questionnaires of 96 operators,  
 visits to three company engineering or R&D centres to discuss alarm system 
standards 
 questionnaires of five engineers involved in specifying or procuring alarm 
systems 
 a literature review on alarm systems 
 discussions with members of industry associations 
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The conclusions of the research project recommended that alarms of little value be 
identified and re-engineered, the use of alarm system performance monitoring to 
drive improvements and control system manufacturers provide alarm handling 
features that users require.  Above all the conclusions pointed to the need for a 
greater understanding of the impacts alarm system performance in relation to both 
financial and safety risks.    
In 1997 the Institution of Electrical Engineers (IEE) in the United Kingdom hosted a 
colloquium titled “Stemming the Alarm Flood”.  Both the HSE UK research team and 
the ASM Consortium presented papers based on the work they were performing.  It 
seemed that there was now a common understanding in the process industry of the 
problems associated with poor performing alarm systems.  Companies were applying 
techniques that were been identified by ASM’s research to improve alarm systems.  BP 
presented a paper on it current practices for alarm management.  It highlights that 
“advanced solutions are never a ‘fix’ for bad basic practices” (Brown & O'Donnell, 
1997). 
The first attempt to provide a common solution to the alarm problem was by EEMUA 
in the United Kingdom.  EEMUA was heavily involved in the HSE UK research project.  
Prior to this involvement it had been considering developing a best practice guidance 
document (Bransby & Jenkinson, 1997).  In 1999 EEMUA Publication 191, Alarm 
Systems – A Guide to the Design, Management and Procurement was released.  As 
well as learnings from the HSE UK research project the ASM Consortium also provided 
input. 
EEMUA 191 is a guidance document, not a standard.  In 2000 the HSE UK released a 
“Better Alarm Handling” information sheet recommending EEMUA 191 be used as 
guidance.  The HSE UK inspector’s tool kit (HSE UK, n.d.) also suggests that it is “vital 
that significant (i.e. more than 300 alarms) new DCS systems going in are designed to 
EEMUA principles and we should enforce on this.  For existing systems enforcement to 
carry out a review is appropriate where there is evidence of problems (e.g. large 
numbers of standing alarms on the system).”   
4.2. Development of Standard (Post 2000) 
In 2001 the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, the government agency for 
administration and regulation of the Norwegian oil and gas resources, produced the 
guidance document YA-711 Principles for Alarm System Design.  This guidance 
document contained much of the guidance of EEMUA191 in a more direct and concise 
manner.  In 2003 NAMUR, the German based User Association of Automation 
Technology in Process Industries also released the guidance document NA102 – Alarm 
Management, again based on EEMUA 191. 
The ASM Consortium released a guideline document in 2003, Effective Alarm 
Management Practices.  Initially ASM considered the EEMUA performance metrics as 
too aggressive but research in 2004 showed that they were appropriate (Metzgar, 
2009).  The guideline document provides examples from ASM member’s sites as well 
as the rationale for recommendations it makes.  It has been updated six times, with 
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the most recent in 2009.  It was initially only available to ASM members, but the latest 
update is available for purchase. 
2003 was also the year that ISA began working on an alarm management standard.  
ISA is a non-profit professional association in the process automation and control 
industry.  Many of its standards have been recognised by ANSI and also adopted by the 
IEC.  Its standards are developed using volunteer committees of professionals.   
In 2007 EEMUA released an update to EEMUA 191.  The ASM Consortium Director 
wrote in the Foreword that the ASM Consortium considers EEMUA 191 “represent the 
best publically available benchmark of industry good practice for alarm management” 
(EEMUA, 2007).  A third edition of the EEMUA 191 was also released in 2013. 
The Electrical Power Institute (EPRI), a research and development organisation based 
in the USA and funded by the electric utility industry, published a guideline document 
Alarm Management and Annunciator Applications Guidelines in 2008.  This was 
developed in close consultation with company called PAS, of which Bill Hollifield is the 
Principle Alarm Management Consultant. 
In 2009 the voting members of the ISA18 committee approved ISA-18.2-2009 
Management of Alarm Systems for the Process Industries.  ANSI adopted the standard 
as ANSI/ISA-18.2-2009.  Two of the voting committee members have both produced 
books on the subject of alarm management.  Bill Hollifield is one of the authors of The 
Alarm Management Handbook – A Comprehensive Guide in 2006.  This was updated in 
2009 and a version is also published by the ISA.  Doug Rothenberg produced Alarm 
Management for Process Control in 2009.  Both books describe methods to manage 
alarm systems that comply with ISA-18.2.  They also provide expanded guidance and 
explanations for some techniques to apply to specific alarm problems.      
The American Petroleum Institute (API) is a trade association based in the USA that 
represents the USA’s oil and gas industry.  In 2010 it published API-RP-1167 Pipeline 
SCADA Alarm Management in 2010.  This document summarises the requirements of 
ISA-18.2, and it as a normative reference.  
The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is a non-profit organisation that 
produces standards for electrical and electronic related technologies.  Its standards are 
created in a similar manner to the ISA – using technical committees for development 
and voting to approve standards. It began working on IEC62682 Management of 
Alarms Systems for the Process Industries in 2010.  Its structure is identical to ISA-18.2 
and it has no new sections, though some minor changes have been made (Hollifield, 
2015).  The major different is that many recommendations using the term “should” 
have been made mandatory with the term “shall”.  It was released in 2014. 
The development alarm management has been driven the process automation and 
control industry.  The EEMUA and ASM industry groups were the early pioneers.  Their 
research and involvement in alarm management built the foundations for the current 
standards and knowledge of alarm systems.  This knowledge is now forms the 
international standard in the form of IEC 62682.  The work of the ASM Consortium 
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continues to explore abnormal situations and the human factors involved in detecting 
and restoring normal plant operation.  
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Chapter 5 – Alarm Management Best Practice                                         
 
When determining alarm management best practice three main sources were used: 
 ISA-18.2-2009 Management of Alarm Systems for the Process Industries 
 EEMUA 191 – Alarm Systems, A Guide to Design, Management and 
Procurement 
 ASM Consortium Guidelines – Effective Alarm Management Practices 
These three documents present the most up to date alarm management practices.  All 
three documents share a common lineage as the organisations that created these 
documents have collaborated during the development of alarm management 
methodologies.  ISA-18.2-2009 was immediately adopted as an ANSI standard in the 
Unites States of America and has now been released as an international version as 
IEC62682-2014, cementing these methodologies as best practice worldwide.  
5.1. When and How Alarms Should Be Used 
Alarms have a specific purpose and purpose should be understood by those who are 
designing and implementing alarm.  The ISA-18.2-2009 definition of an alarm is: 
“An audible and/or visible means of indicating to the operator an equipment 
malfunction, process deviation, or abnormal condition requiring a response.” 
(ISA, 2009). 
This definition agrees with one of the key design principles of the EEMUA 191 which 
states: 
 “Every alarm should have a defined response.” (EEMUA, 2007) 
Common understanding of the definition of an Alarm is important and the ISA-18.2-
2009 definition has been adopted for this project. 
In Section 2.3 the HMI was discussed and the audible and/or visual means by which 
operators are alerted to alarms was described.  This is normally fixed by the control 
system vendor.  Newer control systems have flexibility to change these attributes 
slightly to suit end user requirements.  It is usually only end users who are well versed 
in alarm management that would modify the default configuration to suit specific 
requirements in their Alarm Philosophes.   
End users decide which process conditions will activate an alarm.  This means that end 
users have the most scope to design and implement poor alarms.  This section 
focusses on how to use alarming effectively. 
There a many models that depict how alarms should be used.  Most of these models 
use the concept of layers as depicted in Figure 19 and Figure 20.  The first layer is when 
the process is operating at normal process conditions.  The control system is primarily 
used to keep process variables at set point or target values, as show in Figure 19.  This 
ensures production quality, efficient use of process inputs and the continued reliable 
operation of the plant equipment and machinery.  
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Figure 19 – EEMUA 191 Effective Alarm System (EEMUA, 2007) 
 
There are times when the control system can no longer keep the process at normal 
conditions.  The reasons for this could be that there are set of circumstances that were 
not considered in the original design or equipment has malfunctioned and is not 
operating correctly.  The process conditions will begin to deviate from normal 
conditions.  This is referred to a process upset or a process disturbance.   
If the process continues to deviate it will likely reach a point where the process 
conditions exceed the safe operating parameters of the plant and equipment.  At this 
point the safety of people and the environment may be at risk, or the financial impact 
of the loss of product quality or damage to the equipment may exceed the cost of 
continued production.  At this point automated supervisory actions may intervene and 
shut down the process.  This may be in the form of a controlled shutdown over a 
period of time or an Emergency Shut Down (ESD as depicted Figure 19) where the 
process is halted immediately, or a combination of both.  This is known as the 
shutdown layer.  The shutdown may be performed by the control system or an 
independent shutdown system.   
 
 
Figure 20 – Process Disturbances and Layers of Protection (Hollifield & Habibi, 2001) 
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While in the process disturbance layer an operator may be able to intervene in order 
identify and correct the cause of the process disturbance and return the process to 
normal conditions.  If they are able to do this then production can continue.  The 
purpose of an alarm is to alert the operator that the process in deviating from normal 
conditions and they will need to take action to return the process back to normal 
conditions.  Failure to do so will result in undesirable consequences. 
The speed at which the process transitions from one layer to the next can vary greatly.  
For instance, steam turbine over speed is particularly dangerous and can happen in a 
matter of seconds.  There is no time for an operator to take action to prevent the 
shutdown layer if alerted to the turbine speed deviating from normal speed.  On the 
other hand if a tank is being filled with liquid and a shutdown layer is installed to 
prevent a tank overflow an operator may have many minutes to take action if alerted 
to the tank level being too high. 
Figure 19 shows to versions of the same model.  On the right is ineffective alarming.  
Alarms in the normal process conditions layer require no action.  Alarms in the 
shutdown layer are too late – there is now the consequence of lost production.  Alarms 
depicted in the disturbance or upset layer are time dependant – there must be enough 
time for an operator to take the necessary action to return the process to normal 
conditions.  This must be taken into context when interpreting the left of Figure 19.  
The transition from the process disturbance or upset layer to the shutdown layer is 
time bound.  Understanding the time it takes for the transition from the start of the 
disturbance layer to the start of the shutdown layer makes for an effective alarm.  If 
the time is too short then the detection of the process disturbance may be able to be 
changed to provide more time.  
The action an operator needs to take, or the response, is the most important aspect of 
the alarm.  The definition of an alarm includes the phrase “requiring a response”.  This 
dispels the idea that some alarms should be used ‘For Information Only’.  It also means 
that ‘lazily’ placed alarms have no place either.  ‘Lazily’ placed alarms are those whose 
only purpose is a catch all.  They are normally placed at the operating limits of plant of 
equipment or near the shutdown limits.  They are seen as being safe or conservative.  
When specifying these alarms there is normally no consideration of the operator 
response or if there is time for the operator to reposed before a shutdown occurs.  Pre 
shutdown warning alarms are useful but they must accompanied with a specific 
response and enough time to perform the response. 
There should also be some additional limitations on the use of alarms.  In Figure 19 the 
control system can be seen as the primary means to keep the process at normal 
conditions.  This should be the case – alarms should not be used to prompt operators 
to take actions that the control system can do. 
Alarms should not be the last layer.  Figure 20 shows that the ‘Shutdown Point’ 
prevents the process from reaching the ‘Limits of Operability Point’.  This is the point 
where the process may no longer be contained by the plant and equipment.  The 
consequence of exceeding this point is catastrophic failure.  It is not the role of an 
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alarm to prevent this.  It may be used in addition to, but not the sole layer for this type 
of consequence. 
5.2. Common Alarm Problems (and Treatment Options) 
The unwritten goal of Alarm Management is to have an alarm system that the operator 
trusts.  When alerted to an alarm they should interrupt their current task with the 
confidence that the alarm contains important information.  Alarm problems erode this 
confidence in the alarm system. 
5.2.1. No Response Required 
No Response required means that the alarm was likely added for information only or 
as a result of an overcautious approach to alarms.  By definition alarms require a 
response.  This alarm problem conditions the operator to expect some alarms will not 
likely require a response. 
The treatment option for this alarm is to simply remove it. 
5.2.2. Unknown Response 
Unknown Response is when an operator receives the alarm but does not why or what 
to do.  This could be due to non-intuitive descriptors or a lack of documentation. The 
response to these alarms will be delayed as the operator may have to consult with 
other operators, supervisors, maintenance, or engineering personnel to determine the 
response.  This alarm problem creates a sense of frustration.  If this alarm activates 
during an Alarm Flood it will likely add to the tension operators may be experiencing. 
The treatment option for these alarms is to rationalise it with close attentions to the 
descriptor and ensure the documentation captured during rationalisation is available 
to the operator. 
5.2.3. Unknown Consequences 
Unknown Consequences is when an operator knows how to return the process to 
normal conditions but they do not the understanding of the consequences of not 
responding to the alarm.  This becomes and alarm problem when the operator is trying 
to prioritise several alarms – this alarm may be incorrectly prioritised over other 
alarms.    
The treatment option for these alarms is to rationalise it and ensure the 
documentation captured during rationalisation is available to the operator. 
5.2.4. Alarming Normal Conditions 
Alarming Normal Conditions occurs when an alarm point is used as a trigger or 
condition in the automation of a subsystem.  A typical example is an automated 
sequence that fills a tank with liquid where the high level alarm also stops the filling 
sequence.  This alarm problem conditions the operator to expect some alarms will not 
likely require a response. 
The treatments options are to either remove the alarm or separate the control point 
from the alarm point.  If the alarm it to be kept it should be justified by the 
rationalisation process. 
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5.2.5. Trip/Shutdown Activated 
Trip/Shutdown Activated alarms may operate with no pre-warning that the process 
upset has resulted in a shutdown.  These alarms are generally too late to be of any use. 
The treatment option is to review the alarming strategy of the subsystem to ensure 
alarms are activated with enough time to take action to avoid the shutdown.  Note 
that it may be necessary to alarm to an operator that a specific subsystem has shut 
down as they may then need to perform specific tasks.  For shut down situations alarm 
masking should be used to eliminate alarm flooding. 
5.2.6. Standing Alarms 
Standing alarms (or stale alarms) are alarms that remain active for prolonged periods 
of time – normally more than 24 hours.  This can be because the alarm points have 
been selected incorrectly or the process in being operated incorrectly.  Another cause 
is that out of service subsystems or equipment are generating alarms.  An example is a 
low temperature alarm.  If during normal operation the process is above ambient 
conditions then low temperature alarms will be active when out of service.  Standing 
alarms create many problems: 
 they can fill the alarm list 
 priority one standing alarms diminish the concept of alarm priority 
 the plant maybe being operated in an unsafe manner if the alarm points have 
been selected incorrectly 
 there is effectively no alarm if the alarm is already active 
 they conditions the operator to ignore particular alarms – a problem is there is 
a genuine activation 
The treatment options depend on the cause.  If the cause is due to equipment being 
out of service then alarm masking can be used, otherwise careful consideration of the 
alarm’s purpose and then rationalisation is required.    
5.2.7. Alarm Floods 
ISA-18.2-2009 defines an alarm flood as  
“A condition during which the alarm rate is greater than the operator can 
effectively manage (e.g. more than 10 alarms per 10 minutes).” (ISA, 2009) 
Alarm floods normally occur when there is a shutdown of subsystem or major parts of 
the plant.  Many process variables transition from their normal operating values to 
ambient conditions – creating many alarms.  Process disturbances can also cascade to 
other subsystems creating multiple alarms.  The alarm flood normally occurs at a time 
when the operator in under a lot of stress.  Important alarms can be missed as many 
alarms appear and scroll through the alarm list. 
Alarm floods are perhaps the hardest alarm problem to treat.  To prevent alarm floods 
during shutdowns requires alarming strategies to be developed that consider the 
whole subsystem.  Alarm masking needs to be employed to many alarms. 
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Alarm floods during process disturbances an upsets are harder still.  They are hard to 
predict so most often the only way is design them out once they occur.  This requires 
very diligent alarm performance monitoring looking for alarm flood conditions. 
If the background alarm rate is greater than 10 per 10 minutes then the alarm system 
may be in a constant state of alarm flood.  If this is the case then efforts need 
concentrate on getting the alarm rate to manageable levels before considering alarm 
floods. 
5.2.8. Fleeting Alarms 
Fleeting alarms (or chattering alarms) occur when noisy signals or faulty equipment 
cause alarms to repeatedly activate and clear in rapid succession.  Fleeting alarms take 
over the alarm system such that it no longer useful.  They can account for 1000’s of 
alarm activations in a single day.  It is one of the most common problems that affect 
alarm performance. 
Figure 21 shows how fleeting alarms occur.  Consider a process variable oscillates due 
to noise in the process.  Now consider the average value of the process variable – it is 
increasing and does cross the alarm point.  The oscillations cause the alarm to active 
and deactivate 10 times in this figure, though it was only needed once.  This effect can 
be severely amplified if the oscillations are more frequent.  The problem is worse when 
large oscillations push a normal process value to it alarms point.  This type of fleeting 
alarm can occur for many hours. 
 
 
Figure 21 – Fleeting Alarm 
 
Fleeting alarms can also be caused by faulty equipment.  If this is the case then 
immediate action should be taken to rectify the situation.  A fleeting alarm that takes 
over the alarm system such than no other alarms can be discerned should not be 
tolerated for any length of time. 
There are several treatment options for fleeting alarms: 
 Filtering of the process variable before it is processed.  Caution as this could 
affect control response if the process variable used for control 
 Delay Time (or De-bounce Timer) which means the process value should exceed 
the alarm limit for a predetermined amount of time before it is activated. 
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 Hysteresis, which is adding a dead band or ‘backlash’ to the reset of the alarm. 
EEMUA 191 makes recommendations for filter times and EEMUA 191 and ISA-18.2-
2009 make the same recommendations for Time Delay and Hysteresis.  These 
recommendations are based on the process variable being measured.  These 
recommendations are shown in Table 1 
 
Table 1 – Recommendations for Filter Time, Time Delay and Hysteresis 
 
Variable Type 
Filter Time 
(seconds) 
(EEMUA, 2007) 
Time Delay 
(seconds) 
(EEMUA, 2007) 
(ISA, 2009) 
Hysteresis  
(%) 
(EEMUA, 2007) 
(ISA, 2009) 
Flow 2 15 5 
Level 2 60 5 
Pressure 1 15 2 
Temperature 0 60 1 
 
5.2.9. Alarm Masking 
Alarm masking (or Suppressed by Design) is not an alarm problem – it is a treatment 
option for several alarm problems though.  The ISA-18.2-2009 definition is:   
“3.1.73 Suppressed by Design 
A mechanism implemented within the alarm system that prevents the 
transmission of the alarm indication to the operator based on plant state or 
other conditions.” (ISA, 2009) 
Alarm masking can be used to prevent alarms from activating under circumstances 
where there would be no response required.  The classic example is alarms associated 
with dual redundant subsystems.  While one subsystem is out of service or on standby 
some of the alarms may be active.  Alarm masking is implemented to detect when the 
alarms are not required and prevent them from activating.  The simplest application of 
this is to use Boolean and logic with the alarm conditions and the masking conditions.  
Consider a tank with a discharge pump and a low level alarm.  If the system was out of 
service, i.e. the discharge pump is not running the low level alarm is not required.  
Using alarm masking the alarm activation logic would look like this: 
 Low Tank Level AND Discharge Pump Running 
If there was no alarm masking and system was out of service the low level alarm would 
activate.  The alarm masking prevents an unnecessary alarm. 
Alarm masking is a powerful tool for preventing both standing alarms and limiting 
alarm floods during plant shutdowns. 
5.3. How Alarm Systems Should Be Managed 
Alarm management is a continuous improvement cycle in the same manner as the 
Shewhart cycle of Plan – Do – Check – Act.  This is evidenced by the fact that 
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ISA-18.2-2009, EEMUA 191 and the ASM Consortium all place very high importance on 
performance monitoring of the alarm system to drive alarm management.   
This cycle firstly starts with a definition of the process and the problems that may 
occur.  Methodologies and approaches are identified as well as the goals and measures 
of success.  A feedback loop is then employed where changes are made the process or 
system under continuous improvement.  The effect of changes on the process or 
system are measured and then compared to the goals and measures of success.  Based 
on the results further changes are made to improve the process or system and the 
cycle repeats.  The ISA-18.2-2009 Alarm Management Lifecycle is shown in Figure 22. 
 
 
Figure 22 – ISA-18.2-2009 Alarm Management Lifecycle (ISA, 2009) 
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ISA-18.2-2009 and EEMUA 191 both propose comprehensive planning requirements as 
the first stage in Alarm Management.  The EEMUA 191 guidance is to create a ‘Site 
Alarm Management Strategy’ while ISA-18.2-2009 defines an Alarm Philosophy as: 
“A document that establishes the basic definitions, principles, and processes to 
design, implement and maintain an alarm system.” (ISA, 2009) 
Some of the key requirements are of these documents are: 
 Definitions to ensure common understanding – particularly the definition of an 
alarm 
 Roles and responsibilities for alarm management 
 Principles and guidance for the design of alarms 
 The Rationalisation process 
 Performance metrics 
 Collection of alarm and event data 
The roles are key requirements for successful and sustainable alarm management.  
Generally engineering staff are involved alarm management.  They have the technical 
knowledge of the plant and equipment and the control system.  The ASM Consortium 
recommends that the company management support for alarm management be 
established (ASM Consortium, 2009).  The expectation is that an Alarm Philosophy or 
management strategy will become an official site procedure.  This ensures company 
management will support the alarm management efforts.  Hollifield and Habibi suggest 
that without company management support alarm improvement efforts will not get 
far (Hollifield & Habibi, 2001). 
ISA-18.2-2009 and EEMUA 191 both impress the need for operator to be involved in 
alarm management, particularly alarm design.  The operators are the end users of the 
alarm system so their input is vital.  They also have intimate knowledge of the process 
as it does operate, which may be a little different to how it is designed to operate.  
Their input is an invaluable resource. 
Hollifield and Habibi suggest that an Alarm Champion role be created.  This role is 
responsible for the coordination of the alarm management activities.  They also 
suggest that without this role sustained improvement is very unlikely (Hollifield & 
Habibi, 2001). 
5.3.1. Rationalisation 
Alarm rationalisation has three important roles.  Firstly it is must vet alarms to ensure 
they meet the criteria to be an alarm.  Secondly it the primary design process were the 
requirements for the alarm are identified and standardised.  Finally, it is the means by 
which to document alarms. 
ISA-18.2-2009 recommends that rationalisation be performed using a team.  The ASM 
Consortium provides an example of a site that uses a multidisciplinary team.  The team 
approach ensures all stakeholders are involved in the design. 
To rationalise an alarm the following questions should be asked: 
 What is the functional description of the alarm? 
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 What are the consequences of not responding to the alarm? 
 What are the possible causes of the abnormal situation? 
 How long does the operator have to respond 
 What is action should the operator take? 
The last question is what decides if the alarm is required, remembering the definition 
of an alarm means that response is required.  If no response is required then the alarm 
is not justified. 
Some of the key technical aspects of the alarm should also be determined during 
rationalisation.  This includes alarm masking, delays times, hysteresis values and the 
text for the alarm.  One of the most important aspects is the alarm Priority. 
Alarm priority provides operators with guidance for two aspects.  Firstly, if there are 
several alarms active at the same time the alarm priority can, as the name suggests, 
assist in prioritising which alarms to respond to first.  Secondly the priority can provide 
a suggestion of how quick the response needs to be.  An operator’s tasks are varied 
and not limited to monitoring and responding to alarms so any additional guidance to 
prioritise the alarm response with other tasks is important. 
ISA-18.2-2009 provides no specific guidance for how to set the priority of an alarm.  
EEMUA 191 suggests that prioritisation should be a risk based determination on the 
consequences of the not responding to the alarm.  It presents three methods ranging 
from quantitative to qualitative.   
 
Table 2 – ASM Consortium Example Prioritisation Matrix (ASM Consortium, 2009) 
Potential Consequences 
Response Time Production/ 
Quality 
Plant Asset/ 
Reliability 
Safety/ 
Environmental 
Less than 1 minute Medium High High 
1 to 10 minutes Low Medium High 
10 to 30 minutes Low Low Medium 
 
The first method quantifies the risk in terms of safety, environmental and financial 
consequences a then considers the time the operator have to respond – either less 
than three minutes or greater than three minutes.  Being quantitative this method 
requires an accurate understanding of the financial consequences and conversions of 
safety and environmental consequences so they can be compared side by side.   The 
ASM Consortium guidelines present an example method though the consequences 
have only been classified, not quantified.  There are also there are there time bands 
when considering the alarm response time.  The example is shown in Table 2. 
In their book Alarm Management: A Comprehensive Guide (Hollifield & Habibi, 2001) 
Hollifield and Habibi propose a combination of a semi-qualitative risk assessment with 
prioritisation matrix in the ASM guidelines.  The risk matrix is used to determine the 
consequence severity of not responding to the alarm – either Minor, Major or Serve.  
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The prioritisation matrix and an example of a semi-qualitative risk matrix are shown in 
Figure 23.  As with any risk based approach an organisation must calibrate the risk 
matrix to suit their own risk appetite.  This should normally be aligned to corporate 
their risk management policies. 
 An important part of the rationalisation process is documentation.  EEMUA 191 
(EEMUA, 2007) and the ASM Consortium guidelines recommend that a computerised 
alarm database be created and used throughout the life of the facility.  ISA-18.2-2009 
suggests that rationalisation be documented in a ‘Master Alarm Database’.   
 
 
  
Figure 23 – Prioritisation Matrix and Semi-quantitative Risk Matrix (Hollifield & Habibi, 2001) 
 
This database is should become the master data for alarm configuration.  If a change to 
an alarm is required the correct work flow is to rationalise the alarm, document it in 
the Master Alarm Database.  It is then implemented into the DCS configuration based 
on the information in the Master Alarm Database.  The work flow should not work 
backwards where changed are made in the DCS configuration first and then back filled 
into the Master Alarm Database.  
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Documenting the alarm also captures one of the key components of Alarm 
Management – the correct operator response to the alarm.  Considering that an alarm 
system may consist of 1000’s of alarms it is not practical to expect an operator to know 
the correct response to every alarm.  Making this information available to operators is 
required.  Newer HMI platforms now include the ability to integrate the Master Alarm 
Database to the HMI so the operator has direct access to this information when an 
alarm activates. 
5.3.2. Performance Monitoring 
Performance Monitoring closes the continuous improvement process loop.  Alarm 
activation data is analysed and compared against performance metrics.  If any metrics 
are exceed then the individual alarms causing the performance metric exceedance are 
identified – these are called Bad Actors.  Bad Actors are investigated to establish the 
root cause of the performance issue and changes are made to ensure they no longer 
cause performance issues. 
In some cases Bad Actors are a result of poor alarm design.  The treatment options for 
these alarms are to apply the best practice techniques such alarm masking, hysteresis 
and time delays.  Sometimes the operation of the subsystem needs to be observed.  
Unreliable and faulty equipment can cause Bad Actor alarms.  The treatment option 
for these alarms is not in the scope of alarm management.  It usually requires 
engineering and maintenance personnel to investigate and correct the issues with the 
equipment.  In some cases the alarm itself does not fit the definition to be an alarm.  
No investigation of alarm rates or subsystem operation will change the fact that the 
alarm is just not required.  The treatment option for these alarms is removal.  In some 
instances there is a combination of several alarm problems which are the cause of a 
Bad Actor. 
Using the data in the alarm and event database Alarm reports are produced which 
analyse the chronological nature of the data.  Reports are produced over various 
periods.  ISA-18.2-2009 recommends that analysis of alarm performance should be 
conducted with data over a period of at least 30 days.  It is not uncommon thought 
have daily, weekly and monthly alarm reports. 
One of the key performance metrics used is the average alarm rate.  This alarm rate 
should only consider alarms for the plant area that the operator is actually monitoring 
– not the whole site, unless of course, the operator monitoring the whole site. ISA-
18.2-2009, EEMUA 191 and the ASM consortium all recommend that the ‘likely to be 
acceptable’ alarm rate for an operator 150 alarms per day.  This works out to be 
approximately one alarm per ten minutes.  This is based on the time it takes for the 
operator recognise the alarm, decide the correct course of action, take the action and 
monitor the return to normal process conditions.  This must be completed along with 
the operator’s other tasks.  ISA-18.2-2009, EEMUA 191 and the ASM consortium also 
recommend that the ‘maximum manageable’ alarm rate is 300 alarms per day.   
A full list of the ISA-18.2-2009 performance metrics can be seen in Figure 24.  This is 
the most comprehensive list of performance metrics available the current industry 
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guides and standards.  Note that it may not be necessary or appropriate to implement 
all performance measures identified in Figure 24.  This judgement must be made based 
on the needs, size and complexity of the site.  The alarm rate should always remain the 
key performance metric though. 
 
 
Figure 24 – ISA-18.2-2009 Performance Metrics (ISA, 2009) 
 
Alarm reports can be presented many different ways.  It is common to present alarm 
rates in graphic format.  This allow for quick visualisation of how well the alarm system 
is performing overall.  Tables showing actual alarm performance for each performance 
metric are also used – Figure 25  shows an example.  This report uses the performance 
metric of daily alarm rate; the peak alarm rate, which looks at the number of alarms in 
a 10 minute period; alarm flooding; fleeting alarms; the top ten percentage; and, 
standing alarms.    
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Figure 25 – Example of alarm report results against performance metrics 
 
A common analysis to include in an alarm report is a top alarm table.  This is most 
frequently occurring alarms in the reporting period.  Normally the top ten, 20 or 50 
alarms are presented in descending order of their total activations. This allows several 
performance metrics to be interpreted easily, as well as the identification Bad Actors.  
The table can be used to quickly direct efforts to improve and maintain the alarm 
rates.  Some of the key columns are included are the total count of activations as well 
as the percentage of the total count (as percentage of the total activations in the 
reporting period).  Another useful column is the cumulative percentage of each alarm, 
working down the table. 
 
 
Figure 26 – Example of Alarm Top Alarm Table 
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Figure 26 shows and example of a top alarm table from a daily alarm report.  This is an 
example of how it could be interpreted: 
 The top alarm looks to be a fleeting alarm – there are 62 activations while the 
next ranked alarm has only 18 activations. 
 The second and third alarm have the same number of counts.  It is know that 
the second alarm is a sequence and the third alarm is a valve operated by that 
sequence – these two alarms are for the same problem so half of the count of 
these two alarms is not required. 
By focusing efforts to deal with the first alarm and ensuring the second alarm and third 
alarm do not both activate for the same problem could improve the alarm rate by 58% 
(refer to the second row in the ‘Accum’).  The third alarm looks to be a problem with 
the valve – a discrepancy alarm.  If maintenance could investigate rectify the valve the 
third alarm could be eliminated, the overall improvement would then be 71% (refer to 
the third row in the cumulative ‘Accum’ column). 
This example shows some of the problems identified in alarm reports are not just 
poorly configured alarms – they are actual problems with the plant or equipment.  A 
well performing alarm system can quickly identify process and equipment problems.  
This improves can improve the effectiveness of maintenance at a facility.  Rothenberg 
(Rothenberg, 2009) suggests that within six months of practicing a good alarm 
management regime unplanned maintenance costs by will reduce by 5 – 15%.  
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Chapter 6 – The Project Site                                                                               
 
The project site is one of Western Australia’s largest coal fired power plants.  For 
commercial reasons the site has requested to remain unnamed.  
6.1. Coal Fired Power Generation Process Description 
The following is not exhaustive description of all aspects of the coal fired power 
generation process.  It gives a basic understanding of the industrial process which will 
help put into context some of the decisions and approaches used to select the correct 
alarming strategies for Bad Actor alarms.   Figure 16 shows a schematic presentation of 
the process. 
The process of coal fired power generation has largely remained unchanged for many 
decades.  The combustion of coal produces heat energy.  The heat energy is used in a 
Rankine cycle where the heat energy is transferred to water, which is converted to 
steam.  The steam is feed to a turbine where the heat energy is extracted from the 
steam and converted into mechanical energy.  The steam is then condensed back to 
water and the cycle continues again.  The mechanical energy produced in the turbine is 
used to drive a generator which creates electrical energy. 
 
 
Figure 27 – Coal Fired Power Generation Process 
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6.1.1. Coal Handling 
Coal is delivered to the project site from local mines by an overland conveyor system.  
The size of the coal is approximately 50mm by 50mm by 50mm.  Once the coal is 
received on site there are two options – it may be conveyed to large hoppers call coal 
bunkers where it is feed directly into the Boiler furnace or directed to onsite stockpiles.  
The used of coal from the stockpiles or direct bunkering of the coal is managed based 
on coal delivery windows and the amount of coal in the coal bunkers.  There are 
several conveyers and transfer points which manage the movement of coal around the 
site. 
6.1.2. Air Pre-Heating 
Air for combustion is preheated before being delivered to both the Coal Milling plant 
and directly to the Boiler.  The combustion air pushed into the Boiler using a large fan 
called a Forced Draft Fan.  The heat for the pre-heating is recovered from the Boiler 
Furnace Gasses.  The Furnace Gasses are drawn out of the Boiler using large fans call 
Induced Draft Fans. 
The air pre-heater collects Ash from the combustion of the coal.  The ash is removed 
on a regular basis to prevent ash blockages forming in the air and furnace gas paths.  
The ash is collected and transferred to the Ash Handling plant several times a day. 
6.1.3. Coal Milling 
Before coal is feed to the Boiler is it milled to a powder consistency in large machines 
called Pulverisers.  The coal (or Pulverised Fuel) is then blown directly to the Boiler 
using some of the pre-heated combustion air.  The heat also removes any trapped 
moisture in the coal. 
The coal supply contains impurities such as pyrites (iron sulphides commonly found in 
coal reserves), sand and rock.  The Pulveriser is able to separate the out these 
impurities.  The impurities (or mill rejects) are sent to the Ash Handling plant.  
6.1.4. Boiler 
The Boiler is a large furnace where Pulverised Fuel is combusted.  The walls of the 
furnace are made from metal tubes filled with water that circulates throughout the 
Boiler.  The radiant heat energy from the combustion is absorbed into water and it is 
converted into steam.  The steam is then piped to into heat exchangers where 
convection heat energy from the combustion gasses super heats the steam.  The 
superheated steam the supplied to the steam turbine. 
The water supplied to the Boiler is high quality demineralised water.  This ensures that 
corrosion does not damage the metal components in the Boiler and steam turbine.  
The quality of the water in the Boiler is closely monitored and controlled.  To maintain 
the quality of the water a portion it is continuously replaced with new water from the 
Water Treatment Plant.  
One of the by-products of the combustion of coal is ash particles.  Apart from the 
environmental considerations of emitting particulate matter to the environment, the 
ash must be removed from the Boiler to prevent blockages.  The Boiler is designed to 
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accumulate ash in specific areas. From these areas the ash can be removed in a 
controlled manner while the Boiler is operating.  The ash is removed using specialised 
plant and equipment to transfer the ash to the Ash Handling plant several times a day. 
6.1.5. Steam Turbine and Generator 
The steam turbine consists of three separate turbines connected to a common shaft.  
The High Pressure turbine converts the heat energy in the Main Steam into mechanical 
energy.  The steam is then sent back to the Boiler again and reheated.  The Hot Re-
heat Steam is supplied to the Intermediate Pressure turbine where further heat energy 
is extracted and converted into mechanical energy.  The steam is then directed to the 
Low Pressure turbine where the last possible amounts of heat energy are converted 
into mechanical energy.  Some of the steam in the High Pressure and Intermediate 
Pressure turbines is directed to the Feed Water Heating plant.  This steam is referred 
to as Bled Steam. 
The Generator is a synchronous alternating current generator.  The common shaft of 
the three steam turbines is linked to the rotor of the generator.  The rotor contains a 
rotating magnetic field that is produced using direct current voltage.  The Generator 
casing contains the three phase windings where the electrical power generated and 
output for transmission to the electrical energy grid. 
6.1.6. Condenser 
Steam that exits the Low Pressure turbine is cooled in the shell side of a large shell and 
tube heat exchanger.  The steam condenses into water.  This is then pumped to the 
Feed Water heating plant. 
Cooling water in the tube side of the condenser is supplied from the Cooling Tower.  
This water is low quality water.  It carries away the latent heat energy recovered from 
the steam as it condenses into water. 
6.1.7. Cooling Tower 
The cooling water from the Condenser cascades down the Cooling Tower.  Large fans 
blow air through the cooling water as it cascades down.  The removes the heat energy 
in the Cooling Water.  The heat energy is released into the atmosphere and a large 
amount of water also evaporates.  The cooling water is then returned to the 
condenser. 
The evaporation of the cooling water means that significant amounts of water are 
required to keep the cooling water system full of water.  The cooling water is also 
affected by the accumulation of salts and biological growth.  The quality of Cooling 
Water is closely monitored and controlled.  The main method to control the quality of 
the water is to constantly relace the water with new water from the Supply Water 
Treatment plant.  This creates significant amounts of Waste Water. 
6.1.8. Feed Water Heating 
To improve the efficiently of the Rankine cycle the feed water is heated bled steam 
from the steam turbine.  A series of shell and tube heat exchangers increase the 
Implementing Industry Best Practice Alarm Management – The Project Site 
 
Author: Daniel Snelgar                                                                                                                  Page 52 
 
temperature of the feed water.  The bled steam condenses in the shell section of the 
heat exchangers and is then returned to the feed water 
6.1.9. Furnace Gas Ash Removal 
Some Ash is left in the furnace gasses after it exits the Boiler and Air Pre-Heating plant.  
This ash is removed from the Furnace Gasses using electro-static attraction.  The ash is 
collected and transferred to the Ash Handling plant. 
6.1.10. Ash Handling 
All of the ash from the Boiler, Air Pre-Heater and Furnace Gas Ash Removal is mixed 
with water so it can be transferred to the Ash Storage area using pumps. 
6.1.11. Ash Storage 
Ash and water are pumped into a large dam on the site.  Here the ash and water are 
separated.  The water drains to central collection point where it is recovered and 
returned to the Ash Handling plant for reuse. 
6.1.12. Supply Water Treatment 
Raw Water is supplied to the site and stored in a large dam.  The raw water is neither 
suitable for use as cooling water or boiler water.  The Supply Water Treatment plant 
produces water which able to be used in the cooling water system as well as 
demineralised water for the boiler.  Some waste water is created as a by-product.  
6.1.13. Waste Water Treatment 
Waste water from the Boiler, Cooling Tower and Supply Water Treatment plant is 
treated.  Salty water is produced and piped offsite for disposal.  Other impurities are 
concentrated and sent to the Ash Storage area.  
6.2. Control System Infrastructure Description 
 
 
Figure 28 – Site Control System Infrastructure 
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The following is not exhaustive description of all aspects the control system 
infrastructure.  It gives a basic understanding of the control system infrastructure 
which will help put into context some of the decisions and approaches used to develop 
tools such as the Master Alarm Database and alarm reports. 
6.2.1. DCS Controllers and I/O Interface 
There are twenty DCS controller cabinets which can contain up to 64 cards each.  
Three types of cards are predominantly used in the control system; a universal input 
card which can read both ‘analog’ and ‘digital’ inputs; a ‘digital’ drive card which has 
the required inputs and outputs for a ‘digital’ drive; and, an ‘analog’ drive card which 
the required inputs and outputs for an ‘analog’ drive.  The drive cards also serve as the 
DCS controllers.  The application software is allocated to the drive cards.  Some of the 
drive cards are only used for application software and do not have a connection to any 
drives. 
The controller cabinets are spread through several areas in the plant.  A proprietary 
dual redundant inter-controller network links all of the controller cabinets.  There are 
specialised serial communications cards for interfacing to the HMI system and 
engineering stations. 
6.2.2. HMI System 
There are two HMI systems in use at the project site.  The first system is the original 
system that was installed when the site was constructed.  This system can be seen in 
the left clouded region in Figure 28.  This system is the primary HMI used for operation 
of the plant.  The system is based on three Linux HMI servers.  There is a Thinwire 
Coaxial TCP/IP connection from the each HMI server to a specialised serial 
communications card.  This is the communications interface that connects the HMI 
server to the inter-controller communications network.  This allows the HMI server to 
access all required signals throughout control system. 
The HMI server acts as a central data concentrator for the current status and values of 
process variables, alarm handling and forwarding operator commands to the DCS 
controllers.  The HMI servers use the X-Window system (a windowing system for 
Unix/Linux type operating systems) to provide the HMI interface to Windows based 
HMI stations.  There are 10 HMI stations throughout the plant.  Only five HMI stations 
are available for control of the plant.  Three are located in the central control room 
and one each in the Coal Handling plant and Water treatment plant.  The other HMI 
stations are for engineering and management access to view the operation of the 
plant.  These are located in offices around the plant.   
The second HMI system is a newer system.  This system was installed as a part of an 
upgrade to replace the primary HMI system.  This upgrade has stalled and has not 
been completed.  There are plans to resume the upgrade in the near future.  This 
system can be seen in the right clouded region in Figure 28.  It uses Linux based 
‘Gateway’ servers with the same type of Thinwire Coaxial TCP/IP connection to the 
inter-controller communications network as the primary HMI system.  A Windows 
based HMI server is then paired to each Gateway server.  The HMI server would act as 
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a central data concentrator for HMI stations but none have been installed.   There are 
two Gateway/HMI server pairs for redundancy.  There also a dual redundant TCP/IP 
HMI network for the new HMI system.  
6.2.3. Engineering System 
The engineering system comprises of a LINUX based server with two Windows based 
engineering stations.  This system can be seen in the central clouded region in Figure 
28.  The server is the central of a database for the configuration of the application 
software.  The engineering stations are where the applications software is developed.  
There is an RS232 serial link from each engineering station to specialised serial 
communications cards.  This is the communications interface that connects the 
engineering stations to the inter-controller communications network.  This allows the 
engineering stations load the application software to any of the DCS controller cards. 
The engineering station connects to three TCP/IP networks – the engineering network; 
the primary HMI network; and, the ‘Gateway’ network, which is part of the new HMI 
system.  It acts as a TCP/IP Router for these networks.  HMI configuration information 
for the application software is sent to each of the HMI systems via these networks. 
6.2.4. Historian System 
The Historian is part of the new HMI system – this is one of the reasons why both HMI 
systems are still active.  The Historian is integrated into the new HMI system.  This 
system can be seen in the right clouded region in Figure 28.  This Historian server is a 
Windows based server running proprietary database software to store ‘analog’ data 
and Microsoft SQL Server to store alarm and event data. 
The Historian server connects to the dual redundant TCP/IP HMI network.  It uses OPC 
communications protocols to collect ‘analog’ data from the HMI servers.  Alarm and 
event data is transferred to the Historian using propriety software on the HMI servers.  
In the case of one of the HMI server’s failing the other will continue to be available for 
the Historian and data storage will continue uninterrupted.  In the event of a failure of 
the Historian server the HMI servers will buffer data until the HMI server is available 
again.  All the buffered data will then be transferred to the Historian, meaning no data 
will be lost.  
The Historian server also has a connection to the business TCP/IP network via a TCP/IP 
firewall.  This allows client applications on the business network to access data on the 
Historian.  Client Proprietary software tools are installed on many computers on the 
business network to access both ‘analog’ and alarm and event data.  There are also 
Microsoft Excel Addin’s that allow both ‘analog’ and alarm and event data to be 
exported into spreadsheets for further analysis. 
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Chapter 7 – Alarm Philosophy                                                                     
 
The structure of the Alarm Philosophy is explained in the following sections.  This is not 
a complete recount of the document.  It explains some of the rationale behind the 
development of the Alarm Philosophy.  The Alarm Philosophy document itself can be 
found in Appendix D. 
When developing the Alarm Philosophy there were three considerations.  Firstly it is 
expected that the Alarm Philosophy will mature as the site journeys towards 
sustainable alarm management practices.  For this reason the Alarm Philosophy does 
not attempt to fully comply with ISA-18.2-2009.  Attempting full compliance is likely to 
overwhelm the site and jeopardise the success of their alarm management program. 
The second consideration was the technical capability of the DCS at the project site.  It 
pre-dates standards and guides such as ISA-18.2-2009 and EEMUA 191.  It does not 
have the technical capabilities or features to be fully compliant with requirements of 
an alarm system identified in these standards and guides.  Some limitations and work 
arounds must be in place. 
The final consideration was the resourcing at the project site.  Like many organisations 
the personnel at the project site are very busy with many tasks.  Trying to implement a 
new system of work that heavily impacts many personnel could also jeopardise the 
success of their alarm management.  The Alarm Philosophy is focused on developing 
some operational discipline in the alarm management and improving the daily alarm 
rate, which is the main problem area at this time. 
7.1. Alarm Management Roles 
The development of the Alarm Management Roles, where possible, avoided allocating 
individuals to roles.  Instead the roles were mainly allocated to departments.  The roles 
reflect the actual groups that already exist at the project site.  The roles identified in 
the Alarm Philosophy are: 
 Site Management Team 
 Alarm Champion 
 Asset Engineering 
 Production 
 Maintenance 
The Site Managements Team is the most significant role is alarm management.  They 
must provide the resourcing to complete the activities required.  The resourcing 
includes all of the physical resources as well as the time resources of site personnel.   
Without the support of the Site Management Team alarm management will fail. 
The Alarm Champion role was created so a single person could coordinate all of the 
activities required for successful and sustainable alarm management.  This is the only 
role which does not exist at the project site at present.  This is not a new position at 
the project site, rather a responsibility should be assigned to a person with skills in 
control systems as they knowledge of the control systems and alarms system, as well 
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as skills in systems integration engineering.  This provides the right skill set for driving 
alarm management. 
The role of the Production department is important to the success of the alarm 
management efforts.  The operators are the members of the Production department.  
They are the end users of the alarm system.  The Production department need to hold 
the Alarm Champion to account for the performance of the alarm system.   
The role of the Asset Engineering and Maintenance is to provide the technical 
expertise to support alarm management.  These groups have knowledge of the design 
intent and operating limits of the plant and equipment. 
7.2. Alarm Management Model 
The Alarm Management Model was developed to provide a visual means to identify 
the activities and systems involved in alarm management.  It also reinforces the 
continuous improvement nature of alarm management. 
The core of the Alarm Management Model (shown in blue in Figure 29) includes the 
following: 
 Rationalisation 
 Master Alarm Database 
 Management of Change – a work process to manage technical changes at the 
facility, although not in the scope of the Alarm Philosophy it is important to 
define how alarm management relates to Management of Change 
 DCS Configuration – this reflects the actual alarm as configured via the 
engineering station.  Its position in the Alarm Management Model reflects that 
Rationalisation should always be performed on new alarms and the Master 
Alarm Database is now the master data for alarm configuration, i.e. where the 
specification the alarm configuration is held. 
 Real-time Control – this reflects that fact that the configuration and subsequent 
loading of this configuration into the DCS controllers is what actually results in 
alarms 
 Alarm and Event History Collection – this reflects the Historian where the 
chronological data on the activation of alarms and events is collected. 
 Alarm Performance Reporting 
Another feature of the Alarm Management Model is the work flow entry points.  Three 
workflow entry points are identified: 
 Existing Alarms (the orange start point in Figure 29) – as there has been no 
alarm management at the project site all existing alarms have not been 
designed as per the Alarm Philosophy.  It therefore may be prudent to pro-
actively rationalise some of these alarms.  This may include all alarms from a 
particular plant subsystem, e.g. all alarms on the generator; or, alarms that are 
similar in function from several different subsystems, e.g. all electrical current 
alarms for high voltage motors. 
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 New alarms (the grey start point in Figure 29) – may be required due to new 
plant equipment being installed or personnel may have identified new alarming 
strategies to assist operators in the management of abnormal situations. 
 Bad Actors (the green start point in Figure 29) – are identified in the alarm 
reports. 
 
 
Figure 29 – The Alarm Management Model 
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The final feature of the Alarm Management Model is Bad Actor resolution (shown in 
the green in Figure 29).  There are two possible treatment options for Bad Actors.  The 
first is the Maintenance Rectification.  Alarm maintenance issues include faulty 
equipment, mal-operation or insufficient protection offered by the process control 
layer.  The resolution does not require the alarm to proceed through the Alarm 
Management Model. 
The second treatment option for Bad Actors is Alarm Re-design.  This requires the 
alarm to proceed through the Alarm Management Model, i.e. it is to be rationalised.  
This will result in changes and improvements to eliminate the performance issues.  It is 
then documented in the Master Alarm Database and then installed in the DCS 
controller using site’s Management of Change process. 
7.3. Alarm System Description 
The importance of the Alarm System Description section is to define the alarm system.  
This importance of this is twofold.  It clarifies the capabilities of the alarm system and 
also identifies its limitations. 
The alarm system at the project site pre-dates recommendations from both EEMUA 
191 and ISA-18.2-2009.  Many of the technical requirements identified in these 
documents do not exist at the project site.  An example is the alarm handling 
capabilities identified ISA-18.2-2009, including states such as ‘Shelved’, ‘Suppressed by 
Design’ and ‘Out of Service’.   
One of the features of the HMI is alarm masking.  The application software only 
provides a signal reference to activate the alarm masking.  The implementation of 
alarm masking does not match the ISA-18.2-2009 definition.  In the HMI alarm masking 
only prevents the alarm from making an audible sound and flashing, i.e. it will progress 
directly to the Active and Acknowledged state (refer back to Section 2.3.3 and  
Figure 15 for details).  The alarm will still appear in the Alarm List, in an alarm state on 
graphical displays and also be recorded in the Historian as an alarm activation.   
It is not recommended to use this feature be used on the project site as it does not fit 
the definition in ISA-18.2-2009.  Instead alarm masking should be implemented in the 
application software that is loaded into the DCS controllers.  Note that it was found 
that the HMI alarm masking feature was seldom used.  It was more common to see 
alarm masking implemented in the application software. 
7.4. Alarm Rationalisation 
This is where the alarm rationalisation process is defined.  ISA-18.2-2009 (ISA, 2009) 
suggests that this process should utilise a team approach, which was adopted.  The 
Alarm Philosophy identifies the site personnel who are required at all times, as well as 
requiring other expertise as needs dictate.  The Alarm Champion is nominated as the 
leader of the rationalisation process.  
The rationalisation process also includes specific guidance avoid badly designed 
alarms.  The guidance includes: 
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 The definition of an alarm 
 Ensuring a control system layer is used – alarms should not be used to guide 
normal operation 
 Ensuring the alarm is no the last layer – there should be a shutdown layer 
 Ensuring alarms are not used to prevent harm to people 
 Alarms are not be used for ‘information only’ 
 Grouping of alarms with the same response 
The rationalisation process captures the DCS configuration information required to 
implement the alarm in the application software.  A functional description of the alarm 
is also required.  This may be as simple as a process variable exceeding a predefined 
limit or a complex series of Boolean logic on several different conditions, or a 
combination of both.  Any time delays, hysteresis and alarm masking are also 
considered.  Selecting these three attributes correctly can prevent the alarm creating 
problems in the future such as fleeting alarms and standing alarms. 
The following items are what really define an alarm.  If these points cannot be 
addressed, especially the corrective actions, then the alarm cannot be justified. 
 Consequence of No Action or Incorrect Action 
 Maximum Time for Operator to Respond 
 Potential Causes 
 Corrective Actions 
Determining the consequence may require several areas of expertise.  This is the 
benefit of using a multi-disciplinary team in the rationalisation process.  It is also 
expected that this information will be accessible to an operator in real time.  The 
corrective actions must be in the context of actions the operator can understand and 
actually take.  This is the importance of having an operator as part of the process. 
Another important part of the rationalisation process is selecting an appropriated 
alarm priority. The alarm management corporate directive issued to the project site 
included an example prioritisation matrix as proposed by Hollifield and Habibi in the 
book Alarm Management: A Comprehensive Guide (Hollifield & Habibi, 2001).  This 
matrix has been adopted for the project site.  Table 3 shows the risk matrix as used in 
the Alarm Philosophy. 
A semi-quantitative risk matrix was developed to accompany the prioritisation matrix.  
One of the advantages of this type of risk matrix over a fully qualitative method is that 
it requires less resourcing to use.  Table 4 shows the alarm consequence matrix used in 
the Alarm Philosophy. 
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Table 3 – Alarm Prioritisation Matrix 
Maximum Time for 
operator to 
respond 
Consequence 
Minor Major Severe 
>30 minutes Event Event Event 
10 to 30 minutes 3 3 2 
3 to 10 minutes 3 2 2 
<3 minutes 2 1 1 
 
 
Table 4 – Alarm Consequence Matrix 
Consequence 
Category 
Consequence  
Minor Major Severe 
Safety Any alarm that prevents harm to personnel shall be Priority 1. 
*Alarms  shall not be used as the primary layer of protection to prevent 
harm to personnel  
Environment Local clean up 
required 
Major clean up 
required 
 
Incident report to 
corporate level 
Offsite clean up required 
 
Breech of License 
conditions or incident 
report to regulator 
 
Assets Damage 
or Loss 
Damage or loss 
<$10K 
Damage or loss >$10K Damage or loss >$100K 
Business 
Interruption 
Loss of availability of 
redundant 
equipment 
Temporary loss of 
generating capacity 
<24 hours 
Unit Trip or Shutdown 
 
Temporary loss of 
generating capacity >24 
hours 
Asset Integrity 
 
Any Alarm that protects Asset Integrity shall be Priority 2. 
*Asset Integrity is related to consequences of continued operation outside 
of safe operating windows where consequences may be reduced asset life 
or a scheduled plant shutdown to make repairs. 
 
Two of the consequence categorises in Table 4 were developed specifically for the 
Alarm Philosophy. Alarms should not be used as the last layer of protection to prevent 
undesirable consequences.  A shutdown layer should be used in the case were there 
has been no action or incorrect action in response to an alarm.  Based on this it is likely 
that for the bulk of alarms the consequences of no action or incorrect action will result 
in some sort of shutdown.  The Business Interruption consequence category was 
created for this reason. 
The Asset Integrity consequence category was created as the project site has been 
issued another engineering directive covering asset integrity and safe operating 
windows.  Plant and equipment may be operated at conditions that do not result in 
immediate consequences, and therefore would not result in an alarm being created.  
Prolonged operation at these conditions may result in shortened asset life so should 
therefore be prevented.  An example is the creep lift metal components operating at 
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very high temperatures.  Alarms in this category are automatically assigned a Priority 
of 2.  They require the operator to adjust operation of the plant to ensure it is 
operating within safe operating windows. 
7.5. Alarm Performance Monitoring 
In order to monitor the alarm system performance regular reports are required to 
analyse the historical alarm and event data stored on the Historian.  The definition of 
an alarm for the reporting is “all priority 1, 2, 3 and Maintenance alarms”.  This 
represent alarms which the operator is expected to provide a response.  For the alarm 
reports Disturbance alarms have been ignored.  This is based on ISA-18.2-2009, clause 
9.3.2 which states: 
“Those alarms for which the console operator’s primary response is simply to 
relay the information to the appropriate person or group for action (e.g. 
instrument diagnostics alarms) should be reviewed if an alternative method 
exists the transfer the information without burdening the operator or the alarm 
system.” (ISA, 2009) 
This coincides with current practice on the project site where Disturbance alarms are 
filtered out of alarm displays.  Disturbance alarms are diagnostic type of alarms.  In 
most instances they do not necessarily represent a condition that requires a response 
from an operator.  Disturbance alarms should be monitored regularly (daily) by 
technical personnel.   
Common reporting periods for alarm reports are monthly, weekly and daily.  For the 
project site only monthly and weekly reports were chosen.  This is as a result of two 
factors.  Firstly the baseline alarm rate is an order of magnitude higher than the 
recommend performance metrics.  There are consistent Bad Actors that are generating 
a significant portion of the alarms.  Focusing on daily alarms may shift focus to the 
fleeting alarms that may only create an issues for a day.  These alarms are important to 
resolve but the focus must initially remain on the alarms that will give the most 
sustained improvement. 
Secondly the project site resourcing is limited and finite.  The project site is not 
prepared to resources alarms management on a day by day basis.  The monthly reports 
will keep the focus on sustained improvement.  The weekly reports will give glimpse of 
alarms that may be creating a short term performance issue while still keeping the 
longer term objectives in focus. 
The chosen alarm metrics for the alarms reports are Alarm Priority Distribution, Top 
Alarms and Daily Alarm Total.  These alarm reporting metrics do not reflect all of those 
recommended as best practice.  The Alarm Priority Distribution includes Maintenance 
priority alarms.  These are not included in any of the recognised performance metric.  
The ideally there should be no maintenance alarms, though some will exist.  It was 
decided not redistribute the recommend distribution of the recognised metric to 
include Maintenance alarms.  Instead a target of less than 5% of the total alarm count 
for Maintenance alarms was set.  
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The alarm reports will also include three tables of top alarms.  The tables will include 
the count, percentage and cumulative percentage.  The first table is the Top Alarms – 
this will list the top twenty alarms in the reporting period based on count.  The second 
table is the Top Maintenance Alarms – this will list to top ten maintenance alarms.  
Although Maintenance alarms are included in the Top Alarms analysis splitting them 
out gives a diagnostic for the maintenance department.  The third table is the Top 
Disturbance Alarms – this will list the top ten Disturbance priory alarms.  These alarms 
are not included of any analysis and there are no performance metrics associated with 
these alarms.  Like the Maintenance priority alarms this gives diagnostic for the 
maintenance department. 
Some important metrics have been left out.  Alarm flooding has been left out of the 
metrics because based on the definition of an alarm flood the project site is in a 
permanent state of alarm flood.  Standing alarms have been left out because the 
baseline alarm rates result in the operators using a sequence of event display for 
alarms.  This effectively filters out standing alarms to the operator.  These metrics are 
important and it is envisaged that these metrics will be used in the future.  For now the 
initial focus remains on improving the daily alarms rates to within the recommend 
performance metrics. 
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Chapter 8 – Master Alarm Database                                                       
 
The project site does not have a complete list of all the alarms configured in the DCS 
application software.  There is no means to easily extract a list of all the configured 
alarms in the DCS application software.  The Alarm Philosophy requires that a Master 
Alarm Database be the master data for all configured in the DCS application software.  
The Master Alarm Database was developed to support the documentation 
requirements of the Alarm Philosophy and capture to all of the alarms that are 
configured in the DCS application software.  
8.1. Existing Alarm List 
When the site was constructed a comprehensive set of Operations and Maintenance 
(O&M) manuals were provided by Engineering, Procurement and Contraction (EPC) 
contractor.  Within these manuals a hard copy Alarm List was included.  The Alarm List 
from the O&M manuals was converted to an electronic copy in a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet at some time in the past.  Neither the hard copy version, or the electronic 
version have been maintained, i.e. as new alarms were added to the DCS have not 
been added to the Alarm List.  It is also not known how comprehensive the Alarm List 
was at the time the project site was handed over after construction.  The hard copy 
Alarm List is sometimes used by operators, though not all know of its existence.  Only a 
few of engineering staff know of the existence of the electronic copy. 
The Alarm List comprises of five columns.  The first four are based on the DCS 
configuration of the alarm, while the fifth column is titled ‘Cause/Action’.  Table 5 has 
an explanation of the Alarm List columns.  
 
Table 5 – Columns in the Alarm List 
Column Explanation 
KKS Tag The KKS tag 
Description The text descriptor 
Status Text for the Alarm State  
Priority The priority of the Alarm – 1,2 or 3 
Cause/Action 
A description of the possible cause of the alarm 
and/or action to take when it activates 
 
The Alarm List identifies 4863 alarms, of these: 
 386 have no entry in the Cause /Action column 
 225 are identified as ‘Information Only’ 
 113 suggest to refer to O&M manuals for guidance 
 79 have a limited explanation and then suggest to refer to O&M manuals for 
guidance 
 36 suggest to refer to engineering staff for guidance 
Note: Table 6 has examples of each of these cases. 
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This suggests that a little over 80% percent of the alarms in the Alarm List may have 
had some reasonable consideration into the Cause/Action text.  In some causes this is 
true – the first row of Table 6 does provide some guidance to the operator to identify 
why the alarm is active.  In other cases the Cause/Action text is not helpful – refer to 
the second row of Table 6.  The Cause/Action text only assumes faulty equipment is 
the cause.  There is no reference to process conditions that may be the cause. 
 
Table 6 – Examples from the Alarm List 
KKS Tag Description Status Prio Cause Action 
11LDF10CP030 XH62 PRESSURE CPP INLET <LOW 3 Insufficient inlet pressure for 
the condensate polisher to 
function correctly. Check 
condensate extraction pumps 
are in service and that the 
polisher is not isolated from the 
condensate system. Check that 
the pressure switch has not 
been isolated from the 
condensate system. 
11LBG30CP004 XG11 AUX STM PRESS 2 (CRH) HIGH 2 AUX-STM pressure is high. 
Faulty transmitter. Check and 
rectify. Check and replace if 
necessary 
11LBG30CP014 XG11 CRH CV AIR FAIL SW FAIL 2   
90GBL10EE108 XG11 SUPP WTR TRF P2 CTL VOLT HEALTHY 3 Information Only 
90BMA00CE010 XG11 415V MEAS CUB UV FAULT 3 Refer to LV switchgear O&M 
volume 2of3 section3. 
11PAD60CE402 XG11 3300V CT FAN 6 THEROVLD WARNING 3 Motor thermal overload alarm 
.. Refer to MV switchgear O&M 
section 3. 
11QUA10CQ045 XH11 FW AT ECO 1NL -ACID CTY >HIGH 2 Refer station chemist for 
action. 
 
The Alarm List information was kept for the Master Alarm Database.  Although a 
significant portion (>20%) of the guidance in the Alarm List may be of questionable 
quality, this information may assist in the rationalisation of existing alarms. 
8.2. Extraction of DCS Configured User Alarms 
There is no method view all of the configured User Alarms in the DCS.  The engineering 
station provides limited lists of the configured alarms.  The lists are restricted to alarms 
within a single Function Group, or the Function Groups for a single alarm.  The lists 
cannot be exported in any way.   
8.2.1. Alarm Objects in the HMI  
Alarms are configured as part of the application software.  The engineering station 
includes two distinct tools for the configuration of alarms.  The first tool is used for the 
building the application software.  ‘Digital’ signals can be created in several ways: 
 As limit values from an ‘analog’ signal, e.g. the value has exceeded a pre-
defined limit 
 A ‘digital’ measurement, e.g. a pressure switch 
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 The result of Boolean algebra on other ‘digital’ signals, e.g. valve x is open and 
pressure y is greater than z 
This application software is loaded and processed by the DCS controllers. 
The second tool is used for building the objects that form the HMI.  The objects are 
dynamic elements that provide the means for the user to interact with the application 
software.  They are the basic building blocks of the HMI graphical user interface.  
Objects can include, but are not limited to the following types: 
 ‘Digital’ 
 ‘Analog’ 
 Drives 
The objects are loaded into and processed by the HMI system. 
Some of an object’s attributes are configuration information, such as the KKS tag of a 
process variable.  Other attributes are read from the DCS controller such in real time, 
such as the value of process variable.  Some of the attributes are determined by the 
HMI system, such as acknowledged or not acknowledged state of an alarm.  Alarms are 
a subset of the ‘digital’ objects.  If the priority attribute of a ‘digital’ object is 1, 2 or 3 
then it is an alarm; otherwise it is simply an event. 
Much of the following information is not documented within the control system.  It 
was reversed engineered by inspection.  The output of the HMI tool is the 
configuration attributes for all the HMI objects.   This is spread across four main types 
of files ASCII text files.  Each files type has a specific suffix, they are: 
 .BSIG files – contains configuration attributes for ‘digital’ objects 
 .SIG – contains configuration attributes for ‘analog’ objects 
 .KRS – contains confirmation attributes for drive and controller objects 
 .FGR – contains a list of all objects in a function group 
The BSIG files are of interest as they contain the configuration of all of the alarm 
objects. 
All of the HMI configuration files reside in a directory on the Linux based engineering 
station server.  The HMI servers have access to this directory.  As part of the setup and 
maintenance of the HMI servers engineering personnel can request the HMI server to 
update/refresh its configuration of HMI objects.  The HMI server will read the files 
from the directory on the engineering station server and convert these into the actual 
runtime objects. 
As described in Section 2.2.3 the application software is divided into Functions 
(smallest block of code that can be individually programmed), and the grouped into 
Function Groups.  This hierarchy is maintained in the HMI configuration.  There are 396 
function groups at the project site. 
Each file type is named after a Function Group.  All Function groups are named in the 
format of NNAAANNAA, where ‘N’ is a numeric character and ‘A’ is an alphabetic 
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character.  The name of the BSIG file for Function Group 11HFC10EA would be 
‘11FHC10EA.bsig’ 
There is no known limit to the number of ‘digital’ objects that may appear in a BSIG 
file, though the maximum found was 439 ‘digital’ objects in file 90CYE00EU.bsig.   
There are 13 attributes that define a ‘digital’ object.  The attributes are shown in Table 
7.  Note that the control system is of German origin so many of the attributes are 
based on German abbreviations.   
 
Table 7 – ‘Digital’ signal attributes defined in BSIG file 
Attribute in BSIG 
file 
Explanation 
SIGTYP Always has a value of ‘B’, used to signify the next signal in the list  
SIGKZ The KKS tag 
SIGBEZ The text descriptor 
SIGEINH The engineering units if the ‘digital’ value is associated with a limit 
valve 
SIGADR The DCS controller address - this is used so the HMI can read the 
actual value – either 0 or 1 for ‘digital’ objects 
SIGDAT Data type for the signal – system use  
ZUST_1 Text to display when the ‘digital’ value is 1 
ZUST_0 Text to display when the ‘digital’ value is 0 
ZUST_LOG The ‘digital’ value that represents the active (alarm) state 
PRIO The priority of the signal 0 – event, 1,2 and 3 are alarm priorities 
BGREWERT The numerical value if the signal is associated with a limit valve 
MF_SIG System use 
SPERR_KZ Masking Signal – if this signal is active then the alarming in the HMI is 
blocked 
 
The last item in Table 7 is the Masking Signal.  As stated in Section 7.3 and the Alarm 
Philosophy it is recommended that this feature not be used at the project site.  
The configuration attributes the HMI objects in ASCII text files is serialised.  That is, it is 
not presented in a table.  It is a list of the attributes for each object in a specific and 
repeating order. 
The following is an extract of BSIG file for Function group 90CYE00EU: 
SIGTYP: 'B' 
SIGKZ: '90SGA40AP010 XG11' 
SIGBEZ: 'FPSTN PRESS MAINT RUN' 
SIGEINH: '' 
SIGADR: '1 206 32 034 06' 
SIGDAT: 0 
ZUST_1: 'ALARM' 
ZUST_0: 'N ALARM' 
ZUST_LOG: 1 
PRIO: 3 
BGREWERT:  
MF_SIG: 'N' 
SPERR_KZ: '' 
 
 
SIGTYP: 'B' 
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SIGKZ: '90SGA40AP010 XG12' 
SIGBEZ: 'FPSTN PRESS MAINT FLT' 
SIGEINH: '' 
SIGADR: '1 206 32 034 07' 
SIGDAT: 0 
ZUST_1: 'ALARM' 
ZUST_0: 'N ALARM' 
ZUST_LOG: 1 
PRIO: 2 
BGREWERT:  
MF_SIG: 'N' 
SPERR_KZ: '' 
  
The first object ‘90SGA40AP010 XG11’ is for the running status of the fire pump station 
maintenance pump.  This signal has a priority of 3, so it is an alarm.  The alarm state is 
when the ‘digital’ value is ‘1’, which has the text descriptor of ‘ALARM’.   
The second object ‘90SGA40AP010 XG12’ is for the fault status of the fire pump station 
maintenance pump.  This signal has a priority of 2, so it is an alarm.  The alarm state is 
when the ‘digital’ value is ‘1’, which has the text descriptor of ‘ALARM’.   
The following of the BSIG file for Function group 11ETJ00EA:   
SIGTYP: 'B' 
SIGKZ: '11ETJ00EA006 XU01' 
SIGBEZ: 'VACUUM ECO SYSTEM <20kPa' 
SIGEINH: '' 
SIGADR: '1 039 16 003 02' 
SIGDAT: 1 
ZUST_1: 'ACTIVE' 
ZUST_0: 'N ACTIVE' 
ZUST_LOG: 1 
PRIO: 0 
BGREWERT:  
MF_SIG: 'N' 
SPERR_KZ: '' 
 
The object ‘11ETJ00EA006 XU01’ is for a pressure measurement exceeding a pre-
defined limit.  This signal has a priority of 0, so it is an event.  When ‘digital’ value is ‘1’, 
the text descriptor is ‘ACTIVE’.  When ‘digital’ value is ‘0’, the text descriptor is ‘N 
ACTIVE’. 
Note that these extracts do not show the header and footer information that is 
present in the files. 
8.2.2. Development of BSIG Parser Tool 
In order to capture all of the configured alarms a tool has been developed to extract all 
of the ‘digital’ objects defined in the 395 BSIG files.  The result is a single flat table that 
represents all of the ‘digital’ objects that are defined in the application software and 
configured for use by the HMI.  This table includes alarms and events.  The alarms are a 
subset of this configuration. 
The BSIG Parser Tool was developed using a VBA procedure in Microsoft Excel.  The 
output is sent to a spreadsheet.  When developing the BSIG Parser Tool the following 
requirements and constraints where placed: 
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 All of the HMI configuration files directory will be copied off of the engineering 
server into a local working directory onto the computer running the BSIG Parser 
Tool. 
 No further manual manipulation of the HMI configuration files is to be done, 
i.e. the BSIG Parser Tool must be able to process the files as copied from the 
engineering station server. 
 The BSIG Parser Tool must be able process required files automatically, i.e. it 
must be able to determine which files in the directory to process automatically 
without the user specifying individual files to process. 
 The BSIG Parser Tool must ensure each file is processed completely. 
 The BSIG Parser Tool must also capture the Function Group that each ‘digital’ 
object originates from. 
 The BSIG Parser Tool must not create duplicate entries as some digital objects 
appear in multiple Function Groups 
The method employed to extract the data the ASCII text files was text parsing.  Parsing 
is the process where text is split up to smaller blocks of text based on specific 
characters and symbols, this included control characters such as carriage return and 
line feed.  Parsing is an appropriate choice as structure of all of BSIG files is predictable 
and consistent.  
There were 14 attributes of interest identified for the output of the parser.  Table 8 
shows the output attributes and how they map to the attributes contained in the BSIG 
file.  The BSIG file attribute SIGTYP is not used as it is always ‘B’ for ‘digital’ objects.   
 
Table 8 – Headers for BSIG Parser Tool output 
Column Column Header Attribute in BSIG 
file 
1 Tag KKS SIGKZ 
2 Description SIGBEZ 
3 Engineering Units SIGEINH 
4 P14 Address SIGADR 
5 Data Type SIGDAT 
6 Text for Value 1 ZUST_1 
7 Text for Value 0 ZUST_0 
8 Alarm State ZUST_LOG 
9 Priority PRIO 
10 Limit Value BGREWERT 
11 MF_SIG MF_SIG 
12 Masking Signal SPERR_KZ 
13 Number of FGs N/A 
14 Function Groups N/A 
 
Two additional fields have been added.  Function Groups is sourced from the file 
name.  Number of Function Groups is included as a ‘digital’ object can appear in 
multiple Function Groups – this attribute is determined once all of the BSIG files have 
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been processed.  Both of these attributes are useful reference to the configuration in 
the application software. 
As there is no routable IP network connection to the engineering station to the 
business network the files were transferred using portable USB mass storage media.  
The HMI configuration files reside in a subdirectory called ‘PBS_Daten’ on the 
engineering station server.  This complete subdirectory, including all other file types, 
can be copied to the same subdirectory where the BSIG Parser Tool spreadsheet 
resides.  This is important as the tool uses relative references for file operations. 
The operation of the BSIG Parser Tool is as follows: 
The BSIG Parser Tool firstly sets up the headers as per Table 8 in the output 
spreadsheet.  Variables such as the row and column index pointers for the output 
spreadsheet, and the working directly path are initialised.   
The procedure uses to main loops.  The first, or outer loop, is the File Handling Loop.  
At the start of the procedure a list of all of the files with the ‘.bsig’ extension is 
collected using the VBA ‘DIR’ command.  This command will store the first file name 
with the BSIG extension into a string variable.  When looping through files the next 
BSIG file name can easily be retrieved using the ‘DIR’ command – this will update the 
string variable with the next file name. 
Some of the BSIG files to not contain ‘digital’ objects.  These files do not follow the 
naming convention of NNAAANNAA.bsig.  If a filename does not follow this convention 
then the file is skipped.   
The Function Group name is extracted from the BSIG file name.  It is stored so it can be 
added to the Function Group attribute for each of the ‘digital’ object in the BSIG file.  
The file Handling Loop terminates when the DIR command returns and empty string as 
the next filename.  This means all the BSIG files have been process by the File Handling 
Loop. 
In each operation of the file handling loop the BSIG file contents are processed.  To 
read the contents of the BSIG files the VBA ‘Open’ and ‘Line Input’ commands were 
used.  The intent of these commands is read ASCII files line by line.  The Line Input 
command relies on ASCII control characters to determine the end of a line.  VBA 
expects to see a Carriage Return (ASCII character code 13) followed by Line Feed (ASCII 
character code 10) at the end of each line.  As the BSIG files are sourced from a Linux 
based system each line ends with a single Line Feed control character.  This meant that 
the Line Input command could not detect each line individually.  The whole file 
contents were read as a single line. 
To work around this issue is was decided to manage BSIG file lines as part of the text 
parsing.  This option was chosen over manipulating the files prior to parsing.  It is 
possible to add a Carriage Return control character in the correct location.  This would 
require a separate process and potentially another application to manipulate the BSIG 
files.  This would also risk corrupting the BSIG files before they are parsed. 
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The second, or inner loop, is the Line Handling Loop.  The BSIG file is then parsed in 
this loop.  Its operation is as follows: 
The next line of text from the BSIG files contents is extracted by searching and tracking 
the position of the Line Feed control characters.  Note that the code ignores blank 
lines. 
If the line begins with the text ‘SIGTYP’ (which means the start of the next object) the 
output spreadsheet row index is increased by one and the column index is reset to 1.  
The name of the Function Group and Number of FGs (set to ‘1’) is also written to the 
output spreadsheet using the row index and a fixed column numbers. 
If the line does no begin with the text ‘SIGTYP’ the line represents an attribute that is 
to be written to the output spreadsheet.  The text after the ‘:’ character is extracted 
from the line and written to the output spreadsheet using the row index and column 
index as the destination reference.  The 1 column index is then increased by 1 and the 
Line Handling Loop repeats. 
The Line Handing Loop terminates when there is no more text to search.  Once 
terminated the next operation of the File Handling Loop begins. 
A check was implemented to ensure each BSIG file is completely processed.  The was 
implemented to as there was some doubt that larger BSIG files could be read without 
some of the contents being truncated when using ‘Line Input’ command. 
The last line of each BSIG files starts with the text ’E_DA’.  This is part of a string of text 
indicating the date the engineering station generated the file.  By checking the last line 
of the BSIG file as read by the ‘Line Input’ command it can be confirmed that the file 
was processed completely.   
If the file is not completely processed then a message is presented to the user to 
indicate that the file was not fully processed.  Note that no files were incorrectly 
processed by the BSIG Parser Tool. 
The final part of the BSIG Parser Tool is the removal of duplicate entries.  On the 
engineering station it is possible to place a ‘digital’ object in more than one Function 
Group.  Note that the maximum found was for ‘digital’ object ‘11HJQ04CP010 XH11’, 
which was in 52 Functions Groups. 
The text parsing will create an entry for every ‘digital’ object it encounters.  This means 
that the parsing will have created multiple entries for a single ‘digital’ object where it is 
in multiple Function Groups.  Simply deleting duplicates was not an option as the 
Function Group information was to be retained, i.e. how many and which Functions 
Groups is the ‘digital’ object in. 
The attribute Number of FGs was included for this purpose.  Some additional code was 
added to the VBA procedure to remove duplicates but retain all Function Group 
information. 
 
Implementing Industry Best Practice Alarm Management – Master Alarm Database 
 
Author: Daniel Snelgar                                                                                                                  Page 71 
 
Firstly all of the rows in the output spreadsheet are sorted alphabetically by KKS Tag 
Name and Function Group.  This groups all duplicates together.  Starting with the third 
row as the current row the following loop operates: 
If the KKS Tag Name in the current row and the row above are the same then: 
 append the Function Group name in the current row to the Function Group 
name in the row above, and  
 increment the Number of FGs value in the row above the current row by 
one, and 
 delete the current row 
Else 
 increment the current row number by 1 
This loop terminates when the current row is empty. 
This loop progressively deletes duplicate ‘digital‘ object entries while retaining 
Function Group name and keeping count of the number of  Function Groups the 
‘digital’ object was in. 
The operation of the program can be seen visually in Figure 30, Figure 31 and Figure 32 
– note the cross referencing of program flow across the three sheets.  The full VBA 
code listing of the BSIG Parser Tool can be found in Appendix B.1. 
The BSIG Parser tool was developed as an intermediary stage in developing the Master 
Alarm Database so no user interface was developed.  It is not envisaged that the 
project site will require the use of the tool as the Master Alarm Database is the now 
master data for the alarm configuration.   
The BSIG Parser Tool identified 13811 different alarms and events in the DCS 
configuration.  Of this 7084 where identified as alarms.  A screen shot of the output of 
the BSIG Parser Tool can be seen in Appendix B.2 
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Figure 30 – BSIG Parser Tool flow chart – Sheet 1 
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Figure 31 – BSIG Parser Tool flow chart – Sheet 2 
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Figure 32 – BSIG Parser Tool flow chart – Sheet 3 
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8.3. Compilation of the Master Alarm Database 
The Master Alarm Database is the combination of the Alarm List with the output of the 
BSIG Parser Tool structured in a manner that supports the documentation 
requirements identified in the Alarm Philosophy.  To complete the Master Alarm 
Database the output from the BSIG Parser Tool was expanded to include all required 
fields identified in the Alarm Philosophy.  The data from the Alarm List was then 
added.  To complement the Master Alarm Database a Rationalisation template and 
Alarm Help feature was also added.  
8.3.1. Master Alarm Database 
The format chosen for the Master Alarm Database was a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. 
This format was chosen for several reasons: 
 The Master Alarm Database is a single flat table, which is suitable for 
spreadsheet 
 It is faster to develop than relational database software 
 It may be replaced by a commercial product, hence development efforts 
may be wasted 
Alarm Philosophy defines the documentation requirements for the Master Alarm 
Database.  This was the basis for design of the Master Alarm Database.  Table 9 shows 
the fields created for the Master Alarm Database with an explanation of the each.  To 
aid in the useability Master Alarm Database the fields were grouped.  Each grouping is 
colour coded in Master Alarm Database sheet (same colour coding is used in Table 9).  
The grouping used for the fields is as follows: 
 KKS Tag – the unique identifier for each alarm.  This is the same as the KKS Tag 
the alarm has in the DCS 
 DCS Configuration – includes all information required to implement the alarm 
in the DCS application software 
 Alarm Guidance – the consequence, cause and action information for the 
alarm.  This is the information that operators need for alarm help. 
 Risk Assessment – the risk assessment information used to determine the 
priority 
 General – general administrative information 
To construct the Master Alarm Database fields in Table 9 where used to create the 
blank database in a spreadsheet.  The Output from the BSIG Parser was then imported 
to the spreadsheet.  Table 10 shows how BSIG Parser Tool output fields where mapped 
to Master Alarm Database fata fields. 
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Table 9 – Master Alarm Database Data Fields 
                               KKS Tag KKS Tag of the alarm signal 
DCS 
Configuration 
Description The text descriptor of the signal 
Alarm Text The text descriptor for the alarm state 
Normal Text The text descriptor for the non-active alarm state 
Priority Priority of the alarm as configured in the DCS 
Type A choice of :Measured Limit Value 
                      Calculated Limit Value 
                      Measured Binary 
                      Logic 
Alarm Set Point or Logic 
Conditions 
The functional description is the DCS configuration 
required to implement the alarm.  This is the alarm 
set point or logic conditions that will activate the 
alarm 
Time Delay Time delay applied to the alarm 
Hysteresis Hysteresis applied to the alarm 
Masking Conditions Identity any logic conditions in the DCS which can 
be used to prevent the alarm from activating 
unnecessarily, i.e. sub-system or equipment 
shutdown which may generate an alarm that is 
unnecessary 
# FGs How many Function Groups the alarm is in 
FG The names of the Function Group(s) the alarm is in 
Alarm 
Guidance 
Consequence if no or incorrect 
action is taken 
What is the consequence if no action or the 
incorrect action is taken - assume any shutdown 
layers will operate 
Possible Cause What are the potential causes of the abnormal 
situation 
Corrective Action What is the corrective action to be taken to return 
the process to normal operation 
Time to Respond How long does the operator have to respond to 
the alarm in order to prevent the abnormal 
situation from escalating to the consequence 
Risk 
Assessment 
Safety 
Refer to the Risk Matrix in the Alarm Philosophy 
Environment 
Asset Business 
Recommended Priority 
Priority 
General 
Comments Any additional comments or justifications should 
be noted here 
Rationalised 
Yes / No 
Since all alarms have never been rationalised all 
have been set to 'No'.  Set to yes once each alarm 
is rationalised 
Rationalisation Team The names and function of those in the session 
should be recorded here 
Date of Last Rationalisation The date of the rationalisation session 
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Table 10 – Mapping of BSIG Parser output to Master Alarm Database data fields 
BSIG Parser Output 
(refer to Table 8) 
Master Alarm Database Field 
(refer to Table 9) 
Tag KKS KKS Tag 
Description Description 
Engineering Units Not uses 
P14 Address Not used 
Data Type Not used 
Text for Value 1 These map to Alarm Text and Normal Text 
depending on the value of Alarm State Text for Value 0 
Alarm State Not used - See above 
Priority Priority 
Limit Value Not used 
MF_SIG Not used 
Masking Signal Not used 
Number of FGs # FGs 
Function Groups FGs 
 
The mapping is direct except for the BSIG Parser Tool output field of ‘Text for Value 1’ 
and ‘Text for Value 0’.  The Master Alarm Database uses the fields ‘Alarm Text’ and 
‘Normal Text’.  The mapping of these fields is dependent on the BSIG Parser Tool 
output field ‘Alarm State’.  If the value of ‘Alarm State’ is ‘1’ then ‘Text for Value 1’ was 
mapped to ‘Alarm State’ and ‘Text for Value 0’ was mapped to ‘Normal Text’.  If the If 
the value of ‘Alarm State’ is ‘0’ the mapping was opposite.  A simple VBA procedure 
was created to perform the import of the BSIG Parser Tool output (code not provided). 
The Data from the Alarm List was then imported to the Master Alarm Database.  The 
Alarm List has only one text field for alarm guidance – ‘Cause/Action’.  In the Master 
Alarm Database there are three fields for alarm guidance.  It was decided to map the 
‘Cause/Action’ text into the ‘Possible Cause’ field.  There was no rationale behind this 
choice – it was an arbitrary decision.   
A simple VBA procedure was created perform the import of the Alarm List (code not 
provided).  This procedure looked for KKS Tag matches in the Alarm List and Master 
Alarm Database.  Whenever there was a match the ‘Cause/Action’ text was copied to 
the ‘Possible Cause’ field.  For the import the Master Alarm Database was assumed to 
be the master data as it was derived from the actual DCS configuration, as well as the 
fact that the Alarm List has not been maintained. 
To complete the Master Alarm Database an introduction and instructions were added 
as well as the field definition – Table 9.  Note that the instructions refer to the 
Rationalisation Template describe in Section 8.3.2. 
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The instruction sheet is documented as follows: 
 Introduction 
This is the Master Alarm Database.  It is the master data for Alarms on site.  
Alarms should not be changed in the DCS configuration without first being 
identified in this database. 
Instructions 
1. Prior to the rationalisation session create a copy of the Rationalisation 
Template and name if after the KKS tag name of the Alarm and fill as many of 
the DCS Configuration fields as possible. 
2. During the rationalisation session fill in all of the fields 
Note: if an alarm is to be removed leave all other fields blank and indicate in 
the comments section that it is to be deleted and the reasons why 
3. After the alarm rationalisation session correct site Management of Change 
procedures should be followed to implement any alarm changes in the DCS 
configuration, a copy of the completed Alarm Template sheet should be 
attached to this documentation. 
4. Once the DCS Configuration is up to date the information on the Alarm 
Template sheet for the alarm should copied the Master Alarm Database Sheet 
and the Alarm Template sheet for the alarm sheet then removed from this file.  
If an alarm is to be deleted remove its entry in the Master Alarm Database 
sheet.  It is recommended to keep copies of the Alarm Template sheet for 
alarms in a separated file for reference, especially deleted alarms. 
A screen shot of the Master Alarm Database sheet can be seen in Appendix B.3.  A 
screen shot of the instruction sheet can be seen in Appendix B.4 
8.3.2. Rationalisation Template 
To aid in the rationalisation of alarms a Rationalisation Template was created.  This 
sheet has all of the fields in the Master Alarm Database.  Prior to rationalisation a copy 
of the template should be made each alarm that is to be rationalised.  The 
rationalisation information can them be added during the rationalisation session.  A 
screen shot of the Rationalisation Template can be seen in 0. 
One of the features of the Rationalisation Template is an automated determination of 
the alarm priority based on the prioritisation matrix and risk matrix defined in the 
Alarm Philosophy.  The determination is performed using formulas within the 
spreadsheet.  Figure 33 shows an example where a Severe consequence with a 
Maximum Time to respond of 3 to 10 minutes has been selected.  The recommend 
priority has automatically and correctly selected to Priority 2.  Figure 34 shows the 
same selections, though this time a Safety consequence has been added.  The 
recommend priority has automatically and correctly selected to Priority 1.  
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Figure 33 – Rationalisation template priority selection 
 
 
 
Figure 34 – Rationalisation template priority selection with safety consequence 
 
8.3.3. Alarm Help Interface 
The Master Alarm Database spreadsheet is not suitable tool for operators.  It is quite 
cumbersome to find specific consequence, cause and action information for an alarm.  
An Alarm Help Interface was added so the required alarm information could be 
accessed without having to navigate through the spreadsheet.  The Alarm Help 
Interface only displays information that is relevant to operators. 
It is envisaged that a copy of the Master Alarm Database will be made available to 
operators in the Central Control Room.  They have access to the computer on the 
business network immediately adjacent to one of the HMI stations.  The computer is 
used by operators on a regular basis for electronic operating logs so it a good 
candidate to use the Master Alarm Database with the Alarm Help Interface active.  
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The Alarm Help Interface provides a means to quickly search for a specific alarm and 
retrieve the documented information operators would require.  A simple User Form 
was added to the Master Alarm Database spreadsheet to show the following 
information for a KKS Tag: 
 Descriptor 
 Alarm Text 
 Consequence if no or incorrect action is taken 
 Potential Causes 
 Corrective Action 
 
 
Figure 35 – Screen Shot of Alarm Help Interface 
 
The Alarm Help Interface can be activated by selecting the ‘Alarm Help’ button in the 
top left hand corner of the Master Alarm Database sheet (refer to Appendix B.3).  
When the Alarm Help User Form first opened VBA code populates the Alarm KKS Tag 
combo box will a list of all of the alarms in the Master Alarm Database spreadsheet.   
To find an alarm the user can either use the drop down to scroll to the required alarm 
or they can begin typing a KKS.  The list will automatically begin to filter to the first 
match it finds in the list.  It will continue to filter as typing continues. 
To retrieve the information from the Master Alarm Database the ‘Find’ button on the 
User Form is selected.  This calls a VBA procedure which searches the Master Alarm 
Database spreadsheet for the alarm that in the KKS Tag Combo box.  Using the row 
number of the alarm as a reference the User Form is populated with the required 
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information.  If the alarm cannot be found the all field a cleared except for the 
Descriptor field, which will display ‘Not Found’.   
The Alarm Help interface can be seen in Figure 35.  The full VBA code listing of the 
Alarm Help Interface can be found in Appendix B.6. 
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Chapter 9 – Alarm Report Tool                                                                       
 
The Alarm Reporting Tool was developed to support the alarm performance metrics 
identified in the Alarm Philosophy, refer to Section 7.5 for details. 
9.1. Test Environments 
As time on the project site is limited a test environments were implemented to allow 
development of the alarm reporting tools.  The test environments replicate the SQL 
database named “PlaCoEvents” on the Historian.  Data from the project site Historian 
was exported and the imported to the test environments. 
 
Table 11 – Alarm and Event Table Definition 
Column Name Data Type Comment 
EVENT_ID bigint Event ID number assigned by SQL server 
ts_subsystem datetime 
Date and timestamp of alarm/event in UTC in the format:  
YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS.000 
ts_subsystem_ms char(3) Millisecond of alarm/event 
ts_notify datetime Same as ts_subsystem but time shifted by -8 hours 
ts_notify_ms char(3) Always '000' 
tag_name nvarchar(100) 
Tag name of the HMI object that is the source of the 
alarm/event as configured in the engineering station and 
loaded to the DCS controller 
tag_description nvarchar(100) 
Text descriptor of the HMI object that is the source of the 
alarm/event as configured in the engineering station and 
loaded to the DCS controller 
tag_status nvarchar(100) HMI system generated descriptor of Alarm condition 
tag_limit nvarchar(100) 
Date and timestamp of alarm/event in local time in the 
format:  MM/DD/YY HH:MM:SS 
Line_name nvarchar(50) Always '800xA' 
area_shortID nvarchar(50) Always '143413803' 
area_longID nvarchar(100) Always 'Null' 
ev_longdescription nvarchar(100) Always 'Null' 
ev_shortdescription varchar(50) Always blank 
ev_comment nvarchar(400) Always 'Null' 
ev_modif nvarchar(100) Always 'Null' 
ev_prio smallint Priority of alarm/event 
info_01 nvarchar(100) 
Blank if the row is for an alarm/event transitioning to any 
'Active’ state, "CLEARED' if the row is for an alarm/event 
returning to a 'Normal' state 
info_02 nvarchar(100) Always '0x0' 
Field_A nvarchar(100) Priority of alarm/event (different numbering system) 
Field_B nvarchar(100) Always 'SIMP' 
Field_C nvarchar(100) Always '20' 
IO nvarchar(20) Always blank 
ev_ws nvarchar(50) Always blank 
CompuNo nvarchar(70) Always blank 
tag_shortdescription nvarchar(100) HMI system generated descriptor of Alarm condition 
ev_quitt nvarchar(50) Always 'Null' 
ev_tS_quitt nvarchar(50) Always 'Null' 
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The scope of test system was limited to the alarm and event table “tbl_events”.  This 
table stores all of the alarm and event data collected by the HMI servers.  By inspecting 
the SQL database configuration a specification of the table was created – it can be 
seen in Table 11.  Note that this definition is only considered for alarms and events as a 
result of the application software.  Some alarms and events are recorded that are 
sourced from the HMI server and Historian.  These are not presented to operators, so 
they have been ignored for this project. 
Two test environments were required to complete to development of the Alarm 
Reports.  The test environments were created in virtualized operating systems.  
VMWare Player was used to create and manage the virtualised test environments.  
VMWare Player is free for non-commercial use. 
 
 
Figure 36 – Screenshot of LocalDB Test Environment 
The first test environment was created using Microsoft SQL LocalDB 2012 on a 
Windows 7 Operating System.  LocalDB is aimed at application developers.  It is simple 
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to install and manage and free to use.  It is based on the 2012 edition of MS SQL 
Server.  Local DB has a database size limitation of 10GB and it does not accept remote 
connections.  The LocalDB 2012 software was administered using Microsoft SQL 
Management Studio Express 2012.  Figure 36 shows a screen shot of the test 
environment with table ‘tbl-events’ created. 
 
 
Figure 37 – Screenshot of MSDE Test Environment 
 
The second test environment was created using Microsoft MSDE2000A on a Windows 
XP Operating System.  The use of MSDE is aimed at users with small databases.  It is 
free for non-commercial use.  It is based on the 2000 edition of MS SQL Server though 
it has some built in performance limitations.  MSDE2000A has a database size 
limitation of 2GB and it does accept remote connections.  The MSDE2000A software 
was administered using Microsoft SQL Management Studio Express 2005.  Figure 37 
shows a screen shot of the test environment with table ‘tbl-events’ created. 
Implementing Industry Best Practice Alarm Management – Alarm Report Tool 
 
Author: Daniel Snelgar                                                                                                                  Page 85 
 
The size of SQL database at the project site was approximately 380 MB per month.  
With 1000 days of stored data the total size of the database is approximately 12 GB.  
The total database would not fit into the either test environment.  It was decided to 
only use data from the 1st of January 2015 for the project.  For development of the 
reports and data analysis of the alarms and events the LocalDB test environment was 
used.  All of the data for 2015 could fit into the 10GB size limitation. 
The alarm reports will be installed on a computer on the business Ethernet network.  
The reporting tools must be able to connect to the Historian SQL database over a 
TCP/IP network connection.  For this reason the MSDE2000A test environment was 
used for testing.  This test environment is based on the same version of SQL as the 
Historian at the project site - MS SQL Server 2000.  This allows any compatibility issues 
to be minimised before site testing.  The size limitation of 2GB of MSDE200A meant 
only several months of actual data could be imported to the database.  This was 
enough to test the ability to connect using a TCP/IP network and see if there were any 
compatibility issues between the two versions of SQL in the test environments. 
9.2. Historian Event Table Considerations 
Prior to creating the Alarm Report Query there were some issues in the way the 
Historian records alarms and events from the DCS that had to be addressed.  Firstly, 
the new HMI system uses slightly different alarm priority numbering than the original 
HMI system.  If the alarm reports are to be interpreted correctly then the priorities 
have to be redressed to the same priorities that operators are using in the primary 
HMI system.  The difference in the priorities between the two systems is shown in 
Table 12.  Note that only User and System priorities from the ‘Alarm Type’ column will 
be used in the alarm reports.  These other Alarm Types are system events. 
 
Table 12 – Priority Mapping for Historian and HMI 
Historian 
Priority 
Primary HMI Priority Description Alarm 
Type 
1 1 User Priority 1 User 
2 2 User Priority 2 User 
3 Maintenance Maintenance Alarms System 
4 3 User Priority 3 User 
5 N/A HMI system alarms N/A 
8 Disturbance Bad Data System 
9 Disturbance Switchgear Disturbance System 
11 Event Event N/A 
13 Event Drive in test position N/A 
14 Event Logic overrides by user N/A 
15 N/A Auto Disturbance in drive control N/A 
17 N/A HMI system events N/A 
 
Secondly, during the development of the SQL queries it was found that some User 
Alarms can double up in the alarm reports.  This is because the Historian records the 
alarm twice if the alarm originates from an ‘analog’ limit value where the ‘analog’ 
value is also used in drive object – one alarm is recorded for the drive object and 
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another is recorded for ‘digital’ object.  This does not reflect what actually happens in 
the primary HMI, only one alarm is generated.   
On inspection it was seen that all entries in the alarm and event table for ‘digital’ 
objects have a 17 character KKS tag.  This is made up of a 12 character KKS tag of the 
application software Function, a space character and a four character signal extension.  
All entries in the alarm and event table for drive objects only have a 12 character KKS – 
the tag of the application software Function.  To prevent this double up only User 
Alarms with a character length of 17 characters are considered.  This ensures only the 
alarm associated with the ‘digital’ object is counted in the alarm reports. 
Finally, the reference date and time for alarms and events is recorded in three 
different columns – refer back to Table 11 for details.  In column ‘ts_subsystem’ the 
UTC time is recorded.  In column ‘ts_notify’ the date and time shifted by eight hours is 
recorded.  This was thought to be local time at the project site as it was eight hours 
ahead of UTC.  Closer inspection of the date and time in this column showed that the 
time shift to convert the time to local time was actually applied in the wrong direction, 
making the date and time in this column time shifted by 16 hours from local time. 
In the column ‘tag_limit’ the date and time in is shown correct to local time.  The data 
in this column is stored as ‘text’ datatype.  This means it may not be interpreted as a 
date correctly by SQL queries.  This could create errors when processing alarm reports. 
The other two columns store data as a ‘datetime’ data type.  These columns can be 
safety used in calculations involving dates.  For this reason all analysis of dates will be 
performed using the column ‘ts_subsystem’ with eight hours added to convert to local 
time.  Note that the millisecond value of date and times will be ignored for alarm 
reporting. 
9.3. Alarm Report Query 
The alarm report query is based on the use of temporary tables.  Temporary tables are 
allocated memory on the SQL server host computer during the query execution.  This 
allows for data to be manipulated as required while not interfering with the alarm and 
event data in the database tables.   
The alarm report query uses the following temporary tables (note that temporary 
tables are denoted with a ‘#’ character at the start their name): 
 #working – all of the alarms in the reporting period.  This allows actions such as 
returning the priority and correcting the time to be performed only on these 
records of interest. 
 #prioritydistribution – this table the is the total count of alarm in the reporting 
period grouped priority 1, 2, 3 and Maintenance priority 
 #topalarms – this table is the top ten priority 1, 2, 3 and Maintenance priority 
alarms in the reporting period 
 #topmaintenance – this table is the top ten Maintenances priority alarms in the 
reporting period 
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 #topdisturbance – this table is the top ten Disturbance priority alarms in the 
reporting period 
 #dailyrate – this table the is the total count of alarm in the reporting period 
grouped per day 
The following is functional explanation of alarm report query.  It is shown as flow chart 
in Figure 39.  The full SQL code listing of the alarm report query can be found in 
Appendix C.1. 
The first task of the query is to delete any of the temporary tables if they already exist.  
The temporary tables are deleted at the end of the query, but they may already exist if 
the query did not finish correctly the last time it was run. 
The #working table is created by selecting all records from the table ‘tbl_events’ in 
database ‘PlaCoEvents’ that have occurred in the reporting period based on local time.  
The selection is also limited to records which: 
 Have a priority of 8 or 9 (is a System alarm) 
 have a priority or 1, 2 or 4 (is a User Alarm) and KKS tag text is 17 characters 
 the value in column ‘info_01’ is not ‘CLEARED’ (this means the record is for a 
transition to Alarm state) 
Once the #working table has been created the column ‘ts_subsystem’ is converted to 
local time by adding eight hours to each time entry.  The priorities are converted to 
those used in the primary HMI: 
 8 and 9 to 6 (6 is a holding priority as 4 is being used) 
 3 to 0 (0 is used for Maintenance priority in the alarm reports) 
 4 to 3 
 6 to 4 (4 is used for the Disturbance priority in the alarm reports)  
 The #working table is now the source for all further queries.  The total number of 
alarms (Priority 1, 2, 3 and Maintenance) in the reporting period is calculated and 
stored in a variable.  This will be used for further processing.   
The table #prioritydistribution is created by selecting the total count of all alarms 
(Priority 1, 2, 3 and Maintenance) grouped and sorted by priority.  A column is created 
where the count of each priority is divided by the stored total to give a fraction of the 
total.  This is used as the percentage. 
The table #topalarms is created by selecting the top 20 alarms (Priority 1, 2, 3 and 
Maintenance) by count and sorting by the total.  A column is created where the count 
of each alarm is divided by the stored total to give a fraction of the total.  This is used 
as the percentage. 
The table #topmaintenance is created by selecting the top 10 Maintenance priority 
alarms by count and sorting by the total.  A column is created where the count of each 
alarm is divided by the stored total to give a fraction of the total.  This is used as the 
percentage. 
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The variable storing the total count of alarms is recalculated as the total number of 
Disturbance priority alarms.  The table #topdisturbance is then created by selecting the 
top 10 Disturbance priority alarms by count and sorting by the total.  A column is 
created where the count of each alarm is divided by the stored total to give a fraction 
of the total.  This is used as the percentage. 
The table #dailyrate is created by selecting the total count of alarms (Priority 1, 2, 3 
and Maintenance) grouped and sorted by date. 
The temporary tables #prioritydistribution, #topalarms, #topmaintenance, 
#topdisturbance and #dailyrate are the output of the query. 
The final task is to delete all of the temporary tables.  This ensures that the memory 
the tables are using is released.  The scope of any variables is only while the query is 
running and therefore they do not need to be released from memory 
programmatically.  
The output of the alarm report query in Microsoft SQL Management Studio Express 
2012 can be seen in Figure 38 
 
 
Figure 38 – Output of SQL Query in SQL Management Studio 
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Figure 39 – Alarm Report SQL Query flow chart 
 
9.4. Development of Alarm Report Tool 
The alarm report query on its own is not a suitable tool to create alarm reports.  The 
output requires manual manipulation by the user in order to present the data in a 
meaningful way.  To provide a useful tool the alarm report query was further 
developed into the Alarm Report Tool.  The alarm reports will be installed on a 
computer on the business Ethernet network as installing software on the control 
system infrastructure is not permitted.  To be a useful tool it must be able to produce a 
report that is suitable for printing without further processing or manipulation by the 
user 
The Alarm Report Tool was developed for Microsoft Excel 2010.  A Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet solution was chosen as: 
 The application is widely used at the project site 
 VBA has an interface to SQL Server 
 The alarm report query output tables can be easy placed into a spreadsheet 
Start
Check if any  of the temporary  tables already 
exist, if so delete them.
Get data for report period into a temporary 
table
Determine the total number of alarms and 
put into variable  @total 
Convert dates in column  ts_subsystem  to 
local  time 
Convert prior ities in column  ev_prio  to those 
used in the HMI system
Get top 20 alarms based on count into a 
temporary table
Get top 10 maintenance alarms based on 
count into a temporary table
Get top 10 disturbance alarms based on 
count into a temporary table
Determine the pr iority distr ibution and put 
into a temporary table
#priori tydistribution
Determine total number of disturbance 
alarms and put into variable @total
#topalarms
Get count  of alarm activations for  each day 
into a temporary table
#topdisturbance
End
#working
#topmaintenance
#dai lyrate
Drop al l temporary tables
Start Date
End Date
PlaCoEvents.dbo.tbl_events
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 Data can easily be converted to a chart/graphical format if required 
9.4.1. User Interface 
To simplify the user interface only two selections are required.  First any date within 
the reporting period, and second the reporting period, either weekly and monthly.  
This means the user does not have to manually determine the start and end date of 
the report.  Based on these two selections the Alarm Report Tool will determine the 
start date and end date for the alarm report SQL query. 
 
 
Figure 40 – Screen shot of the Alarm Report Tool user interface 
 
 
 
Figure 41 – Screen shot of the Alarm Report Tool user interface date selection 
 
The user interface of the Alarm Report Tool was implemented on a worksheet.  This is 
the only worksheet visible to the user.  On this worksheet there is a date selector drop 
down box, report period radio button and a ‘Go’ button.  When the user presses the 
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‘Go’ button the report an alarm report is generated based on the selections made.  A 
screen shot of the user interface worksheet can be seen in Figure 40. 
To improve the user interface the date selector drop down box uses a graphical month 
calendar.  This is part of the Microsoft Windows Common Controls-2 6.0 (SP6) library.  
Figure 41 shows a screen shot of the calendar drop down.   
9.4.2. SQL Interface 
To enable remote access to the alarm and event data on the Historian an SQL interface 
is needed.  The SQL interface passes queries the SQL database and receives data as a 
result of the queries.  The output of the SQL interface is placed onto a spreadsheet in 
the correct location to build the alarm report. The SQL interface will be embedded in 
the Alarm Report Tool. 
    
A VBA SQL interface was developed using Microsoft ActiveX Data Objects (ADO).   ADO 
has the capability to interface to SQL databases.  In order to use ADO in VBA two 
specific libraries are required: 
 Microsoft ActiveX Data Objects 6.0 Library 
 Microsoft ADO Ext. 6.0 for DDL and Security 
Two specific ADO objects from the ADO library were used for the alarm reports.  The 
‘Connection’ object can open a unique session to a data source using the ‘Open’ 
method.  The connection can be to a remote server at any routable TCP/IP address.   
As well as managing the connection to the data source the ‘Connection’ object also has 
an ‘Execute’ method which can issue commands to the data source.  The ‘Recordset’ 
object has an ‘Open’ method where commands that return data can be issued the data 
source. 
To connect to the SQL server using the ‘Open’ method a connection string is required.  
The connection string is a series of parameters and their values in a single ASCII text 
string.  The parameters required for the project site and MSDE test environment differ 
to those needed for the LocalDB test environment.  The connection string used for the 
project site is as follows: 
Provider=SQLOLEDB; Data Source=PGIM01,1433; Initial 
Catalog=PlaCoEvents; User Id=xxxxxxxx; Password=xxxxxxxx 
The parameters used in the connection string are: 
 Provider – a reference to the ADO object so it knows the type of connection 
 DataSource – a routable IP address or Host name of the data source where the 
SQL server is running, note the IP port number can also be specified. 
 Initial Catalog – the name of the SQL database 
 User Id – a user who has security access to perform the required commands 
 Password – the password of the user 
The connection string for the LocalDB test environment is specific to an instance of the 
LocalDB SQL database.  It can be seen in Figure 43, cell reference R2C1 (Row 5, Column 
1 – note RnCn notation will be used to reference spread sheet cells from now).  The 
Data Source parameter needed to be updated each time the SQL server started in test 
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environment as the alpha numeric characters after ‘LOCALDB#’ were different each 
time. 
The alarm report query has five specific commands that output data.  The data 
returned data is called a record set.  Each of these record sets is of predicable size with 
only the daily alarm rate having any variability.  This depends on whether the reporting 
period is weekly or monthly, and then the number of days in the month.  It is only the 
number of rows that can vary.  The five record sets that will be returned data from the 
alarm report query are shown in Table 13. 
 
Table 13 – Alarm Report Query Record Sets 
Alarm Metric SQL Temporary 
Table Name 
Rows X 
Columns 
Alarm Priority 
Distribution 
#prioritydistribution 4 X 1 
Top Alarms #topalarms 20 X 7 
Top Maintenance Alarms #topmaintenance 10 X 7 
Top Disturbance Alarms #topdisturbance 10 X 7 
Daily Alarm Total #dailyrate up to 31* X 2 
          * Depending on whether the report is weekly or monthly, and then the number of days in the months 
 
To coordinate the commands that will return records sets the alarm report query was 
split into groups.  Groups of commands that will return a record set then processed by 
the ‘Recordset’ object.  All the other commands are processed by the ‘Connection’ 
object.  The splitting of the command groups must maintain the order of the command 
as per the alarm report query.  The ‘Connection’ object can process multiple 
commands.  The ‘Recordset’ object can also process multiple commands, though the 
SQL server may not be able service the request.  It was found that the LocalDB test 
environment running MS SQL Server 2012 could service requests for multiple record 
sets, while the MSDE2000A test environment based on MS SQL Server 2000 could not 
service requests for multiple record sets.  
Based on this the alarm report query was split into seven groups of commands – all of 
the commands prior to the first record set, five separate commands for the five record 
sets, and then a final group for the remaining commands.  
The output of the SQL interface needs to be placed onto spreadsheet to build the 
report.  The Alarm Report Tool features a report template and sheet configuration 
sheet.  The report template is a blank report with place holders for all titles and record 
sets.  To complete an alarm report all that is required is to place the record sets in the 
returned from alarm report query into the appropriate place holders.  A screen shot of 
a portion of the report template can be seen in Figure 42.  The report template 
worksheet is usually hidden from the user.  It can be unhidden using the Excel 
interface. 
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Figure 42 – Screen shot of Alarm Report Tool report template worksheet (part of) 
 
A configuration sheet was also implemented.  It has all of the SQL commands and 
configuration information required to execute the alarm report query.  It was 
implemented so the configuration information could be modified without having to 
access the VBA code.   The configuration sheet has two sections.  The first contains the 
SQL Connection string. The second section contains the groupings of SQL commands 
that will be processed by the SQL interface.  A screen shot of the configuration sheet 
can be seen in Figure 43.  The configuration worksheet is usually hidden from the user.  
It can be unhidden using the Excel interface. 
If the grouping of SQL commands is expected to return a record set a cell reference 
(row and column of first cell where the record set will be placed on the report 
template) is specified in the cells to the right of the SQL commands.  If there is a cell 
reference then the code will assume a record set will be returned and the SQL 
commands will be processed using the ‘Recordset’ object.  If there is no cell reference 
then the code will assume no record set will be returned and the SQL commands will 
be processed using the ‘Connection’ object. 
As an example consider the Alarm Priority Distribution dataset.  In Figure 43 the SQL 
command in R5C1 return the temporary table #prioritydistribution as a record set.  
Table 13 shows that this record set will be 4 rows by 1 column.  In the two cells to the 
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right of the SQL command is the first cell where the top left cell of the record set will 
be placed on the report template – R10C4.  In Figure 42 at R10C4 is the column for the 
Alarm Priority Distribution.  The other commands returning record set will work in the 
same manner.   
 
 
Figure 43 – Screen shot of Alarm Report Tool configuration worksheet 
 
The SQL interface runs as a subroutine with needing two parameters passed to it.  
They are the start date and the end date of the reporting period.  To pass these 
parameters to the SQL command text two place holders are used – STARTDATE and 
ENDATE.  Prior to executing the command a VBA string find and replace command 
replaces the place holders with the actual dates passed to the sub routine.  The 
resulting line of the SQL code in the SQL configuration sheet is as follows: 
and ts_subsystem > dateadd(hh, -@timeshift,'STARTDATE') and  
ts_subsystem  < dateadd(hh, -@timeshift,'ENDDATE') 
 
The operation of the SQL subroutine can be seen in Figure 44.  Sources (configuration 
worksheet) and destinations (report template worksheet) are shown shaded in green.  
The full VBA code listing of the SQL subroutine can be found in Appendix C.2. 
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Figure 44 – SQL Subroutine flow chart 
 
9.4.3. Report Generation 
Report generation coordinates the operations required to create a finished alarm 
report.  It involves the determination of the start and end dates for the reporting 
period, calling the SQL subroutine and converting the report template worksheet to 
the finished alarm report.  The code for the report generator is called whenever the 
‘Go’ button on the user interface worksheet is pressed. 
The report generator must determine the start and end date as the user interface only 
provides a date within the reporting period and the actual reporting period – weekly or 
monthly.  If a weekly report is chosen the start date is the Monday prior the selected 
date.  If the selected date is a Monday then the selected date becomes the start date.  
The end date is then calculated as the following Monday.  If a monthly report is chosen 
the start date is the first day of the month of the selected date.  The end date is then 
calculated as the first day of the following month.  The start and end dates are stored 
as variables to be passed the SQL subroutine. 
During report generation a copy of the report template is made and named in the 
format of ‘Weekly YYYYMMDD’ or ‘Monthly YYYYMM01’.  The dates used are the start 
Start
Define variables and objects
Open connection to SQL serverConnection String
Main program loop
Read SQL command
SQL commands and
recordset cell 
references
Expecting Records to 
be returned?
Execute SQL command using Connection 
object
Execute SQL command using Recordset object
Return Recordset object results to report 
sheet
SQL Server
Are there more SQL 
commands to process?
Close SQL Connection, release memory for  
objects
End
Priori ty Distribution
Top Alarms
Top Maintenance Alarms
Top Disturbance Alarms
Daily  Alarm Rate
YESNO
NO
YES
Start DateEnd Date
Insert Start Date and End Date into command 
if appl icable
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date of the report.  The SQL subroutine is then called which populates the alarm report 
with the record sets returned by the SQL interface. 
Once the SQL subroutine has finished the alarm report title and subtitle are updated.  
Weekly alarm reports are titled ‘Weekly Alarm Report’ with a subtitle ‘Monday, 
month_name DD, YYYY’.  The monthly reports are titled ‘Monthly Alarm Report’ with a 
subtitle ‘month_name YYYY’. 
Once of the features of the alarm report is a chart showing the daily alarm rate for the 
reporting period.  The chart shows the daily alarm rate as well as the alarm rate 
performance metrics of manageable (150 alarms per day) and maximum (300 alarms 
per day).  The chart uses data from the Daily Alarm Rate record set.  Figure 45 shows 
the charts for the Daily Alarm Rate from a monthly and weekly alarm report.  The chart 
is preconfigured in the report template with its source data from the Daily Alarm Rate 
record set.  This record set is of variable length.  For a weekly report it contains values 
for seven days.  A monthly report could contain values for either 28, 29, 30 or 31 days. 
 
 
Figure 45 – Charts for Daily Alarm Rate from monthly (left) and weekly (right) alarm reports 
 
To ensure that all possible lengths are catered for the report template is preconfigured 
for a duration of 31 days.  The SQL subroutine will only populate the required number 
of rows based on the reporting period – weekly or monthly.  If there are less than 31 
days in the reporting period the chart will show days with no values.  To ensure that 
the chart displays only days in the reporting period the report generator will trim 
empty rows in the Daily Alarm Rate table in the alarm report.  This automatically 
resizes the chart. 
Once the alarm report has been completely populated and formatted the worksheet is 
transferred to a new Excel file.  It is then up to the user to save this file.  The alarm 
report layout and format has been set so the all of tables and charts do not break 
across pages if printed or saved to a document format.  The Alarm Report Tool can 
then be used to generate another alarm report or closed.  No saving is required for the 
Alarm Report Tool as it stores no data locally. 
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The operation of the ReportGenrator can be seen in Figure 46.  Sources (user interface 
worksheet) are shown shaded in green.  The full VBA code listing of the 
ReportGenrator can be found in Appendix C.3 
 
 
Figure 46 – ReportGenerator flow chart 
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Chapter 10 – Resolution of Bad Actors                                                               
 
With all parts of the Alarm Management Model in place efforts shifted to resolving 
some of the Bad Actors.  It was decided to focus on the worst performing alarms in the 
first six months of the year, i.e. the start of January 2015 to end of June 2015.  To 
identify the worst performing alarms in this period the SQL Alarm Report Query was 
used.  By modifying the start and end dates to suit the top twenty alarms (shown in 
Table 14 as well as the daily alarm rate (shown in Figure 47) was determined. 
 
 
Figure 47 – Daily Alarm Rate – January to June 2015 
 
The top 18 alarms Table 14 account for just over 40% of all alarms from January to 
June 2015.  Where possible the top 18 have been grouped where the alarms are 
similar in nature.  This resulted in nine groupings.  The alarm count for each grouping 
can be seen in Table 15.  For each grouping a case study has been performed.  The case 
study includes a description of the subsystem from which the alarms originate; an 
investigation into what is causing the alarm to be a Bad Actor; and, then 
recommendations are presented on what methods and/or changes could be employed 
to precent the alarm form continuing to be a Bad Actor.  
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Table 14 – Top Twenty Alarms – January to June 2015 
Rank KKS Tag Description Prio Count % Cum % 
1 11ETJ00EA800 XU02 VACUUM ECO HOPPERS 2 17537 5.52% 5.52% 
2 11HFH30CL010 XG11 L PYRITE BOX PULV 30 2 13739 4.33% 9.85% 
3 11HFH50CL010 XG11 L PYRITE BOX PULV 50 2 10031 3.16% 13.01% 
4 11HFH40CL010 XG11 L PYRITE BOX PULV 40 2 8687 2.74% 15.75% 
5 11PGC20CE101 XQ50 3300V CCW PP CURR 2 8312 2.62% 18.37% 
6 90GNK35CQ010 XU13 SALINE WTP OUTLET pH 3 8097 2.55% 20.92% 
7 11HFH20CL010 XG11 L PYRITE BOX PULV 20 2 6823 2.15% 23.07% 
8 90SGA40AP010 XG11 FPSTN PRESS MAINT RUN 3 6008 1.89% 24.96% 
9 90SGA40AP010 XG12 FPSTN PRESS MAINT FLT 2 6008 1.89% 26.85% 
10 90GNK35CQ010 XQ50 PH SALINE BSTR PP RECIRC 2 5753 1.81% 28.66% 
11 90GNK35CQ010 XQ50 PH SALINE BSTR PP RECIRC 2 5643 1.78% 30.44% 
12 11HFH10CL010 XG11 L PYRITE BOX PULV 10 2 5361 1.69% 32.13% 
13 11HCB10EA100 XU02 T SOOTBLOWERS DRAINS 2 5315 1.67% 33.81% 
14 11CJA00DU002 XU04 FREQUENCY DEVIATION 2 4805 1.51% 35.32% 
15 90GNK35CQ010 XQ50 PH SALINE BSTR PP RECIRC 2 4585 1.44% 36.76% 
16 11PGC10CE101 XQ50 3300V CCW PP CURR 2 4217 1.33% 38.09% 
17 11HDA01CP003 XG11 DP SDCC HYDR OIL FILTER 2 4193 1.32% 39.41% 
18 90ECJ20CW010 XQ50 WEIGHTOMETER T2C 2 4055 1.28% 40.69% 
19 11QUA10CQ075 XQ50 DOWNCOMER WATER OXYGEN 2 3673 1.16% 41.85% 
20 11HFC30EA800 XU01 PULVERIZER 30 RATIO 2 3139 0.99% 42.84% 
 
 
Table 15 – Alarm Count for the Nine Case studies 
Rank Description Count % Cum % 
1 Pulveriser Reject Hopper Level 44641 14.07% 14.07% 
2 Water Plant pH 24078 7.58% 21.65% 
3 Economiser Ash System Vacuum 17537 5.52% 27.17% 
4 Closed Cooling Water Pump Current 12529 3.95% 31.12% 
5 Fire System Maintenance Pump 12016 3.78% 34.90% 
6 Sootblower Drain Temperature 5315 1.67% 36.57% 
7 Frequency Deviation 4805 1.51% 38.08% 
8 SDCC Hydraulic Oil Filter Differential Pressure 4193 1.32% 39.40% 
9 Coal Conveyer Weight Meter 4055 1.28% 40.68% 
 
This approach mimics how the project site should manage Bad Actors.  An 
understanding of the operation of the subsystem from which the alarm originates is 
required in order to understand the purpose and importance of the alarm. 
Techniques for the investigation of Bad Actors also vary.  In some cases Bad Actors are 
a result of improper use of alarm management best practice.  The treatment options 
for these alarms are to apply the best practice techniques such alarm masking, 
hysteresis and time delays.  These types of issues are identified in analysing the alarms 
rates and alarm duration times and then looking at how these treatment options 
would improve the alarm rate. 
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Sometimes the operation of the subsystem needs to be observed.  The problem can be 
unreliable or faulty equipment – in this case engineering and maintenance personnel 
need to investigate and correct the issues with the equipment.  The problem could also 
be that the alarm design does not fit the purpose of the alarm – this requires and 
understanding of the subsystem so the deficiencies in the alarm design can identified.  
In some cases the alarm itself does not fit the definition to be an alarm.  No 
investigation of alarm rates or subsystem operation will change the fact that the alarm 
is just not required.  The treatment option for these alarms is removal.  In some 
instances there is a combination of some or all of these techniques to understand the 
root cause of a Bad Actor. 
10.1. Pulveriser Reject Hopper Level 
This section investigates alarms 11HFH10CL010 XG11, 11HFH20CL010 XG11, 
11HFH30CL010 XG11, 11HFH40CL010 XG11, 11HFH50CL010 XG11, ranked 12, 7, 2, 4 
and 3 in Table 14.  These alarms account for 14.07% of all alarms in the period of 
January 2015 to June 2015. 
10.1.1. System Description 
The coal delivered to the pulverisers for milling contains impurities such as pyrites 
(iron sulphides commonly found in coal reserves), sand and rock.  The Pulveriser is 
designed to reject these materials so only Pulverised Fuel (PF) is the delivered to the 
boiler furnace.  There are five Pulverisers at the project site, with four required to 
maintain the plant’s Maximum Continuous Rating (MCR). 
Gravity causes the Pulveriser rejects to fall into a Reject Hopper.  To detect that the 
Reject Hopper is full a level switch is used.  The level switch uses a motor driven paddle 
wheel which normally rotates feely.  When solid rejects fill the hopper the paddle 
wheel is physically prevented from turning.  A clutch mechanism detects the paddle 
wheel is no longer turning and operates a mechanical switch.  The level switch 
assembly operates in an extreme environment where there is dirt and dust and the 
temperature may exceed 200 0C.  A schematic representation of the system is depicted 
in Figure 48. 
Each hopper has its own automated sequence which empties the rejects.  This 
operates in a similar manner as the Economiser Ash System – i.e. using an ejector to 
create a vacuum to draw the rejects out of the hopper.  The sequence takes a little 
over two minutes to complete a reject cycle of a single hopper.  There are normally 
anywhere from a 100 to 150 reject operations per day across the four running 
pulverisers.  The sequences were originally configured to run automatically based on 
timers, but this was found to be inadequate and is not used.  The switch is connected 
to a DCS ‘Digital’ input which activates the alarm.  The Alarm List has no Cause/Action 
text for this alarm.  Operators now use the alarm as a prompt to start the sequence.  
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Figure 48 – Pulveriser Reject Hopper 
 
10.1.2. Investigation 
Using the LocalDB test environment an SQL query was run to extract all alarm 
activations and deactivations for level alarms.  The duration of each alarm in was then 
determined.  Sorting the alarm durations into groups to observe the distribution of the 
alarm count proved problematic.  The jamming of the switch creates to different 
problems.  Firstly the switch jams intermittently for short periods of time – this 
appears to be creating many fleeting alarms.  Secondly the switch jams and does not 
return to normal operation for a long time – this produces alarms with an abnormally 
long duration. 
The normal expected duration of the alarm is a somewhere between 45 seconds to 
one minute. The sequence takes about 30 second to start the high pressure water and 
open the valves.   After 45 seconds the hopper is beginning to empty so it is expected 
that the alarm will clear as the rejects clear the paddle wheel.  This assumes that an 
operator starts the sequence when the alarm activates.  
Figure 49 shows the duration distribution grouped into 15 second intervals for each 
pulveriser.  It can be seen there is a spike in the number of alarms in the 45 – 60 
second time range.  It is likely these alarms are an associated with the correct 
operation of the level switch.  There are a large number of alarms in the 0 – 15 and 15 
– 30 second ranges.  It is likely that these are fleeting alarms caused by the 
intermittent jamming of the switch.  There is also large number of alarms in the >300 
second range.  It is likely that these alarms are due to the level switch jamming 
completely.  The large spike is due to the cumulative effect of the alarms in the >300 
second range.  There is no actual spike if the range is expanded beyond an hour.  It is 
assumed that most of the contribution in the >300 second range is due to the switch 
jamming.  This is based on discussions with site personnel.   
If the assumption is made that accurate operation of the level switch is when the alarm 
duration is between 30 seconds and 300 seconds then on average, across all 
pulverisers, the alarm is accurate only 23% of the time.  This can be seen in Table 16. 
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Figure 49 – Pulveriser reject sequence operation January - June 2015 
 
 
Table 16 – Reject Hopper Level Alarm Duration – All Pulverisers 
Alarm Duration 
Level Alarm Count 
Pulveriser 
1 
Pulveriser 
2 
Pulveriser 
3 
Pulveriser 
4 
Pulveriser 
5 
< 30 1124 2726 6033 4926 4797 
30 - 300 1919 1670 3101 1262 1515 
> 300 2316 2406 4521 2468 3617 
Total 5359 6802 13655 8656 9929 
Percent 30 - 300 36% 25% 23% 15% 15% 
Average 23% 
 
10.1.3. Recommendations 
Before there is any attempt to correct this Bad Actor alarm the reliability of the level 
switches must be addressed.  The level switches in their current form are not fit for 
purpose.  Possible solutions are to use a different technology or perform more 
maintenance on the switches to ensure they operate correctly.  This is outside the 
scope of alarm management on its own. 
When the reliability issues are resolved there will still be a residual alarm problem of 
Alarming Normal Conditions.  Operators activate a reject sequence when the high level 
alarm activates.  At 100 operations per day this would take two thirds of the 
performance metric of 150 alarms per day.  It is recommended that the operation of 
the reject sequence automated based on the operation of the high level switch.  The 
abnormal situation that should be alarmed is if the high level switch is still active after 
the completion the reject sequence.  If this occurs then an alarm should be activated 
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and further automated operation of the sequence prevented until the situation can be 
investigated and resolved. 
10.2. Saline Water Plant pH 
This section investigates alarms 90GNK35CQ010 XU13, 90GNK35CQ010 XQ50 <LOW, 
90GNK35CQ010 XQ50 >HIGH and 90GNK35CQ010 XQ50 <MIN, ranked 6, 10, 11 and 15 
in Table 14.  These alarms account for 7.58% of all alarms in the period of January 2015 
to June 2015. 
10.2.1. System Description 
All waste water on site is treated in the Waste Water Treatment plant.  Once treated 
the water is held in large storage tanks ready for disposal offsite. 
The final stage in Waste Water Treatment plant is the adjustment of the water pH to 
7.0 using acid.  The water level in the pH Adjustment Tank is maintained by a level 
control valve – the level control valve only allows water to be pumped to the storage 
tanks if the level in the pH Adjustment Tank is at set point.  This maintains a buffer of 
water in the pH Adjustment Tank.  The pH of the water is controlled by adding acid to 
the water as it first enters the pH Adjustment Tank.  The acid feed rate is controlled by 
variable speed pump.  A schematic representation of the system is depicted in Figure 
50. 
 
 
Figure 50 – Waste Water Treatment plant Final pH Control 
 
A pH transmitter is used for both control and alarming of the pH.  The summary of 
alarms is shown in Table 17.  Note that all of these alarms use alarm masking 
configured in the application software to precent activation if the Waste Water 
Treatment plant is not in service.  If either the <MIN or >MAX alarm is active for more 
than 30 minutes the DCS will shut down the SWP.  
The Alarm List offers the following text as the Cause/Action for alarm 90GNK35CQ010 
XU13: 
LT
Level
Transmitter
AT
pH
Transmitter
pH Adjustment Tank
From SWP
To Disposal
Storage
Level Control Valve
Acid
pH Control
Water Pump
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“PH adjustment of the saline water leaving the SWTP is malfunctioning effecting 
to much acid dosing.  Check to ensure that the acid dosing group is in auto.  The 
saline water treatment plant will shutdown if low pH continues.” 
The Alarm List offers the following text as the Cause/Action for alarm 90GNK35CQ010 
XQ50 <MIN: 
“PH of the saline water at the outlet of the saline water treatment plant is less 
than the minimum allowable pH for ocean discharge and therefore should the 
saline water treatment plant be running in automatic mode the saline plant will 
trip.  Should the saline plant be running in manual mode the operator should 
decrease or stop acid dosing as required.  Change the acid outlet pH setpoint as 
required prior to re-starting the plant in automatic mode.  Should the pH < min 
occur during startup and the pH activation timer (90GNLOODU151) be set less 
than 15 minutes, this timer may be extended to assist in obtaining steady state 
pH control without initially tripping the plant.” 
The Alarm List has no Cause/Action text for the other alarms in Table 17. 
 
Table 17 – SWP Final pH Control Alarms 
Alarm Tag Status Prio
rity 
Explanation Rank in 
Top 20 
90GNK35CQ010 XQ50 <MIN 2 pH <6.7 15 
90GNK35CQ010 XQ50 <LOW 2 pH <6.3 10 
90GNK35CQ010 XQ50 >HIGH 2 pH >8.3 11 
90GNK35CQ010 XQ50 >MAX 2 pH >8.6 N/A 
90GNK35CQ010 XU13   LOW 3 pH is more than 0.56 below 
current pH control set point 
6 
 
10.2.2. Investigation 
The pH control was observed using the historian.  Figure 51 shows the trend of two 
different time periods.  The trends show that the control of the pH is oscillatory.  When 
comparing to other time periods this trend is typical.  The oscillations match the alarms 
that are being seen – both high pH and low pH alarms.   
The likely problem is that the oscillations are caused by poor tuning of the Proportional 
plus Integral (PI) controller in the DCS.  When the pH level falls too low the acid pump 
turns off.  The pH rises and then the acid pump is turned on again.  The over aggressive 
tuning of the PI controller causes the pH level to fall very rapidly again stopping the 
pump.  This cycle repeats over and over.  The continuous control algorithm has 
essentially been degraded to an on/off controller.  
Historically this loop has been hard to tune as there are several disturbance variables 
that are not accounted for, such as: 
 Flow rate of water in to the pH Adjustment Tank is not the same 
 Strength of the acid can vary 
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 Mechanical stroke of the acid pump can be, and does get adjusted locally, 
therefore affecting the process gain. 
The oscillatory nature of the control has little affect final pH of the water as the 
oscillations are generally centred on the pH set point – the large volume of the storage 
tank helps to ‘dampen’ out the final pH.  The only noticeable side effect of the 
oscillations is the number of alarms generated. 
 
 
 
Figure 51 – Trends of SWP Final pH Control 
 
10.2.3. Recommendations 
The ideal solution is to improve the control of the pH.  This would remove the 
oscillations and therefore the alarms.  It may be possible to make the loop tuning 
much less aggressive.  This would stop the resulting on/off control action that is being 
seen.  A side effect would be an increase in the settling time of the pH control but this 
may be tolerable given the dampening effect of the large storage tank.  The Alarm List 
text for alarm 90GNK35CQ010 XQ50 <MIN hints to a settling time in the order of 15 
minutes.  The trends in Figure 51 show with the current tuning the controller is able to 
reduce the pH level from over 8 to a little over 4 in several minutes.  This seems overly 
aggressive if a settling time of 15 minutes was originally expected and the shutdown is 
at 30 minutes. 
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In regard to the alarms, there are three alarms to monitor low deviations of pH and 
two alarms for high deviations.  Three of these alarms should be deleted so there is 
only a single alarm for a low pH deviation and a single alarm for high pH deviation.  
Appropriate alarm masking and time delays and hysteresis should be applied to these 
alarms.  
10.3. Economiser Ash System Vacuum  
This section investigates alarm 11ETJ00EA800 XU02, ranked 1 in Table 14.  This 
accounts for 5.52% of all alarms in the period of January 2015 to June 2015. 
10.3.1. System Description 
One of the areas in the Boiler that ash accumulates is the Economiser Ash Hoppers.  
The ash hoppers are emptied at regular intervals while the boiler is operating.  Failure 
to remove the ash will result in the hoppers filling.  Once full the ash will blow over to 
the Air Heater and cause a blockage. 
The Economiser Ash System is a fully automated subsystem to remove ash from the 
economiser ash hoppers.  The system uses an ejector to produce a vacuum which 
draws the ash out of the bottom of the hoppers.  The ejector is operates by supplying 
high pressure water to the narrow section of a venturi.  This produces a vacuum at the 
inlet of the venturi.  The inlet of the venturi is piped to the ash hoppers where an 
automated valve opened to allow the ash to be drawn out.  Ash enters the ejector inlet 
and mixes with the water.  The water and ash is directed to the ash handling plant for 
disposal.  A schematic representation of the system is depicted in Figure 52. 
The Economiser Ash System is controlled by a DCS sequence which operates as 
follows: 
1. Start the high pressure water pump.  The next step is activated when: 
 the water pressure switch confirms that the high pressure water is above 
the required pressure, AND 
 the pressure transmitter indicates that the pipework pressures is less than -
10 kPa 
2.  Open the Hopper 4 discharge valve.  The next step is activated when: 
 60 seconds has elapsed, AND 
 the pressure transmitter indicates that the pressures is greater than -20 kPa 
3. Close the Hopper 4 discharge valve.  The next step is activated when: 
 Hopper 4 discharge valve is confirmed closed 
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 for Hoppers 3, 2 and 1 
5. Stop the high pressure water pump after 10 minutes 
The system is monitored by Priority 2 alarm 11ETJ00EA800 XU02.  The alarm activates 
if “the pressure is greater than -10 kPa while any ash hopper valve is open”.  The Alarm 
List has no Cause/Action text for this alarm. 
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Figure 52 – Economiser Ash System 
 
10.3.2. Investigation 
Using the LocalDB test environment an SQL query was run to extract all alarm 
activations and deactivations for KKS tag 11ETJ00EA800 XU02.  The duration of each 
alarm in was then determined – Table 18 shows the results.  Very few alarms are in the 
range of 0 – 20 seconds.  This indicates that the alarm is not a fleeting alarm.   
 
Table 18 – Economiser Vacuum Alarm Duration 
Duration 
(seconds) 
Alarm 
Count 
  0 - 20 337 
20 - 40 211 
40 - 60 1513 
60 - 80 15419 
  80 - 100 5 
      > 100 50 
 
The typical operation of the Economiser Ash System was observed using the historian.  
A trend of pipework vacuum over typical cycle can be seen in Figure 53.  It shows the 
pressure reducing to approximately -23kPa at the start of the sequence.  When the 
first discharge valve opens the pressure then increases as the ash is drawn out of the 
hopper.  The sequence holds the discharge valve is open for at least 60 seconds.  In this 
time the pressure increases from -30kPa to -4kPa.  This is repeated for the three other 
hoppers.  When comparing to other time periods this trend is typical.  The alarm 
activates when the pressure greater than -10kPa.  This does not appear to be an alarm 
condition as the normal operation sees the pressure at -4kPa. 
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Figure 53 – Trend of Economiser Vacuum during sequence 
 
After discussing the alarm with site operators and engineering personnel it was 
suggested that the purpose of the alarm may be to indicate that there is a hole in 
pipework.  It appears that this alarm problem is a combination of No Response 
Required and Unknown Response. 
10.3.3. Recommendations 
The alarming strategy for the economiser vacuum should be reviewed.  It is possible 
that an alarm could be used to detect holes in the pipework but the validity of this 
should be confirmed by engineering personnel.  The possibility of using the economiser 
vacuum to detect blockages could also be investigated – if the pressure does not rise 
shortly after the discharge valve opens then there is likely a problem. 
10.4. Closed Cooling Water Pump Current 
This section investigates alarms 11PGC10CE101 XQ50 >HIGH and 11PGC10CE101 
>HIGH, ranked 5 and 16 Table 14.  These alarms account for 3.95% of all alarms in the 
period of January 2015 to June 2015. 
10.4.1. System Description 
The Closed Cooling Water (CCW) System supplies cooling water to many heat 
exchangers in the plant.  Two sets of pumps and shell and tube heat exchangers 
provide the motive power for the water and remove the heat energy from the system.  
The system may run at 100% duty with one pump and heat exchanger pair.  The other 
pair can either in standby or being maintained. 
The CCW pumps are high voltage (3.3 kV) three phase squirrel cage motors.  The 
motors have a full load current rating of 69.8 A.  Power supply for the motors is from a 
3.3 kV switchboard.  The switchboard has motor electrical control circuits that 
interface to the DCS, a motor protection device and current transformers (CT’s).  A 
current transmitter provides an ‘analog’ signal to the DCS.  Each pump has two alarms 
Implementing Industry Best Practice Alarm Management – Resolution of Bad Actors 
 
Author: Daniel Snelgar                                                                                                                  Page 109 
 
are configured as limit values on the ‘analog’ current signal, refer to Table 19.  The 
Alarm List has no Cause/Action text for these alarms. 
 
Table 19 – CCW Pump Current Alarms 
Limit 
Value 
Value 
(Amps) 
Priority 
High 64 2 
Max 69.8 1 
 
10.4.2. Investigation 
The typical operation of the CCW motor current was analysed using the historian.  
Figure 54 depicts a trend of the motor current.  Both pumps were operated during this 
period.  The trend shows that the current signal oscillates during operation.   When 
comparing to other time periods this trend is typical.   
Using the LocalDB test environment an SQL query was run to extract all alarm 
activations and clearing events for KKS tag 10PCG20CE101 for the period of the trend 
in Figure 54.  The duration of each alarm in was then determined.  Table 20 shows that 
almost all of the alarms are of a duration of 5 seconds or less.  This confirms the alarm 
problem is a fleeting alarm. 
 
 
Figure 54 – Trend of CCW motor current 
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Table 20 – 11PGC20CE101 Alarm Duration 
Duration 
(seconds) 
Alarm 
Count 
0 – 5 2120 
5 – 10 94 
10 – 15 19 
15 – 20 8 
20 – 25 3 
25 – 30 1 
30 + 0 
 
10.4.3. Recommendations 
Firstly this alarm should be rationalised to ensure that there is a valid operator 
response to a high motor current alarm.  Changing to the other pump and heat 
exchanger set could be a possible action.  If the alarm is still required then hysteresis 
or a time delay could prevent the oscillations from causing the fleeting alarm. 
The best option would be to add filtering the ‘analogue’ measurement prior to 
processing the alarm.  The current is not used for any other purpose other than 
indication and alarming so filtering can be applied without any adverse effect.  
Regardless of the whether the alarm is removed or kept the filtering should be applied 
to make the measurement more useful. 
10.5. Fire System Maintenance Pump 
This section investigates alarms 90SGA40AP010 XG11 and 90SGA40AP010 XG12, 
ranked 8 and 9 in Table 14.  These alarms account for 3.78% of all alarms in the period 
of January 2015 to June 2015. 
10.5.1. System Description 
A piping system distributes fire water across the site.  The main uses of fire water on 
the site are:   
1. Fire Hydrants – connection points where a lay flat hoses can be connected, 
these are generally used by personnel with specific firefighting skills 
2. Fixed Fire Hoses – a fire hose on a reel that can be easily operated by any 
personnel 
3. Fire Deluge System – fire sprinkler systems that operate automatically when a 
fire is detected 
If required fire water is delivered using an electrical pump and two diesel pumps.  The 
diesel pumps ensure fire water is available even if there is a power failure on the site.  
The fire water distribution system is pressurised at all times.  As the system comprises 
of many joints, valves and there is always a small amount of leakage.  A smaller 
Maintenance Pump operates regularly to maintain the pressurised state of the system.  
A schematic representation of the system is depicted in Figure 55.  
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The pumps are not controlled by the DCS.  Each pump is controlled form its own local 
control panel.  This ensures pumps can still operate is the DCS is not be operational, 
which is possible if there is a major fire.  Each pump monitors the pressure of the fire 
water system using a pressure switch.  As the system pressure falls the starting of the 
pumps is staged.  The Maintenance Pump operates first.  The Maintenance Pump stops 
automatically once the system pressure returns to normal.  As well as keeping the 
system pressurised the Maintenance Pump should be able to deliver enough water to 
operate a single Fixed Fire Hose.  If there is a greater demand for fire water the 
pressure will drop further.  The Electric Pump operates next, followed by the two 
Diesel Pumps.  Both the Electric Pump and the Diesel Pumps must be stopped 
manually. 
 
90SGA10AP010
Diesel Fire Pump 1
90SGA10AP010
Diesel Fire Pump 2
90SGA40AP010
Maintenance Pump
PS
Pressure
Switch
PS
Pressure
Switch
PS
Pressure
Switch
To Fire Water 
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PS
Pressure
Switch
 
 
Figure 55 – Fire Water Pumping System 
 
There are two alarms associated with each pump – a pump running alarm and a fault 
alarm.  The alarms originate from the local control panel for each pump.  The DCS uses 
a ‘digital’ input for each alarm.  The summary of alarms is shown in Table 21.  
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Table 21 – Fire Pump System Alarms 
Alarm Tag Descriptor Prio Explanation 
90SGA10AP010 XG11 FPSTN DIESEL 1 RUN 3 Pump is running 
90SGA10AP010 XG12 FPSTN DIESEL 1 FLT 2 Local control panel reporting a fault 
90SGA20AP010 XG11 FPSTN DIESEL 2 RUN 3 Pump is running 
90SGA20AP010 XG12 FPSTN DIESEL 2 FLT 2 Local control panel reporting a fault 
90SGA30AP010 XG11 FPSTN MAIN ELEC RUN 3 Pump is running 
90SGA30AP010 XG12 FPSTN MAIN ELEC FLT 2 Local control panel reporting a fault 
90SGA40AP010 XG11 FPSTN PRESS MAINT RUN 3 Pump is running 
90SGA40AP010 XG12 FPSTN PRESS MAINT FLT 2 Local control panel reporting a fault 
 
The Alarm List offers the following text as the Cause/Action for alarm 90SGA40AP010 
XG11: 
“System pressure in the fire ringmain is low and the jacking pump is active.  
Should the jacking pump run for a substantial time, check for leaks in the firemain 
or for use of a fire hydrant.” 
The Alarm List offers the following text as the Cause/Action for alarm 90SGA40AP010 
XG12: 
“The jacking pump is enabled for operation and is not operating when required.  
Check pump and its associated drive for faults and correct faults as appropriate.” 
10.5.2. Investigation 
In relation to the pump running alarm there is an obvious problem.  The operation of 
the Maintenance Pump automatically controlled and it is expected under normal 
operating conditions.  In its current form the alarm problem is Alarming Normal 
Conditions. 
The operation of the Maintenance Pump for a prolonged period is an abnormal 
situation though.  The guidance from the Alarm List has the correct causes and actions 
in regard to the possible use of a Fixed Fire Hose.   
The fault alarm activates every time the Maintenance Pump operates.  According the 
wiring schematic for the local panel the fault alarm is configure to activate if the motor 
thermal overload relay has tripped.  If this alarm is active then the pump cannot 
operate.  The fact that this alarm activates when the pump operated indicated that 
there is a problem with how this panel or wiring have been interface to the panel.   
10.5.3. Recommendations 
The guidance from the Alarm List is correct is relation to the possibility that a fixed fire 
hose.  An appropriate time delay should be added to filter out the normal operation to 
pressurise the pipework. 
The fault alarm appears to be a fault in how the local panel or the DCS interface to the 
local panel is wired.  The guidance in the Alarm List does not match the configuration 
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of the alarm either.  The maintenance department should investigate and rectify this 
alarm so it operates correctly.   
It is also recommended that the all the alarms in Table 21 be rationalised at the same 
time so there is a consistent alarming strategy for all of the fire pumps.  There should 
also be a check of the operation of the fault alarms on the other pumps to ensure that 
they are configured correctly. 
10.6. Sootblower Drain Temperature 
This section investigates alarm 11HCB10EA100 XU02, ranked 13 in Table 14.  This 
alarm accounts for 1.67% of all alarms in the period of January 2015 to June 2015. 
10.6.1. System Description 
Ash (also referred to as soot) can accumulate on the internal surfaces of the boiler 
where radiant heat energy and convection heat energy is transferred through the 
metal components to the water and steam.  The coating of these surfaces reduces the 
heat transfer capability, thereby reducing the performance of the boiler.  The most 
common method to remove this ash is to use high pressure steam the blow the ash off 
of these surfaces.  The ash is then carried through the through the furnace and 
collected in the Economiser Ash System. 
Sootblowers are mechanical devices that direct the steam to the internal surfaces.  
They are operated by electric motors.  When the motor operates nozzles are inserted 
into the boiler from the access holes.  Once the nozzle is inserted a mechanically 
operated valve allows steam to flow through the nozzles on to the internal surfaces.  
After a predetermined time the nozzles are retracted and the steam supply is turned 
off via the mechanically operated valve.   
There are 50 sootblowers for the radiant section of the boiler and 40 sootblowers for 
convention section of the boiler.  All sootblowers are controlled from the DCS using 
and an automated sequence.  The selection of which sootblowers will operate during 
the sequence and when to operate the sequence is set depending on boiler steam and 
furnace gas exit temperatures.  
The steam for the sootblowers is supplied from the boiler superheated steam output.  
The pressure of the sootblower steam is controlled to 4200 kPa using a valve 
controlled by the DCS.  There is several hundred meters of piping connecting all of the 
sootblowers to the steam supply.  The pipework is arranged in such that there are no 
dead ends.  All of the pipework ends at the sootblower drain valve.  The take off line to 
each sootblower is also as short as possible.  These piping arrangements prevent 
steam condensing into water in the pipework.  If water is allowed to enter the furnace 
through a sootblower it can erode the internal components of the boiler.  A schematic 
simplified representation of the system is depicted in Figure 56. 
During the start-up of the sootblowing sequence a drain isolation valve and drain 
control valve both open fully.  This directs all of the steam through the pipework.  This 
allows the pipework to be warmed up, again to ensure there is no accumulated water 
in the system prior to operating a sootblower.  Once the system has warmed up the 
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drain control valve closes, but remains partially open so a small amount of steam 
continuously flows through all of the pipework and to the drain.  Again this is to ensure 
no water accumulates in the pipework 
 
 
Figure 56 – Sootblowing System (simplified) 
 
Water condenses if the steam is no longer superheated.  At 4200 kPa the saturation 
temperature of the steam is 254 oC.  The temperature of the drain is monitored during 
operation.  If it detects that the temperature is below saturation temperature then 
alarm 11HCB10EA100 XU02 activates.  The alarm is set to at 245 oC.  This relates to a 
saturation pressure of 3550 kPa.  The difference between the supply pressure and the 
drain pressure is an assumed steam pressure drop through the system.  The alarm is 
masked such that it is only active if the drain isolation valve is open.  The Alarm List has 
no Cause/Action text for this alarm. 
10.6.2. Investigation 
Using the LocalDB test environment an SQL query was run to extract all alarm 
activations and deactivations for KKS tag 11HCB10EA100 XU02.  The duration of each 
alarm in was then determined – Table 22 shows the results.  Very few alarms are in the 
range of 0 – 30 seconds.  This indicates that the alarm is not a fleeting alarm.  
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Table 22 – Sootblower Drain Temperature Alarm Duration 
Duration 
(seconds) 
Alarm 
Count 
0 - 60 194 
60 - 120 285 
120 - 180 956 
180 - 240 710 
240 - 300 384 
300 - 360 855 
360 - 420 1913 
480 - 540 2 
540 - 600 2 
 
 
 
Figure 57 – Trend of drain temperature during operation of Sootblowers 
 
The operation of the sootblowers was observed using the Historian. The radiant area 
sootblowers take approximately 1.5 minutes to operate, while the convection area 
sootblowers take just over 7.3 minutes to complete an operation.  Figure 57 shows the 
drain temperature during the operation of a set of radiant area and convection area 
sootblowers.  As each sootblower operates the temperature initially falls and then 
recovers.  When the convection area sootblowers operate the drain temperature falls 
either close or below the alarm point.  In Figure 57 10 of the 13 operations resulted in 
an alarm.  Looking at other time periods it was observed convection sootblowers 
generally results in anywhere from 3 to 10 alarms each time a set is operated.  
The likely scenario is that when a convection area sootblower operated there is a 
larger pressure drop (and therefore temperature drop) that was assumed when the 
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original alarm was designed.  This creates a false alarm that the drain temperature is 
below the saturation temperature of the steam. 
This is backed up by Table 22 which shows none of the alarms are longer than the run 
time of the sootblowers – 7.3 minutes (430) seconds.  This is also backup by Figure 58 
which shows an alarm rate of anywhere from 10 to 40 alarms per day.  This matches 
the typical trend data for the number of times sootblower operations cause the 
temperature to fall below the alarm point. 
 
 
Figure 58 – Sootblower drain temperature Daily Alarm Rate (Jan – Jun 2015) 
 
10.6.3. Recommendations 
Firstly it should be determined if the alarm is accurately detecting that water may 
accumulating in the pipework.  If this is the case then the operation of the sootblowing 
system must be changed so this does not occur.  This could be done by taking pressure 
readings at the drain to see if assumed pressure drop that results in an alarm limit of 
245 oC is valid.  This information could then be used to determine a more accurate 
alarm limit. 
10.7. Frequency Deviation 
This section investigates alarm 11CJA00DU002 XU04, ranked 14 in Table 14.  This alarm 
accounts for 1.51% of all alarms in the period of January 2015 to June 2015. 
10.7.1. System Description 
All the large power stations in the south west of Western Australia are connected to 
South West Interconnected System (SWIS).  All generators operate at the same speed 
as they are magnetically coupled.  The speed determines the frequency of alternating 
current produced.  This is tightly controlled to 50 Hertz in Australia.  In a large grid such 
as the SWIS only few generators are actually controlling the speed and therefore the 
frequency of the grid.  These generators adjust their mechanical input power to 
control the speed.  Many generators on the grid are operating in load control.  They 
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adjust their mechanical input power to meet a specific generated load target.  The 
project site is normally operated in this manner.   
If the frequency deviates by a pre-determined level alarm 11CJA00DU002 XU04 
activates.  The Alarm List has no Cause/Action text for this alarm.  If the deviation 
exceeds a further pre-defined limit the generator controls will trip the generator circuit 
breaker and remove it from the grid.  This will result in the boiler and turbine shutting 
down also.  If the project site is not operating the generator in speed control there is 
no action an operator may take to correct the situation of a frequency deviation. 
10.7.2. Investigation 
No specific alarm rate analysis has been conducted for this alarm.  If there is a 
frequency deviation and the generator is not being operated in speed control there is 
no action the operator can take to correct the situation.  Even if the deviation 
escalates to a complete shutdown of the generator/turbine/boiler the operator cannot 
correct the situation.  The problem with alarm is that there is no response required. 
10.7.3. Recommendations 
There are two possible solutions to this alarm.  The first is to remove the alarm.  If the 
project site feels that operation in speed control mode may be required in the future 
the alarm should be masked to only activate when operating in this mode. 
10.8. SDCC Hydraulic Oil Filter Differential Pressure 
This section investigates alarm 11HDA01CP003 XG11, ranked 17 in Table 14.  This 
alarm accounts for 1.32% of all alarms in the period of January 2015 to June 2015. 
10.8.1. System Description 
The SDCC (Submerged Drag Chain Conveyer) removes ash from the bottom of the 
boiler furnace.  The SDCC used a hydraulically driven motor to provide motive force to 
the conveyer.  The hydraulic oil system consists of electrically driven pumps to 
generate the hydraulic force and control valves to direct oil to the hydraulic conveyor 
drive.  The DCS regulates the speed of the conveyor the control valves.   
Cleanliness of the hydraulic oil is important.  Particulate contamination can block small 
passages in the valves and also cause damage to metal components that use polished 
surfaces and rubber seals to prevent oil leakages.  To eliminate particulate 
contamination a filter system is used.  The filter is installed directly downstream of 
hydraulic pumps.  It prevents particulates that are larger than a specific size from 
entering the hydraulic oil system. 
As the filter captures particles the hydraulic pressure drop across the filter increases.  
The pressure drop will eventually increase to the point where the hydraulic pumps 
cannot deliver enough pressure to the system.  Prior to reaching this point the filter 
must be replaced with a new one.  To indicate that the filter is blocked a differential 
pressure switch monitors the pressure difference from the inlet to the outlet of the 
filter.  The pressure switch is connected to a ‘digital’ input on the DCS.  Note that the 
input is configured in such a way that the normal state of the alarm is when the input 
is in the active state.  When the pressure drop exceeds a pre-determined level it 
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operates and activates Priority 2 alarm 11HDA01CP003 XG11 – DP SDCC HYDR OIL 
FILTER.  The Alarm List offers the following text as the Cause/Action: 
“SDCC HYD FILTER”  
10.8.2. Investigation 
Using the LocalDB test environment an SQL query was run to extract all alarm 
activations and deactivations for KKS tag 11HDA01CP003 XG11.  The duration of each 
alarm in was then determined – Table 23 shows the results.  It shows that all but 15 of 
the 4193 alarm activations were for a duration of less than one second.  This is a classic 
case of a fleeting alarm. 
 
Table 23 – SDCC Hydraulic Oil Filter Differential Pressure alarm duration 
Duration 
(seconds) 
Alarm 
Count 
< 1 4080 
1 - 10 98 
> 10 17 
 
There are two possible causes of the fleeting alarm.  Firstly the alarm was genuine and 
caused by high pressure across the filter.  It should be noted that the pressure will not 
be constant.  It will fluctuate around its operating point.  The hydraulic oil is supplied 
by an electric pump operates at high speed.  This causes fluctuations that are a likely to 
cause the fleeting alarm if the pressure drop approaches the alarm point.  The second 
possibility, given the wiring configuration, is that a loose wiring connection that is 
vibrating may have also caused the alarm. 
 Also worth noting in that the 4193 alarm activations all occurred in the period of 18th 
of February to the 26th of February – over eight days.  This shows how fleeting alarm 
can have a dramatic impact on the alarm system performance over a short period. 
10.8.3. Recommendations 
Two methods to prevent fleeting alarms are to apply either hysteresis or a time delay.  
As the alarm originates from a simple pressure switch it is likely that it is not possible 
to adjust the hysteresis.  A time delay is therefore recommended. Guidance from the 
Alarm Philosophy recommends a time delay of at least 15 seconds be applied to alarms 
for pressure measurements.  This is the minimum time recommended so the 
rationalisation team may decide that the time can be extended further if appropriate.  
This depends on the response time required and consequence.  The plant can tolerate 
the SDCC to be shut down while the boiler is operating so a longer time delay could be 
suitable.  To ensure there is not a fault all wiring connections associated with the alarm 
should also be inspected by maintenance staff. 
10.9. Coal Conveyer Weight Meter 
This section investigates alarm 90EJC20CW010 XQ50 >HIGH, ranked 18 in Table 14.  
This alarm accounts for 1.28% of all alarms in the period of January 2015 to June 2015. 
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10.9.1. System Description 
There are two coal conveyers that can transport coal from either the overland coal 
conveying system or coal stockpiles, one is designated as ‘T1C’ and the other ‘T2C’.  
The coal conveyers have finite capacity to transport coal, normally specified in tonnes 
per hour.  If coal is feed onto the conveyers over this limit the conveyor may be 
overloaded and damaged, coal transfer points my block or coal spillages may occur.  
Spillage is dangerous as an accumulation of coal presents a fire hazard.  This is a 
concern as coal can self-combust. 
Each coal conveyer has a weight meter measures the instantaneous rate of coal in 
tonnes per hour and transmits this to the DCS as an ‘analog’ input.  Alarms 
90ECJ10CW010 XQ50 (for ‘T1C’) and 90ECJ20CW010 XQ50 (for T2C) activate when the 
instantaneous rate of coal is greater than 660 tonnes per hour.  The Alarm List offers 
the following text as the Cause/Action: 
“T2C has exceeded its design capacity of 660 tph.  Feed rates should be reduced 
to prevent chute blockages and coal spills.” 
10.9.2. Investigation 
The first consideration in investigating this alarm was to ask “How many alarms are 
there on the other conveyor?”  Conveyer ‘T2C’ produced 4055 alarms while ‘T1C’ only 
produced 15 alarms for the same period.  The next question to ask was “Was one 
conveyor run more often than the other?”  Investigating the run hours for the period 
shows that conveyor ‘T2C’ was run for 2613 hours while ‘T1C’ was run for 1211 hours.  
Although the conveyor with Bad Actor alarm was run for twice as many hours as the 
other, this does justify the difference in alarms. 
It is likely that there is an accuracy problem with one of the weight meters.  The 
operation of the coal conveyers was observed using the Historian.  Figure 59 shows a 
trend of the weight meter for T1C and T2C conveyors, and the status the conveyor 
drive motor.  Both are reading significantly different in both value and characteristics.  
T2C shows a very noisy signal that is likely creating fleeting alarms.  After discussing 
the system with site personnel there is no confidence in accuracy of either weight 
meter. 
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Figure 59 – Trend of coal conveyor weigh meters 
 
10.9.3. Recommendations 
Before any further alarm analysis is preformed the accuracy of the weight meters 
needs to be restored.  In the short term the alarms should be disabled as in their 
current form the alarms are of no use. 
10.10. Impact of Removing the Bad Actors 
To see to impact of resolving the top 18 Bad Actors daily alarm rate the query was 
rerun.  This time the top 18 alarms were ignored.  The assumption made is that all of 
the Bad Actors would be completely eliminated or reduced such that they would not 
have any significant effect on the daily alarm rate. 
The query was rerun for the period from the start of January 2015 to October 25th 
2015.  By looking forward from the original dates of the top 18 analysis it can be seen 
how sustainable the improvements would be.  Figure 60 shows comparison between 
the actual alarm rate and the predicted alarm rate with the bad actors removed. 
The results show that there is an appreciable reduction in the daily alarm rate over the 
period January to June 2015.  There remove of the top 18 Bad Actors has also been 
sustainable into the second half of 2015.  The predicted alarm rate has continued to be 
significantly lower than the actual alarm rate. 
The effect of a single fleeting alarm can be observed in Figure 60.  The Submerged Drag 
Chain Conveyor Hydraulic Oil Filter Differential Pressure was a Bad Actor for eight day 
period in mid-February.  During this period there are significant spikes in the actual 
alarm rate.  These are not seen in the predicted alarm rate.  
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Figure 60 – Daily Alarm Rate Actual and Predicted 
 
There still appear to be many fleeting alarms.  There are periods where actual alarm 
rate is above 3000 alarms per day, with one over 7000.  The predicted alarm rate still 
follows this in most cases.  As has been previously stated, fleeting alarms should be 
dealt with immediately to prevent them taking over the alarm system.  
There are two important points that can be inferred from Figure 60.  Firstly significant 
effort will be required to reduce the daily alarm rate to below the maximum 
recommended daily alarm rate and below.  The top 18 alarms accounted for 
approximately 40% of all alarms.  To reduce the alarm rate by a further 40% of the 
actual alarm rate will require the resolution of considerably more Bad Actors. 
Secondly, toward the end of September and into October the difference between the 
actual alarm rate and the predicted alarm rate does appear closer.  This is because the 
actual alarm rate has increased due to alarms other than the top 18 – both actual and 
predicted are trending upwards.  This shows that alarm management is a continuous 
process.  As Bad Actors are resolved others quickly begin to emerge and cause 
problems.    
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Chapter 11 – Conclusions and Further Work                                            
 
11.1. Alarm Philosophy 
To comply with the corporate engineering directive for alarm management the project 
site was required to implement the Alarm Philosophy by the end of June 2015.  The 
Alarm Philosophy was handed to the project site at the start of June.  The project site 
made some slight changes to the document to suit their business requirements.  
Anecdotally the project site reported that well over 95% of the document was adopted 
with no changes.  The Alarm Philosophy is now an official site procedure.  The principal 
engineer in the organisation has endorsed the Alarm Philosophy and commended the 
project site for the quality of the document. 
Further work for the project site is to ensure the Alarm Philosophy is actually used as 
the guiding reference for alarm management activities on the site.  It is expected that 
the alarm management practices will mature as the site journeys towards sustainable 
alarm.  Further work is also required to ensure that Alarm Philosophy is updated to 
reflect any changes to alarm management practices. 
11.2. Master Alarm Database 
The Master Alarm Database was handed over the project site.  The project site now 
has an up to date list of all configured alarms configured in the DCS.  It is too early to 
determine if there Alarm Help Interface is being used by operators. 
Further work for the project site is to investigate is the ability of using Alarm Help as 
part of the HMI interface.  The current HMI will not support this functionality.  The 
project site is now preparing to continue he roll out of the new HMI system and 
decommissioning the current HMI system.  This roll out requires significant 
development as the existing displays cannot be easily ported to the HMI system.  As 
part of the development of the new HMI system the inclusion of an Alarm Help 
Interface should be investigated. 
It is likely that the current format of the Master Alarm Database is not going to be 
suitable for long term use.  Managing the database in a spreadsheet is cumbersome.  
Once the project site has decided if it will integrate the alarm help into the HMI system 
a longer term solution for Master Alarm database can be made.  This could be a 
custom made database or a commercially available product.  The chosen solution 
should continue to support the documentation requirements of the Alarm Philosophy. 
11.3. Alarm Report Tool 
The Alarm Report Tool was successfully tested on the project site.  It was then handed 
over for use.   Alarm reports are now beginning circulated to production, maintenance 
and engineering departments. 
In October 2015 the project site engaged the control system vendor to update the new 
HMI system to the latest version of the software, as well as replacing the aging 
hardware.  The correct functioning of the Alarm Report Tool is included as one 
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acceptance tests for the update.  This shows the project site is committed to continued 
use of the Alarm Report Tool. 
It is expected that the alarm performance monitoring will mature at the project site.  
The reporting requirements may outgrow the Alarm Reporting Tool.  Standing alarm 
reporting and flooding require a higher level of analysis that would not be supported 
by simple SQL queries.  It is likely that a commercially available reporting tool will be 
required in this case.  A custom tool could be developed as per the Alarm Report Tool, 
but the complexity of the reporting increases the maintainability of the tools becomes 
more difficult. 
11.4. Alarm Management Practices 
Take up of alarm management practices has been slow at the project site.  The 
adoption Alarm Philosophy and including the Alarm Reporting tool in acceptance tests 
for the new HMI system show that there is a level of commitment.  No work has been 
attempted yet to address the alarm performance though. 
The initial challenge for the project site is to reduce the daily alarm rate to the 150 – 
300 alarms per day range.  The current alarm rate of 1500 alarms per day makes the 
alarm system almost unusable.  The recommendations from the Top 18 Bad actors 
should be accessed and implemented where possible. 
Of these the biggest challenge is the Pulveriser Reject Hopper Level alarms.  
Collectively these alarms accounted 14% of the alarm count.  Part of the solution is 
outside the scope of alarm management, and has historically been very hard to 
resolve.  The Water Plant pH (7.6%) and Coal Conveyer Weight Meter (1.3%) alarms 
also require solutions outside of alarm management to resolve, though the resolutions 
should be achievable using technical expertise at the project site. 
The remaining Top 18 Bad Actors are all classic alarm management problems and 
should be able to be resolved by applying good alarm management practice.  These 
remaining alarms accounted for 17.8% of the total alarm count.  Implementing the 
recommendations will produce quick wins for alarm management at the project site. 
Only sustained alarm management will reduce and keep the daily alarm rate in control 
(150 – 300 alarms per day).  Once this is achieved focus should shift to standing alarms 
and alarm floods created by major process disturbances and shutdowns.  The likely 
solutions to these problems will be to develop alarm masking strategies at the 
subsystem level.  This will require well matured alarm management practices to be 
successful. 
The Alarm Philosophy, Master Alarm Database and Alarm Reporting Tool were road 
blocks to effective alarm management at the project site.  It still remains to be seen if 
the project site will be able to successfully implement and sustain industry best 
practice alarm management practices.  Now that they have the tools to be successful 
all they need is the will. 
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Appendix A – Project Specification                                                           
 
University of Southern Queensland 
FACULTY OF ENGINEERING AND SURVEYING 
ENG4111/4112 Research Project 
Project Specification 
FOR:  Daniel Justin SNELGAR 
TOPIC:  Implementing Industry Best Practice Alarm Management 
SUPERVISER: Catherine Hills 
PROJECT AIM: This project seeks to investigate Process Automation industry best practice for the management 
of alarm systems.  This information will be used to benchmark the selected industrial site, a 
large thermal power station, against industry best practice alarm metrics for alarms rates and 
the installed base of alarms.  The site’s current managements systems associated with alarm 
management will also be compared to industry best practice alarm management practices so a 
gap analysis can be created. 
PROGRAME:  Issue A, 18th March 2015 
1) Research the history of industrial alarms, the risks associated with poorly managed alarms 
systems and some industrial incidents that have been attributed to poorly managed alarms 
systems. 
2) Compare current industry guides and standards, not limited to but specifically: 
a. ‘EEMUA 191 Alarms systems – a guide to design, management and procurement’ 
b. ‘ISA 18.2 Management of Alarm Systems for the Process Industries’ 
c. ‘IEC 62682 Management of alarm systems for the process industries’ 
3) Based on current industry guides and standards establish the appropriate aspects and metrics 
for an industry best practice alarm management system. 
For the selected industrial site: 
4) Design and implement reporting tools to analyse the archived chronological alarm data and the 
installed base of configured alarms so they may be compare to industry best practice metrics. 
5) Compare the results of the reporting tools against industry best practice metrics and where 
possible suggest changes to improve alarm performance.  Simulate the results of the proposed 
changes to alarms.  
6) Compare the site’s management systems associated with alarm management against an 
industry best practice alarm management system and create a gap analysis. 
As time permits: 
7) Implement proposed changes to the alarm system and compare against simulated results. 
8) Research the cognitive boundaries of human performance and how this relates to the metrics 
used in industry guides and standards. 
 
AGREED                                       (student)                                         (supervisor) 
  Date:     /    /2015    Date:     /    /2015   
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Appendix B.1. BSIG Parser Tool Code Listing 
 
Sub bsig_parser() 
 
' Set column headers 
Cells(1, 1).Value = "Tag KKS" 
Cells(1, 2).Value = "Description" 
Cells(1, 3).Value = "Engineering Units" 
Cells(1, 4).Value = "DCS Address" 
Cells(1, 5).Value = "Data Type" 
Cells(1, 6).Value = "Text for Value 1" 
Cells(1, 7).Value = "Text for Value 0" 
Cells(1, 8).Value = "Alarm State" 
Cells(1, 9).Value = "Priority" 
Cells(1, 10).Value = "Limit Value" 
Cells(1, 11).Value = "MF_SIG" 
Cells(1, 12).Value = "Masking Signal" 
Cells(1, 13).Value = "Number of FGs" 
Cells(1, 14).Value = "Function Group" 
 
' Initialise row and column index counters 
r = 1 
c = 1 
 
' Find the first file with the BSIG extension in the directory 
' Note: assuming the files reside in a subdirectory .\PBS_daten relative to this file 
strFilePath = ThisWorkbook.Path 
strFileName = Dir(strFilePath & "\PBS_daten\*.BSIG") 
 
' File Handling Loop - process while there are still .BSIG files found in the directory 
While strFileName <> "" 
     
    ' Some of the BSIG files need not be processed, only files that start with numeric 
    ' characters, is not numeric the skip to the next file 
    If IsNumeric(Mid(strFileName, 5, 1)) = False Then GoTo skipfile 
     
    ' Extract the Function Group name from the file name 
    strFunctionGroup = Right(Left(strFileName, 13), 9) 
     
    ' Build the a string of the file name including the full path 
    strFileNameFull = strFilePath & "\PBS_daten\" & strFileName 
     
    ' Open the file an import the contents to a string variable 
    ' Note: because the files are sourced for a Linux based computer system the line feed used as 
    ' a carriage return is not recognised by VBA, so the Line Input command reads the whole file. 
    ' Later we check to ensure the full file has been parsed and the contents have not been clipped 
    ' due to string length restrictions 
    FileNum = FreeFile 
    Open strFileNameFull For Input As FileNum 
    Line Input #FileNum, strFileContents 
     
    ' Close the current BSIG file 
    Close FileNum 
     
    ' Initialise file index counters 
    intStartPos = 1 
    intLineNum = 1 
     
    ' Line Handling Loop 
    While intStartPos < Len(strFileContents) 
     
        ' Get the next line of the file - Chr(10) is the line feed character 
        intEndPos = InStr(intStartPos, strFileContents, Chr(10)) 
        strLineText = Mid(strFileContents, intStartPos, intEndPos - intStartPos) 
        intStartPos = intEndPos + 1 
     
        ' Only process after the 4th line, the line is not blank and the line start with "E_AD" 
        If intLineNum > 4 And strLineText <> "" And Left(strLineText, 4) <> "E_DA" Then 
             
            ' If the line starts with "SIGT" then line represents a new signal ... 
            If Left(strLineText, 4) = "SIGT" Then 
                 
                ' ... increase the row index, reset the column index and write the Function Group 
name ... 
                r = r + 1 
                Cells(r, 14).Value = strFunctionGroup 
                Cells(r, 13).Value = 1 
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                c = 1 
             
            ' ... else the line is a continuation of the signal ... 
            Else 
                '... split the column name from the data and write the data to the spread sheet 
                strCellText = Right(strLineText, Len(strLineText) - InStr(strLineText, ":") - 1) 
                strCellText = Replace(strCellText, "'", "") 
                Cells(r, c).Value = strCellText 
                c = c + 1 
                 
            End If 
     
        End If 
         
        ' Increment the line index counter 
        intLineNum = intLineNum + 1 
     
    ' Continue the Line Handling Loop 
    Wend 
     
    ' Check that the last line of the file begins with "E_DA" - this proves that the complete file 
was 
    ' imported into the string.  If not captured use a message box to warn 
    If Left(strLineText, 4) <> "E_DA" Then 
     
        a = MsgBox("File " & strFileName & " not fully processed", vbOKOnly) 
           
    End If 
         
' If the file was skipped this is where the code jumps to 
skipfile: 
    
    ' Find the next file with the BSIG extension in the directory 
    strFileName = Dir 
 
' Continue the File Handling Loop 
Wend 
 
' Remove duplicates but retain FG information 
' Note - a binary signal may be in more than one function group, therefore be in multiple lines. 
' We only want the signal once, so the following code removes all duplicates but keeps the Function 
' Group information from each duplicate. 
 
' This block of code was created with the aid of the macro recorder 
' It sorts all information in order of KKS name and then Function Group 
lastrow = Cells(Rows.Count, 2).End(xlUp).Row 
Range("A1:M" & lastrow).Select 
ActiveSheet.Sort.SortFields.Clear 
ActiveSheet.Sort.SortFields.Add Key:=Range( _ 
    "a2:a" & lastrow), SortOn:=xlSortOnValues, Order:=xlAscending, DataOption:= _ 
    xlSortNormal 
ActiveSheet.Sort.SortFields.Add Key:=Range( _ 
    "n2:n" & lastrow), SortOn:=xlSortOnValues, Order:=xlAscending, DataOption:= _ 
    xlSortNormal 
With ActiveSheet.Sort 
    .SetRange Range("A1:n" & lastrow) 
    .Header = xlYes 
    .MatchCase = False 
    .Orientation = xlTopToBottom 
    .SortMethod = xlPinYin 
    .Apply 
End With 
 
' Initialise row index counter 
r = 3 
 
' Loop - while there are binary signals to process keep processing rows 
While Cells(r - 1, 1) <> "" 
     
    ' If the current row is the same signal as the row above ... 
    If Cells(r - 1, 1).Value = Cells(r, 1).Value Then 
         
        ' ... increment the column  which identifies the number of Function Groups and append the 
        ' Function Group name to the Function Group column, then delete the row 
        Cells(r - 1, 13).Value = Cells(r - 1, 13).Value + 1 
        Cells(r - 1, 14).Value = Cells(r, 14).Value & "," & Cells(r - 1, 14).Value 
        Rows(r).Delete 
         
    Else 
     
        ' Increment the row index counter 
        r = r + 1 
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    End If 
 
' Continue removed duplicates the Loop 
Wend 
 
End Sub 
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Appendix B.2. BSIG Parser Tool Output Screen Shot 
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Appendix B.3. Master Alarm Database Sheet Screen Shot 
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Appendix B.4. Master Alarm Database Instruction Sheet Screen Shot 
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Appendix B.5. Rationalisation Template Screen Shot 
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Appendix B.6. Alarm Help Interface Code Listing 
 
Private Sub UserForm_Initialize() 
 
' First row in the MasterAlarmDatabase with an alarm 
r = 3 
 
' Populate the KKS Tag combo box with all of the alarms in the Master Database 
With ComboBox_KKS_Tag 
 
    ' Loop through each item in coloum 1 until a blank cell is found ... 
    While Worksheets("MasterAlarmDatabase").Cells(r, 1) <> "" 
     
        ' ... and add the item to the KKS Tag combo box 
        .AddItem Worksheets("MasterAlarmDatabase").Cells(r, 1).Value 
         
        r = r + 1 
             
    Wend 
 
End With 
 
End Sub 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Private Sub CommandButton_Find_Click() 
 
' Call the FindAlarm subroutine if the Find button is pressed 
 
Call FindAlarm 
 
End Sub 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Private Sub FindAlarm() 
 
' Get the current alarm selected in the KKS Tag Combo Box 
KKS_Tag = ComboBox_KKS_Tag.Value 
 
' If the alarm is not found there will be an error 
On Error GoTo NotFound 
 
' For the alarm selected find the row in the Master Alarm Database 
r = Application.WorksheetFunction.Match(KKS_Tag, Worksheets("MasterAlarmDatabase").Range("A:A"), 0) 
On Error Resume Next 
 
' Populate the fields in the UserForm with the information for selected alarm 
TextBox_Descriptor.Value = Worksheets("MasterAlarmDatabase").Cells(r, 2).Value 
TextBox_Alarm_Text.Value = Worksheets("MasterAlarmDatabase").Cells(r, 3).Value 
TextBox_Consequence.Value = Worksheets("MasterAlarmDatabase").Cells(r, 13).Value 
TextBox_Cause.Value = Worksheets("MasterAlarmDatabase").Cells(r, 14).Value 
TextBox_Action.Value = Worksheets("MasterAlarmDatabase").Cells(r, 15).Value 
 
Exit Sub 
 
NotFound: 
' If the alarm is not found then put 'Not Found' in the descriptor text box 
' Empty all of the other text boxes 
TextBox_Descriptor.Value = "Not Found" 
TextBox_Alarm_Text.Value = "" 
TextBox_Consequence.Value = "" 
TextBox_Cause.Value = "" 
TextBox_Action.Value = "" 
 
End Sub  
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Appendix C – Alarm Reporting Tool                                                                                                   
Appendix C.1. Alarm Report SQL Query Code Listing 
 
 
/* Clean up temp tables */ 
IF OBJECT_ID('tempdb..#working') IS NOT NULL 
    DROP TABLE #working 
IF OBJECT_ID('tempdb..#topalarms') IS NOT NULL 
    DROP TABLE #topalarms 
IF OBJECT_ID('tempdb..#topmaintenance') IS NOT NULL 
    DROP TABLE #topmaintenance 
IF OBJECT_ID('tempdb..#topdisturbance') IS NOT NULL 
    DROP TABLE #topdisturbance 
IF OBJECT_ID('tempdb..#prioritydistribution') IS NOT NULL 
    DROP TABLE #prioritydistribution 
IF OBJECT_ID('tempdb..#dailyrate') IS NOT NULL 
    DROP TABLE #dailyrate 
 
declare @total decimal(10,3) 
declare @timeshift int 
set @timeshift = 8 
 
/* Prepare working table for alarm activations in the reporting period */ 
select * 
 into #working 
 from PlaCoEvents.dbo.tbl_events 
 where (((ev_prio = 1 or ev_prio = 2 or ev_prio = 4) and len(tag_name) = 17)   /* User Alarms */ 
 or ev_prio = 3  /* Maintenance Alarms */ 
 or ev_prio = 8 or ev_prio = 9 ) /* Disturbance Alarms */ 
 and info_01 <> 'CLEARED' and tag_shortdescription <> 'CLEARED' 
 and ts_subsystem > dateadd(hh, -@timeshift,'01-01-2015') and  ts_subsystem  < dateadd(hh, -
@timeshift,'02-01-2015') 
 
/* Set column ts_subsytem to local time */ 
update #working  
set ts_subsystem = dateadd(hh, @timeshift, ts_subsystem) 
 
/* Return priorities to DCS values */ 
 
/* Set Disturbance Alarms to Priority 6 - temporary!*/ 
update #working 
set ev_prio = 6 
 where ev_prio = 8 or  ev_prio = 9 
/* Set Maintenance Alarms to Priority 0 */ 
update #working 
set ev_prio = 0 
 where ev_prio = 3 
/* Set User Priority 4 to Priority 3 */ 
update #working 
set ev_prio = 3 
 where ev_prio = 4 
 /* Set Disturbance Alarms to Priority 4 */ 
update #working 
set ev_prio = 4 
 where ev_prio = 6 
 
/* Calculate total alarms for calcs */ 
set @total = (select count(*) from #working where ev_prio <> 4) 
 
/* Get priority distribution into a table */ 
select ev_prio, cast(count(*) as decimal(10,3)) as priopercent 
 into #prioritydistribution 
 from #working 
 where ev_prio<>4 
 group by ev_prio 
 order by ev_prio  
update #prioritydistribution 
 set priopercent = priopercent / @total 
 
/* Get Top Alarms into a table */ 
/* Priority 1, 2, 3 and Maintnenance alarms */ 
select top 20 tag_name, tag_description, tag_shortdescription, tag_status, ev_prio, COUNT(*) as total 
,COUNT(*) / @total as alarm_percent 
 into #topalarms 
 from #working 
 where ev_prio <> 4 
 group by tag_name, tag_description, tag_shortdescription, tag_status, ev_prio 
 order by total desc 
 
/* Get Top Maintenance Alarms into a table */ 
select top 10 tag_name, tag_description, tag_shortdescription, tag_status,  ev_prio, COUNT(*) as 
total, COUNT(*) / @total as alarm_percent  
 into #topmaintenance 
 from #working 
 where ev_prio = 0 
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 group by tag_name, tag_description, tag_shortdescription, tag_status, ev_prio 
 order by total desc 
 
 
/* Get Top Disturbance Alarms into a table */ 
set @total = (select count(*) from #working where ev_prio = 4) 
 
select top 10 tag_name, tag_description, tag_shortdescription, tag_status,  ev_prio, COUNT(*) as 
total, COUNT(*) / @total as alarm_percent   
 into #topdisturbance 
 from #working 
 where ev_prio = 4 
 group by tag_name, tag_description, tag_shortdescription, tag_status, ev_prio 
 order by total desc 
 
/* Get the daily alarm rates into a table */ 
SELECT DATEADD(dd, DATEDIFF(dd, 0, ts_subsystem), 0) as Date, COUNT(*) as Rate 
 into #dailyrate 
 FROM  #working 
 where ev_prio <> 4 
 group by DATEADD(dd, DATEDIFF(dd, 0, ts_subsystem), 0) 
 order by Date 
 
 /* Output results */ 
select * from #prioritydistribution order by ev_prio 
select * from #topalarms order by total desc 
select * from #topmaintenance order by total desc 
select * from #topdisturbance order by total desc 
select * from #dailyrate order by Date 
 
/* Clean up temp tables */ 
IF OBJECT_ID('tempdb..#working') IS NOT NULL 
    DROP TABLE #working 
IF OBJECT_ID('tempdb..#topalarms') IS NOT NULL 
    DROP TABLE #topalarms 
IF OBJECT_ID('tempdb..#topmaintenance') IS NOT NULL 
    DROP TABLE #topmaintenance 
IF OBJECT_ID('tempdb..#topdisturbance') IS NOT NULL 
    DROP TABLE #topdisturbance 
IF OBJECT_ID('tempdb..#prioritydisturbance') IS NOT NULL 
    DROP TABLE #prioritydistribution 
IF OBJECT_ID('tempdb..#dailyrate') IS NOT NULL 
    DROP TABLE #dailyrate 
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Appendix C.2.  SQL Subroutine Code Listing 
 
 
Sub SQL(ByVal startdate As String, ByVal enddate As String) 
 
' Declare the objects and variables 
Dim Cnn As New ADODB.Connection 
Dim Rst As New ADODB.Recordset 
Dim ConnectionString, SqlTextFile, SqlStatement As String 
 
' Read connection string of configuration sheet 
ConnectionString = Worksheets("SQL").Cells(2, 1).Value 
 
' Execute the 'Open' method using the connection string 
Cnn.Open ConnectionString 
Cnn.CommandTimeout = 900 
 
' Initialise the row index 
r = 4 
 
' Main program loop - while the cell at RrC1 is no blank there are more SQL commands to process 
While Worksheets("SQL").Cells(r, 1).Value <> "" 
     
    sqlstr = Worksheets("SQL").Cells(r, 1).Value 
    sqlstr = Replace(sqlstr, "STARTDATE", startdate) 
    sqlstr = Replace(sqlstr, "ENDDATE", enddate) 
     
    ' Determine with object ot use to process the SQL commands 
    If Worksheets("SQL").Cells(r, 2).Value = "" Then 
     
        ' Execute SQL commands using connection object - no record set will be returned 
        Cnn.Execute sqlstr 
     
    Else 
     
        ' Execute SQL command using the recordset object 
        Rst.Open sqlstr, Cnn 
        ' Put the record set at the row and column referecne as per SQL configuration sheet 
        Range(Chr(64 + Worksheets("SQL").Cells(r, 3).Value) & Worksheets("SQL").Cells(r, 
2).Value).CopyFromRecordset Rst 
        Rst.Close 
             
    End If 
     
    ' Increase the row index 
    r = r + 1 
 
Wend 
 
' Close the connection to the SQL server and release memory for objects 
Cnn.Close 
Set Cnn = Nothing 
Set Rst = Nothing 
 
End Sub   
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Appendix C.3.  ReportGenerator Code Listing 
 
Sub ReportGenerator() 
 
' Declare the variables 
Dim strStartDate, strEndDate As String 
 
' Get the report date from the date picker object on the user interface worksheet 
strDate = Worksheets("Main").ReportDatePicker.Value 
 
' Determine the reporting period from the radio button selection - weekly or monthly 
If Worksheets("Main").WeeklyButton.Value = True Then 
 
    ' Weekly Report 
    ' Determine the start date 
    ReportDate = strDate - Weekday(strDate, vbMonday) + 1 
    ReportYear = Year(ReportDate) 
    ReportMonth = Month(ReportDate) 
    If ReportMonth < 10 Then ReportMonth = "0" & ReportMonth 
    ReportDay = Day(ReportDate) 
    If ReportDay < 10 Then ReportDay = "0" & ReportDay 
    ' Start date for weekly report that will be passed to the SQL subroutine 
    strStartDate = ReportMonth & "-" & ReportDay & "-" & ReportYear 
     
    ' Built strings for report titles and subtitles 
    strReportName = "Weekly " & ReportYear & ReportMonth & ReportDay 
    strReportTitle = "Weekly Alarm Report" 
    strReportPeriod = "Monday, " & MonthName(ReportMonth) & " " & ReportDay & ", " & ReportYear 
     
    ' Determine the end date 
    ReportDate = ReportDate + 7 
    ReportMonth = Month(ReportDate) 
    ReportYear = Year(ReportDate) 
    ReportDay = Day(ReportDate) 
    ' End date for weekly report that will be passed to the SQL subroutine 
    strEndDate = ReportMonth & "-" & ReportDay & "-" & ReportYear 
     
Else 
         
    ' Monthly Report 
    ' Determince the start date 
    ReportDate = strDate 
    ReportYear = Year(ReportDate) 
    ReportMonth = Month(ReportDate) 
    If ReportMonth < 10 Then ReportMonth = "0" & ReportMonth 
    ' Start date for monthly report that will be passed to the SQL subroutine 
    strStartDate = ReportMonth & "-1-" & ReportYear 
     
    ' Built strings for report titles and subtitles 
    strReportName = "Monthly " & ReportYear & ReportMonth & "01" 
    strReportTitle = "Monthly Alarm Report" 
    strReportPeriod = MonthName(ReportMonth) & ", " & ReportYear 
     
    ' Determine the end date 
    ReportMonth = ReportMonth + 1 
    If ReportMonth > 12 Then 
        ReportMonth = 1 
        ReportYear = ReportYear + 1 
    End If 
    ' End date for monthly report that will be passed to the SQL subroutine 
    strEndDate = ReportMonth & "-1-" & ReportYear 
     
End If 
 
' Create a copy of the report template and name it appropriately 
Sheets("Report").Visible = -1 
Sheets("Report").Copy after:=Sheets("SQL") 
ActiveSheet.Name = strReportName 
Sheets("Report").Visible = 2 
Sheets(strReportName).Activate 
 
' Call the SQL subroutine with the appropriate start and end dates 
Call SQL(strStartDate, strEndDate) 
 
' Update the report title and subtitle appropriately 
Cells(1, 1).Value = strReportTitle 
Cells(2, 1).Value = strReportPeriod 
 
' Trim the unused rows in the Daily Alarm Rate table 
LastRow = Range("B150").End(xlUp).row + 1 
Range("B" & LastRow & ":E144").Delete 
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' Move the alarm report to a new Excel file 
Sheets(strReportName).Move 
 
End Sub 
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Appendix C.4.  Weekly Alarm Report Example 
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Appendix C.5. Monthly Alarm Reports 
The following pages show the monthly alarm reports for January 2015 to September 
2015 
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Appendix D – Alarm Philosophy                                                               
 
The following pages are the alarm philosophy developed for project site.  Note the 
numbering of pages, figures and tables is separate and does not coincide with this 
document.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Purpose 
The purpose of the Alarm Philosophy is to define the management systems, procedures and 
activities to ensure the management of the Alarm System, where practical, is consistent with 
both ISA-18.2-2009 – Management of Alarm Systems for the Process Industries and 
Engineering Directive – Alarm Management in Process Control Systems.  This Alarm Philosophy 
will evolve as the journey of Alarm Management moves forward. 
1.2. Scope 
The scope of the Alarm System is: 
 The DCS logic configuration which results in both User Alarms and System alarms 
 The HMI system which is used to display alarms and provide the means for Operators 
to respond to alarms 
 The Master Alarm Database 
 The historical data collection of activated alarms and events 
 The reporting tools used to generate alarm performance reports 
1.3. Definitions 
Table 1 – Definitions 
Alarm “An audible and/or visual means of indicating to the operator an equipment 
malfunction, process deviation, or an abnormal condition requiring a 
response.” 
ISA-18.2-2009 definition 
User Alarm An alarm which the user has complete control over which conditions will 
cause it to activate 
System Alarm An alarm which the system generates based on its interaction with the 
equipment connected to the DCS.  These alarms are usually diagnostic in 
nature and the user has no control over the configuration of these alarms 
DCS Distributed Control System - the site’s process control system 
HMI Human Machine Interface used to control and operate the plant via the DCS 
Operator Panel operator in who operates the plant via the HMI 
Bad Actors Alarms that cause the alarm performance to exceed predefined metrics  
Alarm 
Masking 
Programmatically (in the DCS configuration) preventing alarms from 
activating based on equipment conditions – e.g. preventing a low discharge 
pressure alarm on a pump when it is shutdown  
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2. Alarm Management Roles 
2.1. Site Management Team 
The Site Management Team shall ensure the necessary resources, including people, systems 
and equipment, are available to adequately implement and execute the Alarm Philosophy. 
2.2. Alarm Champion 
The Alarm Champion is the lead Alarm Management role on the site.  This role is responsible 
for ensuring that alarm management is executed in accordance with this Alarm Philosophy.  
The Alarm Champion should be an Instrument and Control / Electrical Asset Engineer as they 
have the skills and system knowledge to support the Alarm Philosophy. 
2.3. Asset Engineering 
Asset Engineering shall provide the technical knowledge and skills to support the Alarm 
Philosophy where required.  As the Alarm System is also used to improve asset and risk 
management of equipment Asset Engineering also act as a key stakeholder in the Alarm 
System. 
2.4. Production 
Production represent the end user of the Alarm System.  Production shall hold the Alarm 
Champion to account for the performance of the Alarm System as well its use to improve the 
operability of the process.  Production shall also provide technical knowledge to support the 
Alarm Philosophy where required.  
2.5. Maintenance 
Maintenance shall provide the technical knowledge and skills to support the Alarm Philosophy 
where required.  Maintenance shall also rectify defects that affect the performance of the 
Alarm System in a timely manner. 
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3. Alarm Management Model 
The Alarm Management Model describes the systematic manner in which the Alarm System 
will be managed.  As the site has an existing Alarm System a combined approach will be taken 
to ensure: 
 New alarms or are designed and implemented as per this alarm philosophy 
 Bad Actors are quickly identified, rectified if caused by alarm maintenance issue, 
otherwise re-designed and implemented as per this alarm philosophy 
 There is a method to rationalise all of the remaining installed alarms  
To support these goals three distinct workflow entry points to the Alarm Management Model 
will be used.  Appendix A depicts a visual representation of the Alarm Management Model and 
workflow entry points. 
3.1. Core Model 
3.1.1. Rationalisation 
Rationalisation is the process where new or existing alarms are scrutinised to ensure that they 
meet the requirement to be an alarm and are designed consistent with this Alarm Philosophy. 
Refer to Section 0 for details of the Rationalisation Process. 
3.1.2. Master Alarm Database    
All configured User Alarms are to be documented in a Master Alarm Database.  The Master 
Alarm Database shall also document all alarm information identified during the Rationalisation 
process. 
The Master Alarm Database is to be administered by the Alarm Champion.  It is the master 
data for control system personnel when installing or maintaining an alarm.  It should also be 
available to Operators for the purpose of determining the correct response to alarms.   
3.1.3. Management of Change 
To ensure alarms are correctly implemented, the appropriate people know about the alarms, 
and any follow-up documentation or actions are completed, all changes to the Alarm System 
must be managed using the site’s management of change process.  No changes to may be 
made to the Alarm System without authorization via the management of change process. 
Refer to the sites Management of Chance Process for details.   
3.1.4. DCS Configuration 
The way in with alarms are generated are a result of the DCS Configuration.  User Alarms are 
configured to activate when specific conditions are present, while System Alarms are a 
consequence of how equipment connected to the DCS behaves.  When configuring User 
Alarms they must be implemented as specified in the Master Alarm Database.  When installing 
or modifying equipment is important that the control system personnel understand how the 
equipment will generate System Alarms. 
The DCS Configuration is administered by the Asset Engineering group. 
3.1.5. Real-time Control 
Real-Time Control is the operation of the process.  Alarms are generated due to the operation 
of the process and how equipment is connected to the DCS responds.  In an ideal situation the 
there are three layers to prevent undesirable consequences – the process control layer, the 
alarm layer, and the shutdown/trip layer. 
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The process control layer consists of the plant automation which keeps the process in normal 
operating parameters.  If there is an abnormal situation that the process control layer cannot 
prevent an Alarm is presented the Operator via the HMI.  The Operator will make an 
adjustment to the process via the HMI and return the process to normal operation.  If no 
action or incorrect action is taken then shutdown/trip layer will shut down equipment to 
prevent consequences such as harm to people, equipment damage and environmental 
damage.  Although the shutdown itself is likely to be an undesirable consequence, it is more 
favourable than consequences such as harm to people, equipment damage and environmental 
damage.   
3.1.6. Alarm and Event History Collection 
Chronological data on the activation of alarms and events is collected and stored for historical 
purposes.  This data is used for both review of plant operation and alarm performance 
reporting. 
The Alarm and Event History Collection is administered by the Asset Engineering. 
3.1.7. Alarm Performance Reporting 
The performance of the Alarm System is measured through regularly schedule reports that 
analyse chronological alarm activation data and compare against pre-defined metrics. 
Refer to Section 6 for details of Alarm Performance Reporting. 
3.2. Alarm Management Workflow Entry Points 
The following Alarm Management workflow entry points have been identified: 
3.2.1. Workflow Entry 1 – New Alarm 
Whenever a new alarm is proposed it shall progress through the core of the Alarm 
Management Model.  Proposed alarms are rationalised, entered into the Master Alarm 
Database.  From there the management of change process should guide the implementation of 
the alarm into the DCS Configuration and then into Real-time Control.  Once implemented the 
alarm may be reviewed in the future if is progresses through the other workflow entry points 
3.2.2. Workflow Entry 2 – Alarm Performance Improvement 
The Alarm Performance Improvement workflow is a result of Alarm Performance Reporting.  
Weekly and Monthly reports shall be used to identify Bad Actors.  The Alarm Champion shall 
determine if the cause of the Bad Actor is an alarm maintenance issue or a poorly designed 
alarm. 
Alarm maintenance issues include faulty equipment, mal-operation or insufficient protection 
offered by the process control layer.  The Alarm Champion may require support from Asset 
Engineering, Maintenance and/or Production personnel to rectify maintenance issues.  
Responsibility for rectification may be passed to other departments but the Alarm Champion 
shall ensure they are completed.  If the Bad Actor has never been rationalised then is shall also 
be put forward for rationalisation.  Note that System Alarms cannot be rationalised and should 
be treated as alarm maintenance issues. 
If the Bad Actor cannot be rectified by alarm maintenance the alarm should be put forward for 
rationalisation.  In some circumstances it may be more appropriate to group the Bad Actor 
with all other alarms that are part of the same sub-system or plant area and re-design the 
alarming strategy for the sub-system or plant area. 
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Note: Where an equipment defect or equipment malfunction produces a fleeting that is 
overshadowing all other alarms then it should be rectified immediately.  These alarms may 
undermine the effectiveness of the whole Alarm System. 
3.2.3. Workflow Entry 3 – Existing Alarm 
Due to the high number of installed alarms (1000’s) it is not practical to provide the time and 
human resource required to rationalise all existing User Alarms.  The drivers for selection may 
be to improve asset and risk management of equipment, or to improve the alarming strategy 
for a sub-system or plant area.  The scheduling and criteria for selecting alarms for Scheduled 
Rationalisation shall be determined by the Alarm Champion in consultation with Asset 
Engineering and/or Production.   
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4. Alarm System Description 
The HMI provides the means the present alarms to the Operator.  The alarm functionality is 
fixed within the HMI in that it provides three priorities for User Alarms and two priorities for 
System Alarms.   
The HMI provides three distinct states for Alarms, they are: 
 Normal 
 Active Un-acknowledged 
 Active Acknowledged 
Figure 1 shows a state transition diagram for the alarm states.  The HMI provides a method to 
implement Alarm Masking.  The alarm masking provided only prevents the alarm from making 
an audible sound and flashing, i.e. it will progress straight to the Active and Acknowledged 
state.  The alarm will still appear in the Alarm List, in an alarm state on graphical displays and 
also be recorded in the Historian.  This is not consistent with the ISA18.2-2009 definition of 
“Suppressed by Design”.  It is not recommended that this feature be used.  Instead alarm 
masking should be configured in the application software loaded into the DCS controllers.   
 
Normal
Active
Not Ack.
Active
Ack.
Alarm transition to non-active state
Alarm Masking Signal in active state
Alarm in non-active 
state
Operator 
Acknowledges Alarm
Alarm in active state
Transition based on operator command
Transition based status of signal in DCS Controller
 
Figure 1 - Alarm Handling transition diagram (note HMI alarm masking not to be used) 
 
Table 2 describes the priorities of User Alarms, how they are visually indicated, whether there 
is an audible indication, and the manner in which the Operator should respond.  Table 3 
describes the priorities System Alarms, how they are visually indicated, the types of situations 
that can cause the alarm to activate, and manner in which the Operator should respond.  
During normal operation alarm displays should be set to only present activations requiring an 
operator response – this is Priority 1, 2, 3 and Maintenance alarms.  Priority S (Disturbance) 
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alarms should filtered out so they are not presented to Operators.  These are diagnostic alarms 
where the Operator response would be to relay information to maintenance personnel. 
Table 2 – Alarm System Priorities for User Alarms 
Priority Visual Indication 
 
Audible 
Annunciation 
Operator Response 
1 High-lighted Red with White text 
(Flashing until Acknowledged) 
Yes Cease all current tasks and 
activities and respond to the 
alarm 
2 High-lighted Orange with White 
text 
(Flashing until Acknowledged) 
 
Yes 
Close off any current tasks or 
activities and then respond to 
the alarm 
3 High-lighted Yellow with Black 
text 
(Flashing until Acknowledged) 
No Timely (within 10 to 30 
minutes) response to the 
alarm is required – lowest 
priority of both User Alarms 
and System Alarms 
Event White or Green text No Alarm displays should be 
filtered to prevent these 
alarms from being presented 
to operators 
 
Table 3 – Alarm System Priorities for System Alarms 
Priority Visual Indication Possible Source of Alarm Operator Response 
Maintenance Blue 
(Flashing until 
Acknowledged) 
 
A Drive or Sequence is  not 
at its expected position – 
there has been an 
unexpected change of state, 
the monitoring time to 
transition to an expected 
state has been exceeded, or 
the has been an interlock 
protection trip 
Response as per Priority 2 
Alarm (refer to Table 2) 
S 
(Disturbance) 
High-lighted Grey 
with Yellow text 
(Flashing until 
Acknowledged) 
System diagnostics has 
determined, or a device is 
reporting an error which is 
or will prevent it from 
operating correctly 
Alarm displays should be 
filtered to prevent these 
alarms from being 
presented to operators 
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5. Alarm Rationalisation 
Apart from the process as identified in this section the most important part of Alarm 
Rationalisation is the documentation of alarms.  All outcomes of the Alarm Rationalisation 
process shall be documented in the Master Alarm Database. 
5.1. Rationalisation Team 
Alarm Rationalisation shall be performed using a cross functional team.  The Rationalisation 
Team shall consist of the following roles: 
 The Alarm Champion 
 Instrument and Control Asset Engineer 
 Electrical Asset Engineer 
 Mechanical Asset Engineer 
 Production Coordinator 
 Senior Production Operator 
 Instrument and Control / Electrical Maintenance Analyst (as required) 
 Mechanical Maintenance Analyst (as required) 
 Environmental (as required) 
 Safety and Health (as required) 
The Rationalisation Team shall meet in the context of a design review meeting.  The Alarm 
Champion shall lead the Rationalisation Team.  Prior to meeting the Alarm Champion shall: 
 Compile the list of alarms to be rationalised, identified via one of the Alarm 
Management Workflows (refer to section 3.2) 
 Pre-populate the DCS configuration (as intended for new alarms or as installed for 
exiting alarms) for the list of alarms for the alarms to be rationalised 
 Ensuring the correct team members attend the meeting 
 Ensure any required supporting documentation is available to the team. 
5.2. Rationalisation Guidance 
The following guidance is provided to ensure rationalisation in performed in the correct 
context: 
 Alarms should indicate to the Operator an equipment malfunction, process deviation, 
or an abnormal condition requiring a response 
 The Alarm System should not be used as protection layers to prevent harm to people.  
Alarms with a consequence category of Safety should only be activated after to alert 
the Operator to that an emergency response maybe required.  Examples of safety 
consequence alarms are Fire System alarms, safety shower initiation alarms and area 
gas detection alarms.  Alarms with a consequence category of Safety should always be 
configured as Priority 1.  Process equipment should have protection layers for Safety 
designed into equipment.   
 Alarms should not be used as the first protection layer to prevent undesirable 
consequences – alarms should be used indicate that process control layer has become 
ineffective 
 Alarms should not be used as the last layer of protection to prevent undesirable 
consequences – the shutdown/trip layer should be used where there has been no 
action or incorrect action in response to an alarm. 
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 Base on the previous two points it is likely that the for the bulk of alarms the 
consequences of no action or incorrect action will be assigned to the consequence 
category of Business Interruption due to the shutdown/trip layer 
 Alarms should not activate to provide information only – particular attention is 
directed to the alarming of logic conditions used for automated operation of the 
processes.  If the process control layer is working as required no alarms should be 
activated. 
 Alarms requiring the same response should be grouped to a single alarm 
o Where these alarms are generated from external subsystems the use of a 
group or summary alarm is recommended.  An example of this may be a group 
of trip indications from an external subsystem.  The response to each of the 
individual trip alarms is likely the same for all.  The best implementation may 
be to use one common alarm to indicate that a trip has occurred, while the 
individual alarms are reconfigured as events and their status used as an 
indication on a HMI graphic display. 
o Where there are multiple or many measurements a single alarm can be 
implemented.  An example of this is generator winding alarms where could be 
several dozens of measurements, each with an alarm.  The response to each of 
the individual trip alarms is likely the same for all.  The best implementation 
may be to use one common alarm to indicate a temperature problem.  The 
Operator response could be to review all of the measurements, confirm that 
there is an abnormal situation and then decide on the correct cause of action. 
5.3. Rationalised Alarm Definition 
During the alarm rationalisation the following items are to be defined for each alarm: 
5.3.1. DCS Configuration 
Table 4 provides a list of the information required to implement an alarm in the DCS.   
Table 4 – DCS Configuration 
Attribute Guidance 
KKS Tag Dependant on how the alarm in configured – this may need to be 
updated once the alarm has been implemented in the DCS 
Configuration. 
Descriptor  System limits this to 24 characters – this should be as intuitive as 
possible to help the Operator identify the abnormal situation. 
Text for Alarm State System limits this to 7 characters – this should be used in conjunction 
with the Descriptor to help the Operator identify the abnormal 
situation. 
Text for Normal 
State 
System limits this to 7 characters. 
Functional 
Description  
The functional description is the DCS configuration required to 
implement the alarm.  This is the alarm set point or logic conditions 
that will activate the alarm. 
*See text below table for guidance in determining the function 
description. 
Page 13 of 19 
 
Attribute Guidance 
Time Delay Time delay can precent fleeting alarms, though overuse may reduce 
the maximum time to respond. 
ISA-18.2-2009 Time Delay Recommendations: 
 Flow Rate: ~15 seconds 
 Level: ~60 seconds 
 Pressure: ~15 seconds 
 Temperature: ~60 seconds 
Hysteresis Hysteresis can be used to prevent fleeting alarms, though overuse can 
create standing alarms. 
ISA-18.2-2009 Hysteresis Recommendations: 
 Flow Rate: ~5% 
 Level: ~ 5% 
 Pressure: ~2% 
 Temperature: ~1% 
Alarm Masking 
Conditions 
Identity any logic conditions in the DCS which can be used to prevent 
the alarm from activating unnecessarily, i.e. sub-system or equipment 
shutdown which may generate an alarm that is unnecessary. 
 
The Instrument and Control / Electrical Asset Engineer should provide guidance to the 
Rationalisation Team when determining the functional description of the alarm to ensure what 
is specified is within the capabilities of the DCS. 
The following guidance is provided when designing the Functional description of the alarm: 
 Limit values of measured analog signals – these types of alarms are not recommended 
as there is no means to apply time delays or masking conditions. 
 Measured binary signals – the types of alarms are not recommended for process 
measurements as there is no means to apply time delays or masking conditions.   
 Calculations on measure values – these types of alarms are recommended as they can 
be tailored to best identify abnormal situations.  It is also easier to apply Alarm 
Masking to these types of alarms 
 Logic Base Alarm – these types of alarms are recommended as they can be tailored to 
best identify abnormal situations.  It is also easier to apply Alarm Masking to these 
types of alarms 
5.3.2. Consequence of No Action or Incorrect Action 
For each alarm to be rationalised the Rationalisation Team shall access the consequence if 
there is no action or incorrect action to the abnormal situation the alarm has identified.  The 
consequence shall be considered for the categories of Safety, Environmental, Asset Damage or 
Loss, Asset Integrity and Business Interruption.  For each of these consequence categories the 
consequence shall be classed as Minor, Major or Severe according the guidelines in Table 5.  It 
should be assumed that any shutdown layers will operate if there is no action or incorrect 
action to the alarm  
Note that it may be useful to determine the corrective actions first if the consequence is not 
easily determined 
The Rationalisation Team should document the rationale of the selections from the 
consequence matrix for inclusion in the Master Alarm Database.  This will aid future alarm 
rationalisation of the alarm.  
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Table 5 – Consequence Matrix 
Consequence 
Category 
Consequence  
Minor Major Severe 
Safety Any alarm that prevents harm to personnel shall be Priority 1. 
*Alarms  shall not be used as the primary layer of protection to prevent 
harm to personnel  
Environment Local clean up 
required 
Major clean up required 
 
Incident report to 
corporate level 
Offsite clean up 
required 
 
Breech of License 
conditions or 
incident report to 
regulator 
 
Assets 
Damage or 
Loss 
Damage or loss <$10K Damage or loss >$10K Damage or loss 
>$100K 
Business 
Interruption 
Loss of availability of 
redundant equipment 
Temporary loss of 
generating capacity <24 
hours 
Unit Trip or 
Shutdown 
 
Temporary loss of 
generating capacity 
>24 hours 
Asset Integrity 
 
Any Alarm that protects Asset Integrity shall be Priority 2. 
*Asset Integrity is related to consequences of continued operation outside 
of safe operating windows where consequences may be reduced asset life or 
a scheduled plant shutdown to make repairs. 
 
5.3.3. Maximum Time for Operator to Respond 
For each alarm to be rationalised the Rationalisation Team shall determine the maximum time 
for an Operator to respond to the alarm in order to prevent the abnormal situation from 
escalating to the consequence.   
The times should be classified as either: 
 Less than three minutes 
 Three to ten minutes 
 Ten minutes to 30 minutes 
 Greater than 30 minutes 
Note that the maximum time for an Operator to respond is not required for consequence 
categories of Safety and Asset Integrity. 
5.3.4. Potential Causes 
For each alarm to be rationalised the Rationalisation Team shall identify potential causes of 
the abnormal situation the alarm has identified.  The context for the potential cause is to 
provide guidance to an Operator in real time to confirm abnormal situation.  This will also 
assist the Operator in making an assessment of the appropriate corrective action.  
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5.3.5. Corrective Actions 
For each alarm to be rationalised the Rationalisation Team shall identify the possible corrective 
action(s) required to return the process to normal operation.  The context for the corrective 
action(s) is to provide guidance to an Operator in real time as to what correct action(s) to take 
to return the process to normal operation. 
5.3.6. Priority Determination 
Alarms are prioritised according to the Consequences of No Action or Incorrect Action and 
Maximum Time for the Operator to Responded.  Table 6 shows how alarms are to be 
prioritised using these two attributes. 
Table 6 – Priority Determination Matrix 
Maximum Time for 
operator to respond 
Consequence 
Minor Major Severe 
>30 minutes Event Event Event 
10 to 30 minutes 3 3 2 
3 to 10 minutes 3 2 2 
<3 minutes 2 1 1 
 
Note that the Priority for consequence categories of Safety and Asset Integrity are not related 
to the maximum time for an Operator to respond, they are fixed as per Table 5. 
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6. Alarm Performance Monitoring 
The purpose of Alarm Performance Monitoring is to provide a continuous improvement loop in 
the alarm management.  Initially Alarm Performance Monitoring will focus on basic alarm 
performance metrics.  As the sites alarm management journey continues and alarm 
performance improves the Alarm Performance Monitoring more sophisticated metrics will be 
assessed. 
6.1. Alarms Reports 
All alarm reports are to be based on the total alarms each operating positon will receive in the 
reporting period.  This includes all plant areas within the span of control of the Operator.  
Priority S (Disturbance) alarms will not be included in the alarm rate reporting metrics.  These 
are diagnostic alarms where the Operator response would be to relay information to 
maintenance personnel.   
The reporting periods to be used will be calendar month and week – Monday to Monday.  For 
each reporting period the report the follow items will be reported: 
6.2. Alarm Performance Measures 
The following Alarm Performance Measures will drive Alarm Performance Improvement: 
6.2.1. Alarm Priority Distribution 
Definition: 
All alarm activations requiring an operator response (Priority 1, 2, 3 and Maintenance 
alarms) in the reporting period are grouped into priority.  The total count of alarm 
activations for each group is expressed as a percentage of the total number of alarm 
activations. 
For an Alarm System with three priorities ISA-18.2-2009 identifies an Alarm Priority 
Distribution of ≈80% for Priority 3, ≈15% for Priority 2, and ≈5% for Priority 1.  Poor priority 
distribution can undermine the intent of priorities.  ISA-18.2-2009 provides not guidance for 
Maintenance alarms, but these should be less than 5% 
Exceedances of the Alarm Priority Distribution metric should drive scheduled rationalisation – 
e.g. overuse of a priority may mean that the focus of scheduled rationalisation should focus on 
a particular priority ahead of others.  I may also be used to determine it the rationalisation 
methodology is effective – e.g. if the priority distribution of alarms that have been rationalised 
exceeds the metric then a review of the rationalisation methodology may be required. 
6.2.2. Top Alarms 
Definition: 
All alarm activations in the reporting period requiring an operator response (Priority 1, 
2, 3 and Maintenance alarms).  The top 20 alarms based on total number of activations 
is listed.  Further processing of the list will include: 
 The alarm count percentage – i.e. the total count for each alarm expressed as a 
percentage of the total alarm activations for the reporting period 
 The alarm count cumulative percentage – i.e. the cumulative percentage of the 
alarms working down the list from highest count to lowest count. 
The Top Alarms for alarms requiring an operator response (Priority 1, 2, 3 and Maintenance 
alarms) should are used to determine Bad Actors.  The Bad Actors should progress through the 
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Alarm Performance Improvement workflow entry (refer to Section 3.2.2).  The Top Alarms can 
be used to identify both frequently occurring alarms and fleeting alarms.  
 
6.2.3. Top Maintenance Alarms 
Definition: 
All Maintenance alarm activations in the reporting period.  The top 10 alarms based on 
total number of activations is listed.  Further processing of the list will include: 
 The alarm count percentage – i.e. the total count for each alarm expressed as a 
percentage of the total alarm activations for the reporting period 
 The alarm count cumulative percentage – i.e. the cumulative percentage of the 
alarms working down the list from highest count to lowest count 
The Top Maintenance Alarms should be used to identify equipment that requires maintenance 
intervention. 
6.2.4. Top Disturbance Alarms 
Definition: 
All Disturbance alarm activations in the reporting period.  The top 10 alarms based on 
total number of activations is listed.  Further processing of the list will include: 
 The alarm count percentage – i.e. the total count for each alarm expressed as a 
percentage of the total alarm activations for the reporting period 
 The alarm count cumulative percentage – i.e. the cumulative percentage of the 
alarms working down the list from highest count to lowest count. 
The Top Disturbance Alarms should be used to identify equipment that requires maintenance 
investigation. 
6.2.5. Daily Alarm Total 
Definition: 
The total alarm activations requiring an operator response (Priority 1, 2, 3 and 
Maintenance alarms) for each day in the reporting period are totalled and listed. 
The Daily Alarm Total is the key performance metric that drives Alarm System Monitoring.  ISA-
18.2-2009 identifies two metrics for the Daily Alarm Total.  The first is ‘Very Likely to Be 
Acceptable’ at 150 alarms per day, the second is ‘Maximum Manageable’ at 300 alarms per 
day.  The Daily Alarm Total should be below 150 alarms per day, though some exceedances up 
to 300 alarms per day can accepted. 
The alarm management response to the exceedance of the Daily Alarm Total is not directed at 
individual alarms, but it should be used are an overall indicator of the health of the Alarm 
System.  Focus on alarm management should intensify when the ‘Very Likely to Be Acceptable’ 
metric is regularly exceeded. 
6.2.6. Future Alarm Performance Metrics 
Although not currently used as reporting metrics, the following will be considered into the 
future: 
 Standing Alarms (alarm active for more than one shift/24 hours) 
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 Top 10 Alarm Percentage (the percentage of the alarm count made up by the top 10 
alarms)  
 Fleeting Alarms (direct analysis) 
 Alarm Flooding (based on 10 minute intervals) 
 Peak Alarm Rates (based on 10 minute intervals) 
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Appendix A Alarm Management Model with Workflows 
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